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Abstract
The transition from the current electrical power grid towards a smart grid is driven
by new technologies and services. Traditional dedicated power grid components
are exchanged with more powerful and highly conﬁgurable devices that are inter-
connected and help monitoring and controlling the power grid. The power grid is
a critical infrastructure with high dependability requirements. The pervasive use
of information and communication technology (ICT) to support the operation in
the smart grid creates a complex interdependent system in which the dependability
of the ICT systems plays an important role for the overall dependability. Addi-
tionally, interdependent system-of-systems feature new failure modes not found in
simple systems. Therefore, it becomes crucial to understand and address the de-
pendability issues in the smart grid in order not to risk a decreasing dependability
with the introduction of new technology.
The objective of this thesis has been to analyze how the dependability of the
power grid changes with the introduction of smart grid technologies, to propose
new dependability models and propose operational support mechanisms for the
control center to detect and master the expected dependability issues in the smart
grid. The ﬁrst step of the research was to conduct literature studies to ﬁnd new de-
pendability challenges in the smart grid. Based on that, the consequences of these
new challenges are assessed with the help of analytical models and simulations.
My ﬁndings show that there are several challenges such as cascading and es-
calating failures, latent errors and a risk of automation waiting when transitioning
towards a smart grid. The qualitative and quantitative analysis show that these
effects can have a strong impact on the total dependability of the smart grid and
need to be considered. The analysis also shows that smart services like demand
response or automatic detection and isolation of failures can help improving the
dependability if implemented with the right supporting measures. As a conclu-
sion from the analysis, I give a list of guidelines for the control center on how to
address the future challenges. One of the central advices from this thesis to the
electrical utilities is, that they should try to thoroughly understand their speciﬁc
iii
interdependencies by analyzing their systems, processes and organizational struc-
ture. The next step is then to create awareness inside the company and invest in
preparedness and mitigation strategies.
Overall, this thesis contributes to the discussion on new dependability chal-
lenges in the smart grid, the deﬁnition of realistic use cases illustrating how they
might affect the system, the quantiﬁcation of their consequences, and the discus-
sion on how the utilities might address these new challenges.
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PART I
THESIS INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The industrialization and the emergence of the information age has put the elec-
trical power system into a central position in our society. Our daily life depends
strongly on a reliable electrical power supply; a large blackout may lead to prob-
lems in communication networks, in the transportation sector, in the ﬁnancial sec-
tor and basically in any ﬁeld with machinery or equipment relying on supply from
the power grid.
Everything indicates that the electrical power system has to undergo major
changes over the course of the next decades to adapt to new challenges both on
the supply and demand side. On the supply side, we see an increasing use of re-
newable energy sources around the world because of a desire of either reducing
CO2 emissions, stepping down the usage of nuclear energy, reducing energy im-
ports, or a combination of it. The power production with renewable energy sources
is in many cases less predictable than with traditional energy sources making the
operation of the grid more challenging. At the same time, the demand side is also
bound to change in the future. Electrical vehicles are on the rise and increase
both the energy and power consumption of household customers, which change
the load pattern and might push the distribution grid, the low voltage part of the
power grid, to the margins of its capacity. Additionally, it is expected that some
consumers become prosumers, i.e. they possess a small power production facility
in the form of for example photovoltaic cells. A prosumer may choose to supply
or demand power from the grid depending on its needs, its production, and the
current energy price and is changing thereby the load pattern, too.
The mentioned challenges differ between countries but there is unanimity that
they should be addressed by making the power grid smarter, thereby creating
the smart grid. The added smartness refers to an increased use of monitoring and
controlling devices in the power grid, especially in the lower voltage part, allowing
for a more accurate state estimation of the grid and a more detailed control of it.
This opens up for automation of processes and for new services like for example
remote controlling certain loads.
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We can loosely split the smart grid into the power grid and the supporting in-
formation and communication technology (ICT) system. Both depend strongly
on each other’s reliable service: one relies on power supply, the other on monitor-
ing data and a channel to control devices. Together they build an interdependent
system-of-systems. These kind of interconnected systems are not only more com-
plex than more independent systems but because of the mutual interdependencies,
they have additional failure modes as described in Rinaldi et al. (2001).
Already today relies the power grid strongly on ICT for operation. The anal-
ysis of past incidents by Kirschen & Bouffard (2009) shows that these interde-
pendency effects had an important role in several large outages, either they were
partly caused by a failure in the ICT system or a power grid failure was made
more severe because the ICT system ceased to work. Xie et al. (2002) analyzed
disturbances in the US power grid from 1979 to 1995 and state that "problems in
real-time monitoring and operating control system, communication system, and
delayed restoration contribute to a very high percentage of large failures". Be-
cause of the nature of the smart grid, the interdependencies between the two sys-
tems is going to further increase and the question becomes: how can this challenge
be addressed?
1.1 Motivation
Reliability, the term used for dependability in power engineering, has always
played a central role in the power grid. In the future grid, the smart grid, it has
at least the same importance. This is reﬂected by the mentioning of the term reli-
ability in most smart grid reports, for example the European Commission (2006)
states in there vision that smart grids need to be “ﬂexible, accessible, reliable and
economical”. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in the US deﬁnes a
smart grid as follows: “A Smart Grid is one that incorporates information and
communications technology into every aspect of electricity generation, delivery
and consumption in order to minimize environmental impact, enhance markets,
improve reliability and service, and reduce costs and improve efﬁciency” (EPRI,
WEB). I.e. the use of ICT shall improve reliability by means of process automa-
tion, and an increased amount monitoring and controlling infrastructure.
The National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) (2010) analyzes the
beneﬁts of implementing smart grid technologies in a qualitative way and they
ﬁnd positive effects in various areas such as dependability and safety. However, it
is assumed that the technologies function ﬂawlessly when needed or that failures
in the ICT infrastructure have no major impact on the total smart grid dependabil-
ity. But is this true?
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It is difﬁcult to say if the assumption is justiﬁed or overconﬁdent; it needs
further investigation. Experience shows that ICT systems indeed fail and it can be
assumed that they will also do so in the future. In the best case, a failure in the
ICT system/service just negates its positive effects and brings the system to the
same state as before the introduction of that speciﬁc ICT system/service and the
dependability may drop at most to that past level. However, ICT can potentially
fail in more ways than that, for example by sending faulty commands which may
lead to catastrophic consequences. Additionally, the increased interdependencies
introduce new failures as well, as mentioned above. The question is if all this
still leaves a positive dependability contribution of ICT or not? This question
cannot be answered directly because there are many parameters that have to be
taken into account such as properties of the speciﬁc power grid, the ICT system,
their interconnections and interdependencies etc. The North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) is aware of this and states: “The main challenge
for the envisioned smart grid infrastructure is to integrate smart grid devices and
systems while maintaining reliability” (NERC Report, 2010).
What we can state after this introduction is, that a smart grid is more complex
than a traditional power grid and may possess different failure modes. Faulty
ICT systems and interdependency effects between ICT and the power grid have to
be carefully analyzed and they have to be included in the dependability analysis,
otherwise the results may be inaccurate and could lead to false conclusions about
the system.
And as a ﬁnal note: It is probable that the total dependability is increased
by the introduction of some new smart grid technologies based on ICT, but there
is more to dependability than just average values like steady-state availability.
Depending on the speciﬁc scenario, other properties are more important such as
the shape of the distribution, extreme values or the speciﬁc date or time of an
outage. For example, Norwegians heat their households primarily with electricity.
One long outage may have a more adverse effect for the customer than several
shorter outages.
1.2 Note on Terminology
New terms are usually deﬁned whenever they are used the ﬁrst time. The follow-
ing terms take a very central role in the thesis and also the introduction, therefore,
I give some clariﬁcation about them already now.
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1.2.1 Dependability, Reliability, Availability and more
The terms dependability, reliability and availability are used differently in the
ICT domain and in power engineering. In the former, the deﬁnitions of Avizienis
et al. (2004) are widely accepted, which uses dependability as an umbrella term
deﬁned as "the ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more
severe than is acceptable". It comprises several quantiﬁable attributes among oth-
ers availability and reliability, which are deﬁned as "readiness for correct service"
and "continuity of correct service", respectively.
In power engineering the deﬁnitions from IEEE/CIGRE Joint Task Force on
Stability Terms and Deﬁnitions (2004) are widely employed. Reliabilty is used as
umbrella term or similar to availability as deﬁned above. It is expressed through
Adequacy and Security, deﬁned as “ability of the power system to supply the ag-
gregate electric power” and “ability of the power system to withstand sudden dis-
turbances”, respectively. Additionally, the term stability refers to the continuance
of intact operation following a disturbance.
The terms are well deﬁned within their ﬁeld but it can get ambiguous when
the two ﬁelds meet. To avoid confusion, I use whenever possible the former def-
initions by Avizienis et al. (2004), which are used in ICT, even if referring to the
power grid.
1.2.2 Smart Grid
The term Smart Grid is widely used in research, governmental commissions and
newspapers and while there exist various deﬁnitions, most of them resemble each
other. The european technology platform deﬁnes a smart grid for example as “an
electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all users con-
nected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to efﬁciently
deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies.” (European Com-
mission, 2010). EPRI’s deﬁnition, given in Section 1.1, is very similar and has a
similar high abstraction level.
In literature, the term smart grid is generally used in two different ways. First,
it is used to describe a vision for the future power grid. This vision is charac-
terized not by speciﬁc technologies but rather by certain functionalities, such as
active consumer participation, and accommodation of a wide range of different
power generation and storage options (National Energy Technology Laboratory
(NETL), 2009). Visions are usually used to set a direction but it is not expected
to achieve them. Second, the term smart grid is used in a more pragmatic way
to denote the next generation power grid, i.e. the power grid that is going to be
implemented in about 10-20 years, which incorporates certain aspects of the smart
grid vision. Certain authors use two different terms to distinguish between the two
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cases (Vadlamudi et al., 2014), but more often than not the term smart grid is used
without an explicit deﬁnition, often implying the latter deﬁnition. In this thesis,
the term smart grid is mostly used in the latter way, i.e. standing for the future
power grid or the next generation power grid; these terms are used synonymously
with smart grid throughout the thesis.
It is important to note that power grid challenges vary strongly between coun-
tries and continents. The challenges depend on factors such as distribution of
consumer types, consumption patterns, the type of power production, age of in-
frastructure and its reliability, and governmental policies. Therefore, smart grids
may look very differently throughout the world.
1.3 Research Questions
The objective of my research is to understand how the dependability of the power
grid changes with the introduction of the smart grid technologies in order to pro-
pose guidelines for the grid operators, on how to address these new issues and to
be prepared for the future challenges in the smart grid.
This can be broken down into the following research questions leading towards
an answer of the objective:
RQ1 Challenges and Models: What are the new dependability chal-
lenges in the interdependent smart grid and how can they be modeled?
The aim of RQ1 is to describe how the dependability analysis differs between the
current power grid and the smart grid. The focus lies on new dependability threats
and new potential faults that are introduced by the new add-ons to the current
power grid and how they may manifest in the future. The second step is to deﬁne
dependability models, which allow to analyze the smart grid including the new
potential threats. The aim is not to make one big model, but rather to concentrate
on particular threats and model them. The outcome are several models, which can
be used to analyze speciﬁc scenarios.
RQ2 Impact Analysis: What impact do the future challenges have on
the dependability of the smart grid?
The aim of RQ2 is to quantify the impact the new threats and failures have on
the dependability of the smart grid. For this, scenarios depicting relevant future
scenarios are created and analyzed. Additionally, it includes the assessment of
how future smart grid services can contribute to face the future challenges.
The research questions build on each other as shown in Figure 1.1. The out-
come of RQ1 is a number of threats speciﬁc to the smart grid and models. RQ2
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Figure 1.1: Relation of the research questions and the overall objective.
can be answered with the help of the new models from RQ1 and based on the re-
sults and their discussion, guidelines can be formulated, thus answering the overall
objective.
1.4 Scope
In this thesis I focus on dependability challenges caused by the interdependency
and interaction of the power grid and the supporting ICT system. Both systems
come from different domains and there is a lot of research about various aspects of
both of them. For the thesis I have to limit myself on a certain aspect and choose
a certain abstraction of the systems. I primarily limit myself to the dependen-
cies between the systems because I am most interested in the superordinate new
challenges of the systems. Related topics such as performance analysis and ICT
security are outside the scope of this work.
I use abstraction to hide details that are not of major importance to the study.
For example, the power grid is either considered as a black box supplying power
or only its structure is considered. The dynamics in the power grid such as volt-
age ﬂuctuations are not considered because they are not central for answering the
research questions. In the same way, the ICT system is only considered in as
much details as necessary in the different studies. Details such as protocols are
not included when not needed to analyze the functional dependencies.
The objective is not to develop an all-purpose smart grid dependability model
but rather to concentrate on speciﬁc aspects and services and analyze what changes
they may bring and how the control center may prepare for them.
1.5 Research Method
In order to answer RQ1 I have conducted a broad literature study yielding a list of
potential future challenges, which are then evaluated for their relevance in smart
grid. Subsequently, I have created use cases for the future smart grid based on the
criteria that they both depict an important part of the future grid and illustrate the
effect future challenges can have on systems.
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Depending on the objective and the complexity of the system, I have chosen
different modeling approaches. One of the main problems in modeling is the right
choice of abstraction. The motto as few details as possible but as many as needed
is a good but rather vague guide. I tried to solve this in various ways: modeling
bottom-up or top-down, and also modeling the structure or a speciﬁc process. I
started out with a bottom-up approach, which allows to create a detailed model of
the system and it allows to use state-based and structural models to qualitatively
assess interdependencies in the system. The approach is based on the concept
of errors that are in the system but do not manifest themselves as failures. This
is deﬁned in Avizienis et al. (2004); Laprie et al. (2007) uses it in a smart grid
model under the name latent error. In the context I have used them, these models
remain comprehensible and provide a good basis for discussion. They are only
used to model single components or the whole system in a very high abstraction
level. Thus, the complexity of the model is limited. When using this approach
for modeling a larger system in a quantitative way, issues such as state explosion
occur and have to be solved.
For Paper C and Paper D, I used a top-down approach with focus on the struc-
tural dependability of the systems, considering only the topology and some special
properties of the system. The dynamics in the power grid are ignored, which is a
strong abstraction but it shows what the system can achieve if all the power en-
gineering challenges are successfully met. The structural analysis is conducted
on a real-world regional power grid in Norway. I was provided with the topology
from a utility in our project and digitized it by hand. Information about the power
grid are very sensitive, therefore, I only received the topology without informa-
tion about customer types or consumption and production facilities. In Paper D, I
additionally use random networks with node degree distribution following an ex-
ponential distribution, because it has been indicated by Rosas-Casals et al. (2007)
that the European transmission networks possess this property. I used information
from the Norwegian regulator to make educated guesses as described in the pa-
pers. The analysis itself is then conducted in the form of a Monte Carlo simulation
in Mathematica (Wolfram Research, 2012).
Another high abstraction level is used for modeling the mobile networks in
Paper E. Each network is treated as a black box and is either working or not
working. The reason for this modeling approach is that this is how a subscriber
sees the network, it has no information about the detailed state of the network.
The measurement data from the study by Kvalbein (2013) serve as a starting point.
The dependency between the two mobile networks is given implicitly in the study,
however, its nature is unspeciﬁed as the networks are considered as black boxes
and no details about the networks are known. The relation between the networks
could be modeled as a common cause failure or with load sharing, i.e. in case of a
failure in the ﬁrst network the second network is subject to increased stress due to
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load sharing. I have chosen the former, because statistics on incidents in mobile
network indicate that at least half of the incidents, in remote areas even up to 90 %,
are caused by power failures or failures in a leased line (Følstad & Helvik, 2011).
Those failures can potentially cause a simultaneous failure in another network and
thereby a common cause failure.
Paper F and Paper G analyze each a speciﬁc process in the power grid and for
the modeling I use SAN (stochastic activity network (Sanders & Meyer, 2001))
and a Markov model, respectively. SAN is an extension of stochastic petri nets
and has the advantage, that it can prevent state explosion issues by hiding details
in a comprehensible visual model. It remains readable even when considering
multiple failures like in my study. The model cannot be solved directly, though. I
use the Möbius tool (Clark et al., 2001) to simulate the model and get the results.
Theoretically, it would have been possible to model and solve it with a Markov
model, but that had been very complex with that many states. I used the Markov
model in Paper G where there is only one failure. That way, I got analytical results
and did not need to use SAN and simulation.
1.6 Included Papers
The following papers have been produced during the PhD study period and aim
to answer the listed research questions. These papers are included as Part II in
this thesis. Note that some of the papers may have been subject to minor editorial
changes since their publications.
• Paper A:
Interdependency Modeling in Smart Grid and the Inﬂuence of ICT on
Dependability
Jonas Wäﬂer and Poul E. Heegaard
In Thomas Bauschert (Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Vol. 8115.
Advances in Communication Networking (pp. 185-196), Springer, 2013
This paper discusses the interactions between power grid and ICT com-
ponents on a high level and serves as a common foundation for the other
papers. We start bottom-up with the components constituting the smart grid
and give a categorization based on their use of ICT. We then give state ma-
chines for the components and services and explain their interactions from
a dependability perspective. Further, we discuss the positive and negative
effects ICT can have on the dependability of the system. Finally, we intro-
duce a meta-model which incorporates the information about the states of
the components and services to create a state estimator for the smart grid
considering ICT and power components.
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• Paper B:
ACombined Structural and DynamicModelling Approach for Depend-
ability Analysis in Smart Grid
Jonas Wäﬂer and Poul E. Heegaard
Proc. 28th ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC), Coimbra, Por-
tugal, March 2013
In this paper, we show how reliability block diagrams, pivotal decompo-
sition and Markov models can be combined to exploit the complementary
advantages of structural and dynamic models. In particular, we show how a
Markov model can be used during the pivotal decomposition to include de-
pendencies between entities, limited repair facilities, and other system dy-
namics in reliability block diagrams. This permits the qualitative and quan-
titative analysis of some classes of problems which are commonly solved
only by simulation because the analytical solution is not feasible with the
traditional models or are too complex. Further, we show how our approach
can be used to assess the dependability in smart grids.
• Paper C:
Structural Dependability Analysis in Smart Grid under Simultaneous
Failures
Jonas Wäﬂer and Poul E. Heegaard
Proc. IEEE Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), Vancouver,
Canada, October 2013
In this paper, we consider simultaneous failures in the network and explore
how network percolation can be used for structural dependability analysis
of the future power grid. We introduce new measures taking fundamental
properties of the power grid into account, i.e. the connectivity between con-
suming nodes and power sources on the one hand and balancing the con-
sumption and production in connected network components on the other.
The measures are used in scenarios with random failures and intentional
failures. The results are compared with the Largest Component measure
and analyzed for their suitability for dependability and survivability analy-
sis. Further, we show how to use these new measures to quantify the poten-
tial increase in dependability by using Demand Response and Distributed
Energy Resources for the mitigation of the studied simultaneous failures.
• Paper D:
Quantifying Inﬂuence of Strategies and Network Properties in Repair-
ing Simultaneous Failures in Smart Grid
Jonas Wäﬂer and Poul E. Heegaard
Proc. Norsk Informatikkonferanse (NIK), Fredrikstad, Norway, Nov. 2014
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In this paper, we continue the work from Paper C and analyze and compare
several repair strategies to recover from simultaneous failures and quantify
their performance during the repair time. In order to evaluate the different
repair strategies we introduce a quantiﬁcation method based on the accumu-
lated cost of energy not delivered (CENS) during the repair. We consider
the scenario in which the failure only affects the power grid and leaves the
ICT system completely unaffected, i.e. the control center has the full infor-
mation about the state of the whole network. We study how changes in the
network, namely increasing the average node degree or increasing the num-
ber of power sources affect the repair costs. Further, we interpret our results
in the advent of the smart grid services Demand Response and Distributed
Energy Resources. And ﬁnally, we show how the results can be used for a
survivability analysis.
• Paper E:
How to Use Mobile Communication in Critical Infrastructures: A De-
pendability Analysis
Jonas Wäﬂer and Poul E. Heegaard
In Floor Koornneef, Coen van Gulijk (Eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer
Science: Vol. 9338. Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security,
Springer, 2015
In this paper, we suggest several alternatives on how a power utility may use
mobile communication; we single out the four main future challenges and
analyze how the alternatives are inﬂuenced by them. After this qualitative
analysis we analyze the availability of the alternatives quantitatively based
on measurement data from a Norwegian study. And ﬁnally, we analyze the
availability improvement when equipping the base stations in the mobile
network with more battery capacity.
• Paper F:
Interdependency in Smart Grid Recovery
Jonas Wäﬂer and Poul E. Heegaard
Proc. 7th International Workshop on Reliable Networks Design and Mod-
eling (RNDM), Munich, Germany, Oct. 2015
In this paper, we focus on the interdependency between the power grid and
the supporting ICT systems during the recovery process. We take a sur-
vivability approach in which the study starts the moment the system fails
and ends with its full recovery. The recovery process is split into several
phases and the interdependencies between power grid and ICT systems are
analyzed step-wise for all of them. Based on this, we propose an analytical
model for the recovery phase. First, it is used to investigate the potential of
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automation and additional battery supply in the communication network to
delay the interdependency effects between the systems. Second, it is used to
analyze scenarios with different degrees of battery support, automation and
number of repair crews, under high, medium and low frequency incidents.
Finally, we discuss the impact of automation on the needed skill set for the
repair crews and its implications for the recovery time.
• Paper G:
Managed Dependability in Interacting Systems
Poul E. Heegaard, Bjarne E. Helvik, Gianfranco Nencioni, Jonas Wäﬂer
In Lance Fiondella, Antonio Puliaﬁto (Eds.), Principles of Performance and
Reliability Modeling and Evaluation. Springer, to be published in 2016
In this chapter, we address the dependability challenges related to complex
system of systems. We discuss how adding automation in critical infras-
tructure inﬂuences the risks both with respect to the consequences and the
probabilities. In order to increase the insight, a dependability modeling
approach is taken, where the goal is to combine and extend the existing
modeling approaches in a novel way. The objective is to quantify differ-
ent strategies for management of dependability in interacting systems. Two
comprehensive system examples are used to illustrate the approach. For this
thesis only the second example is relevant. It builds loosely on paper F and
demonstrates and discusses the consequences of adding more functionality
to a smart grid, both in the distributed entities serving the primary function,
and centralized in the control centre.
1.7 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured in two parts. Part I contains four chapters, including this
one that motivates the thesis and gives the research questions. Chapter 2 presents
the state of the art, Chapter 3 describes the contributions and discusses them and
Chapter 4 contains concluding remarks and thoughts about future research direc-
tions. Part II provides the included papers. The appendix contains explanations
for the formulas used in Paper G. I have chosen to include the papers in the same
template as they were originally published. This results in a better recognition
effect for readers having read the papers previously.
13
14
CHAPTER 2
State of the Art
In each of the included papers there is a section about the relevant related work
for that speciﬁc study. In this chapter, I give an aggregated overview over the state
of the art for the whole thesis. It is structured in two main parts: challenges and
modeling and analysis.
2.1 Challenges and Modeling
The last years have seen an increase in research in complex systems. Several
authors stress that when a system becomes more complex, the failures do not
only increase linearly with the size but rather, systemic risks are increased. Hel-
bing (2013) notes that “complex systems have additional problems” caused by
their interdependencies. He adds that protection measures are not implemented
because of “insufﬁcient theoretical understanding and, consequently, wrong pol-
icy decisions”. Little (2002) looks at critical systems in general and notes that
“many problems will occur simply due to the complexity of these systems” and
Amin (2000) notes that “conventional mathematical methodologies that underpin
today’s modeling, simulation, and control paradigm are unable to handle their
complexity and interconnectedness”. These papers discuss the matter on a high
level, and conclude that the challenges of complex systems lie in the different
behavior of these systems and that a thorough analysis is crucial to prepare for
the future challenges. They also state the problem that current models do not in-
clude these interdependencies; for the analysis they either have to be created from
scratch or existing models need to be adapted.
2.1.1 Modeling Complex System
The power grid, and even stronger the smart grid, is an instance of a complex
system. However, the dependability and reliability analysis of power grids has
traditionally not included the state of supporting ICT infrastructure (Bose, 2010;
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Kirschen & Bouffard, 2009; Singh & Sprintson, 2010) and thereby ignored the
inﬂuence the interdependencies between systems can have. Kirschen & Bouffard
(2009) present an interdependency model for the power grid that illustrates how
ICT and the power grid inﬂuence each other. In this model, depicted in Figure 2.1,
both ICT and power grid have a binary state variable and can either be in a normal
or abnormal state leading to a four-state model. It illustrates that, in addition to the
traditional failure paths, the power grid can also fail as a consequence of an ICT
failure. Being in the Informationally Abnormal State the failure probability for
the power grid is different than in the Normal State. If the state of the ICT system
is not considered, then this is ignored. In the paper they also give a list of past
incidents, where the interdependency played a role. The model is very conceptual
but can illustrates the main challenges.
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Figure 2.1: Four-state model showing the interdependency between ICT and
power grid (based on model from Kirschen & Bouffard (2009)). The transitions
marked with 1 , 2 and 3 represent a cascading, escalating and common cause
failure, respectively.
A classiﬁcation of particular types of failures which are caused by the interde-
pendency of systems is put forward by Rinaldi et al. (2001). Failures are classiﬁed
as cascading, escalating and common cause failures depending on the interaction
of the systems. A cascading failure is deﬁned as a failure in one system that
causes an undesired event or failure in another system. An escalating failure is
when an existing failure in one system escalates an independent failure in another
system. And a common cause failure is a simultaneous failure in several systems
caused by an external event or a failure of a shared resource or service. Figure 2.1
shows possible transitions of these failures in the four-state model. The transition
marked with 1 is an example of a cascading failure, a failure in the power grid
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that leads to a failure in the ICT system. This could be a power outage, the ICT
system is not provided with power anymore and stops working. The transition
2 is an example of an escalating failure. In this case the ICT system was in the
abnormal state, i.e. not working properly when an independent power grid failure
happened. The latter failure is escalated by the failure in the ICT system. An ex-
ample for that is a conﬁguration error in a control system. When an independent
power failure happens, the control system may react in the wrong way because of
the error and escalate the already existing failure even more. The transition 3 is
a common cause failure, for example caused by a storm affecting both the power
grid and ICT infrastructure at the same time.
These three failure types are speciﬁc to interdependent systems and do not ex-
ist in simple systems. They are important causes for the additional challenges in
the smart grid. Rinaldi et al. (2001) present in total six different dimensions for
describing infrastructure dependencies. Another dimension that is worth mention-
ing is the dimension labeled as Coupling and Response Behaviour. It describes
how tight or loose and how linear or complex the coupling is. This is an important
point as the dependencies are often loose and complex, meaning a failure in one
system leads only sometimes to a failure in the dependent system and the inter-
action is not always understood that well. The study presents a formal system
for deﬁning dependencies and is written in a way that ﬁts various systems. This
means it can be applied in many different domains such as transportation systems,
agriculture and of course the power system. It leaves the investigator with the task
of studying how these interdependencies manifest in a speciﬁc system.
The discussion of the three failure types in the four-state model shows also the
limitations of the model. While it allows to demonstrate the interdependencies, it
cannot be used for more detailed analysis. There are many more abnormal states
in both systems with very different consequences, in an analysis they have to be
differentiated. Other effects such as a back-and-forth cascading chain cannot be
illustrated with the model.
Some of these problems are addressed by Laprie et al. (2007) presenting a
model including the three above mentioned interdependency failures. They dis-
cuss in some details the interactions and create a model in which both systems
have four to ﬁve different states. The model contains interesting features such as
passive and active latent errors. Passive latent errors in a system are characterized
by a passive malfunction, i.e. the system is not working when needed. Active la-
tent errors lead to undesired actions such as execution of an action without having
received a command. Both are latent errors that reside in a system until they pro-
voke a failure, during this latent phase they might remain unnoticed by the control
center for a long time. Latent errors, sometimes also just called errors (Avizienis
et al., 2004), also exist in power grids, but ICT systems are more prone to such
errors because of additional complexity due to their software components. There-
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fore, these errors are instances of arising challenges brought by the increased use
of ICT. In fact, Rahman et al. (2009) studied critical infrastructures in the US and
came to the conclusion that more than 65% of all reported failures were software
related, including software design, implementation, conﬁguration, malicious logic
fault inserted by an attacker, and authorization violation based on a faulty access
control. These might be originating from a latent error. The model in Laprie et al.
(2007) can be seen as an extension to the four-state model of Kirschen & Bouffard
(2009), where the additional states allow a more detailed description of the system
state. Its strengths lie in the inclusion of the new interdependency effects and the
latent errors. It is still very high-level and the focus is mainly on the failing pro-
cess, the repair process is not covered in the same level of detail. An example for
that is the restoration of a power grid failure caused by a latent error, it is assumed
that the next state is the state in which both systems are completely repaired, how-
ever, errors in the ICT system may be very hard to ﬁx if they concern for example
software bugs or faulty conﬁgurations.
A different way of extending the four-state model was chosen by Panteli et al.
(2013). Their focus lies on the situational awareness, i.e. the potential discrepancy
between the monitored state and the actual state of the system. The model they use
duplicates all the states in the four-state model and adds the awareness information
to the states. This addresses an important issue, which was partially addressed in
Laprie et al. (2007) with the latent states, but it does not signiﬁcantly extend the
way the model can be used. The models have in common, that they describe
some of the future challenges on a high level and they are meant to be used in a
qualitative analysis.
A more practical approach is taken by Utne et al. (2011). They propose a
method for assessing interdependencies of critical infrastructure, focusing on a
step-wise process including both qualitative and quantitative analysis. After deﬁn-
ing an initial event the steps identify interdependencies and perform quantitative
and qualitative analysis. Their method works with cascading diagrams deﬁning
different consequences of the initial event. Kjølle et al. (2012) shows a variation
of this approach and gives a case study in an emergency preparedness context.
Both studies focus on risk analysis, the concrete models used to get a quantitative
result are not speciﬁed or are based on power ﬂow and dependability analysis of
power systems, respectively.
2.1.2 Network Robustness
Research in network robustness has seen a lot of activity in the past years. Studies
include various networks including the internet (Albert et al., 2000; Cohen et al.,
2000) but also the power grids (Albert et al., 2004; Solé et al., 2008; Wang et al.,
2010b). These studies model the simultaneous failure based on percolation theory
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which describes the behavior of the size of the largest connected network compo-
nent after the removal of a fraction of 1− p of the n nodes of a network. A network
component is a part of the whole network in which any two nodes are connected
with a path and which is not connected to other nodes from the network. If a criti-
cal fraction of nodes 1− pc is removed, the largest component collapses for a high
number of nodes. The percolation point pc and the size of the largest component
after a failure of a fraction of 1− p nodes are used as indicators for the structural
vulnerability or robustness. The latter is called Largest Component measure and
p uses usually the whole range from 0 to 1.
In Albert et al. (2004) an additional measure is deﬁned, which takes connec-
tions between consumers and power sources into account. The number of power
sources reachable from each node is counted before and after the incident and the
averaged difference is then called connectivity loss. This measure yields less the-
oretic results as the Largest Component measure, however, it measures only the
change and gives no indication about the absolute number of disconnected nodes
after the incident.
Several previous studies stress the importance of adapting purely topological
measures to the speciﬁc needs of the power grid and extend centrality measures
with electrical parameters such as impedance (Wang et al., 2010a), impedance and
power ﬂow (Arianos et al., 2009), electrical distance, power transfer distribution
and line ﬂow limits (Bompard et al., 2012). They have in common, that they
analyze the relative importance of nodes and lines with the aim to ﬁnd vulnerable
parts of the system.
The study of Buldyrev et al. (2010) goes one step further: Here the authors
include the interdependencies between the power grid and the supporting ICT
network in their model. Both networks are represented as a graph and the mutual
dependencies are modeled as an additional type of link connecting the two net-
works. A failure of a node leads directly to a failure of all dependent nodes, i.e.
they assume a tight coupling between the systems. Their model is based on a cas-
cading failure that goes back-and-forth between the two systems until it reaches a
steady state. They explicitly note the smart grid and a major outage in the past as
a motivation for their model.
All the studies have in common, that they work on a very high abstraction
level and the details of the events stay unclear. The results give information about
some properties of the network but the implications for a power grid are open.
2.2 Analysis
There are a couple of studies about past power grid incidents, which show that
some of the proclaimed future challenges in the smart grid already exist to a cer-
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tain extent in the current power grid (Andersson et al., 2005; Buldyrev et al., 2010;
Kirschen & Bouffard, 2009; Xie et al., 2002). A chain of cascading failures, i.e.
failures in one system that trigger failures in another system, was a major reason
for the large blackout in Italy in 2003 (Buldyrev et al., 2010). An escalating fail-
ure, i.e. independent failures in systems that amplify each other, was an important
reason why the blackout in the US in 2003 could become so large (Andersson
et al., 2005). The analysis of disturbances in the US power grid from 1979 to
1995, to which I have already referred to in the introduction, ﬁnds that problems
in ICT related systems like monitoring and communication systems “contribute to
a very high percentage of large failures” (Xie et al., 2002). Kirschen & Bouffard
(2009) cite more examples in which ICT systems caused or escalated a failure in
the power grid.
ICT will play a bigger role in the smart grid and the control centers have to
include the state of it in their system state. Line (2015) studied how well power
utilities are prepared to handle ICT incidents and found that the risks are often
not addressed well, partly because of a different understanding of the challenges
and different priorities among business managers, IT and control personal. The
study is limited to information security incidents, but the gap between the ICT and
power personal might be similar when looking at ICT dependability incidents.
Bae & Thorp (1999) use a rare event technique to model and analyze a power
system to ﬁnd weak links. The study analyzes latent errors in the protection sys-
tem, which consists of relays throughout the system and is responsible to protect
the system from damage. Each relay has a small controller deciding on its own
if the relay should be opened or not. False operation by the controller can either
lead to damage in the system, if the controller does not open the relay in time or
to additional outages, if the tripping was not necessary. Latent errors, or hidden
failures as they are referred to in this study, are made responsible for escalating
power grid failures in two major outages in 1996.
2.2.1 Structural Analysis
In Solé et al. (2008) the relation of the percolation point pc of 19 european trans-
mission grids is investigated to non-topological dependability measures such as
average interruption time, power loss and energy not delivered. Dividing the grids
into two groups based on their node degree distribution, the authors ﬁnd a corre-
lation between this grouping and the empirical dependability indices.
Wang et al. (2010b) study the percolation point in american power grids and
on IEEE model systems. The study is done for both random and selective node
break down. Using the Largest Component measure they ﬁnd that selective node
breakdowns have a much higher effect on the robustness of the system than ran-
dom node breakdown.
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However, it is not clear yet how to use these results for a dependability anal-
ysis as this Largest Component measure and its percolation point is agnostic to
characteristics of the underlying network.
2.2.2 Cascading Failures
There are several studies analyzing the behavior of interdependent networks on
a structural level. Buldyrev et al. (2010) create a model of two interdependent
networks and study their behavior when removing nodes, i.e. inspired by percola-
tion theory as explained above. They analyze simple networks and interdependent
networks and ﬁnd that the behavior of networks changes when introducing inter-
dependency. In a follow up study Parshani et al. (2011) show that increasing the
number of interconnections and thereby increasing the interdependency between
the systems, leads to a higher vulnerability to random failures. While interesting
on a theoretic level, there is no information about the details causing the cascad-
ing steps and hence, it is not clear if such a scenario is realistic at all. In addition,
the authors use the largest component measure, which gives in my opinion very
limited information about the state of a network.
A similar approach is taken by Svendsen & Wolthusen (2007), the networks
are chosen in a way to match the topologies of the power grid and the telephony
network. The power devices rely on information from the telephony system and
the telephony system relies on power supply from the power grid; a failure of any
node leads to a failure of all dependent nodes. The analysis contains information
about how the power grid and the telephony network react on single and multiple
failures in the power grid. This is done once for a one-way dependency of the
telephony network on the power grid and once for a two-way dependency, i.e.
interdependency. Their results show that the interdependency has a very strong
effect on both networks. Even though this study goes into some details such as
the different topologies and models the interactions between the system nicely,
they fail to motivate why a node in the power grid is disconnected from the grid if
no information is available. Only this tight dependency between the ICT system
and the power grid allows the devastating effect of cascading failures as shown by
them and the two studies mentioned above.
Morris & Barthelemy (2013) also model the power grid as two networks, the
power grid itself and a control network covering parts of the power grid. A prop-
agating failure is modeled by an initial failure that leads to a load redistribution
in the power grid. If the load on a line rises over the maximum capacity, the con-
trol node in an adjacent substation tries to dissipate the excess power and thereby
avoid an overload failure. If it is not successful, the line fails and loads are redis-
tributed in the system, which may lead to a propagation of failures in the system.
The failure is not deﬁned in more details, it could be a latent error, i.e. the system
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is not performing as it should, or simply a situation in which it is not possible to
dissipate the excess power. The cascading failure is then given by power outages
resulting in unpowered control devices and control devices not managing to stop
the overloaded situation.
2.2.3 Adding New Services
According to European Commission (2006) one of the objectives of the smart grid
is to improve the dependability of the power grid with the help of new services
supported by ICT systems. Vadlamudi et al. (2014) analyze 10 smart grid tech-
nologies for their potential dependability contribution. The qualitative analysis
yields for all technologies a reduction of either the frequency of failure events, the
duration of failure events, or both. The improvement comes from, among oth-
ers, additional power generators throughout the network, load control and more
monitoring devices to increase the situational awareness. These technologies rely
heavily on a working and reliable ICT system. Faulty ICT support is not consid-
ered in this study.
Strbac (2008) analyzes the beneﬁts and challenges of demand response (DR),
which is a technology for adjusting the load dynamically depending on the grid
state and is either locally or remotely controlled. He sees beneﬁts for the depend-
ability by using DR to reduce the load in case of a power shortage caused by an
outage in the grid and thereby mitigate the outage temporarily. As a challenge he
notes that the additional ICT systems “increase the complexity of the system op-
eration when compared with traditional solutions”. The challenge is the reliable
operation of this complex system.
The risks are clearly underlined by NERC (NERC Report, 2010). In their re-
port they discuss dependability challenges that arise with the introduction of new
technology. They issue the following warning statement as one of their conclu-
sions: “While the promise of smart grid is, in part, to enhance reliability, if it is
poorly deployed the reliability of the bulk power system could suffer. Therefore, it
is vitally important to ensure the evolution of smart grid does not increase the bulk
power system’s vulnerability, but rather supports industry’s bulk power system re-
liability goals.”. The report does not contain analysis but gives recommendations
on how to proceed. It includes creating new models taking the interdependency
between power and ICT systems into account; which is the aim of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
Contribution and Discussion
In this chapter, I ﬁrst give the contributions to the research questions, followed by
the discussion and the implications for the power utilities.
3.1 Contribution
Figure 3.1 gives an overview over the papers, their relevance to the research ques-
tions, their direct implications on the overall objective and how they relate to each
other.
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Figure 3.1: Overview over the included papers.
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Table 3.1: Dependencies considered in the papers.
Paper Failure Chain Details
ICT →PG PG →ICT
Paper A X X cascading and escalating failures be-
tween PG and ICT
Paper B (x) (x) models could be used for both
Paper C X new failure patterns in PG due to cascad-
ing effect from ICT
Paper D X new failure patterns in PG due to cascad-
ing effect from ICT
Paper E X cascading failure from PG to ICT, plus
common cause failures between mobile
networks
Paper F X X cascading failure from PG to ICT, esca-
lating failure from ICT to PG
Paper G X X cascading failure from PG to ICT, esca-
lating failure from ICT to PG
3.1.1 Contribution to RQ1: Challenges and Models
The contributed papers show how the transition towards a smart grid increases
the interdependencies between the power grid and the supporting ICT systems.
Additionally, they illustrate and discuss how some of these interdependencies look
like in more detail than previously studied and what the resulting challenges are.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the covered dependencies in the papers.
The thesis identiﬁes the following future challenges: cascading, escalating and
common cause failures, higher possibility for simultaneous failures caused by a
cascading failure from the ICT system, passive and active latent errors, and the
risks of automation. They have all been mentioned in the literature before, the
contribution of this thesis is to give concrete examples and investigating them
in more detail including giving use cases with models and then analysing the
implications of them.
Paper A explains on a component level how a failure can cascade or escalate
from the power grid to the ICT system, and vice versa. It shows that the system can
fail in new ways because new interdependencies are introduced in the smart grid,
which create new types and patterns of faults and failures, speciﬁcally: cascading
and escalating failures, and latent and passive errors. The paper presents a way
how to model smart grid entities. The resulting challenge is to recognize the
interdependencies in a given system and create a large model. The paper also
discusses techniques and models for the quantitative analysis, but only on a high
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level as this has to be chosen depending on the speciﬁc use case. The proposed
meta-model is supposed to be used primarily as a condensed state visualization or
for the incident analysis.
Paper B is purely concerned about the use of structural and dynamic models.
Its contribution to RQ1 is the discussion of combination of modeling techniques
to solve some typical issues encountered when using reliability block diagrams.
The remaining papers address speciﬁc use cases. Their main contributions to
RQ1 lie in the description of threats, their manifestation and the modeling part.
The ﬁrst use case is based on a cascading failure from the ICT system to the power
grid. A simultaneous failure in several ICT nodes cascades to the power grid and
creates there a simultaneous failure, thereby increasing the frequency of this type
of failure and changing the failure pattern in the power grid. This use case is the
starting point for both Paper C and Paper D. The modeling and especially the new
measures are the main contribution to RQ1 from these papers.
Paper E focuses on a cascading failure from the power grid to an ICT system,
namely a mobile communication system. Its contributions are, ﬁrst, the discussion
of primary challenges in mobile communication, which a power grid operator
has to consider. And second, the models for the common cause failure in the
mobile networks and the models including battery support for temporary failure
mitigation.
The use case for Paper F and Paper G is based on the recovery process in smart
grids. Part of the contribution here is the process itself, which has an interesting
interdependency with cascading and escalating failures. The main contribution
for RQ1, however, is the modeling of failures in the supporting ICT systems and
the risk curve method to visualize and analyze the change of risks when increasing
the automation of processes.
3.1.2 Contribution to RQ2: Impact Analysis
Paper A analysis the interaction between smart grid components in a qualitative
way. For each state a component can be in, its implication on other components is
analyzed. In addition, it is discussed passive and active latent errors can lead to a
divergence of the perception and the actual state of components.
Paper C analyzes the impact of a simultaneous failure in a typical Norwegian
power grid. It is a purely structural analysis and its contributions to RQ2 are: First,
showing that the network topology and the placements of power plants therein in-
ﬂuences the dependability. As a consequence, the chosen dependability measure
is crucial to assess the state of the system in a detailed enough way. Second, dis-
cussing the very different behavior of the system when changing from random
failures to intentional failures, i.e. deliberate attack on the most crucial parts in
the network. And third, the quantitative discussion of how much the smart grid
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services demand response, distributed energy resources or micro grid may poten-
tially improve the dependability in this context.
Paper D focuses on the performance of repair strategies after a simultaneous
failure. Its main contribution to RQ2 is to show how to select the optimal next
node to repair and that the strategy of choosing this next node has a large im-
pact on the performance and total costs of an outage. The performance depends
strongly on the network topology and network properties such as number of power
grids. An additional contribution is like in Paper C the quantitative discussion on
the improvements potentially achievable with the smart grid services demand re-
sponse, distributed energy resources or micro grid.
Paper E discusses mobile communication as an option for the communication
layer for parts of the power grid. Its contributions are the different alternatives
of how to use mobile communication and how they face the primary future chal-
lenges. Additionally, the availability of all the alternatives are computed based
on Norwegian measurement data. The ﬁnal contribution is the analysis of how
the availability changes when the cascading failure in the mobile network is tem-
porarily mitigated by a limited battery support.
Paper F describes a use case in which a failure not only cascades from one
system to the other, but also comes back to the original system. Its fundamental
contribution is the illustration of a back and forth cascading and escalating fail-
ure in a real system and the discussion of ICT dependency for each phase and
step of the power grid recovery process. Additionally, it analyzes the availability
increase by adding an automatic detection and battery support in the supporting
communication system. Its main contribution, however, is the quantiﬁcation and
discussion of the changing consequences for high and low frequency failures due
to automation and its impact on the role of the repair crews.
The contribution of Paper G for RQ2 is that it puts the potential change of risks
of system due to automation in a bigger context. Additionally, the included smart
grid example discusses the interdependencies during the ﬁrst stage of the recovery
process of the power grid in more details. Its contribution is to discuss how the
introduction of automation reduces the down time per outage but increases the
frequencies of outages, because of malfunctioning ICT. Further, it shows how the
malfunctioning ICT system can partly negate the positive effect of its introduction.
3.2 Discussion
In the following the implications and limitations of the thesis contributions are dis-
cussed. The discussion follows the structure of the two major research questions
and is then completed by implications and guidelines for grid operators.
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3.2.1 Discussion of RQ1: Challenges and Models
The new challenges increase the complexity of the system, which in turn can lead
to even more failures. A study by Norros et al. (2012) discusses that complexity
in systems is a strong driver for human errors, which constitutes the biggest error
type in certain systems (Kuhn, 1997). Paper A can be seen as an introductory
paper describing most of these challenges. It describes the interdependencies on
a component level. I present models for all of the challenges. However, models
always depend strongly on the objective of the study and have to be adjusted for
other studies.
My model in Paper A allows modeling software errors that are difﬁcult to de-
tect and remove, because the removal of a failure does not necessary mean the
removal of an error (Avizienis et al., 2004). This is not covered in the model
presented by Laprie et al. (2007). However, the model is only given for com-
ponents and not for a larger system. The meta-model also presented in Paper A
extends the model from Kirschen & Bouffard (2009) and allows to model pas-
sive and active latent errors. ICT components are more complex than common
power grid components because of the complexity in the software. Therefore, the
concept of errors is important. In general it has a similar application as the four-
state model in Kirschen & Bouffard (2009) but suffers also the same drawbacks,
i.e. longer back-and-forth cascading chains cannot be modeled and it hides a lot
of information. I believe that it can be very useful for situational awareness and
in qualitative analysis especially when supplemented with information about the
individual steps as shown in Paper A and in Paper F.
As a next step, I use a top-down approach to model a simultaneous failure in
a power grid, focusing purely on the structural dependability. The proposed mea-
sure extends the biggest component measure used in many studies such as Solé
et al. (2008) and Buldyrev et al. (2010) and thereby yields more relevant infor-
mation about the robustness of a power grid. This is discussed in more details in
Paper C and to some degree in Paper D. However, it still stays on a high abstrac-
tion level and it gives only a limited view of the grid, but it can be interpreted as
the best case scenario in case of an incident, i.e. when all the other challenges
are met. I choose to work with node failures in the network and do not consider
link failures. This corresponds to the usage in literature. The main reason for me
to use node failures was that statistics from the Norwegian power grid shows that
failures in the substation are more frequent than link failures (ENTSO-E, 2010).
This varies strongly between different countries and it has to be noted that the fail-
ures in the substation usually do not affect the whole substation but only one part.
The assumed node failures are therefore not that frequent. I did analysis with link
failures and the results were similar, however, there is a looser coupling between
link failures and power outages as there are usually alternative routes available.
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The probability of such a simultaneous failure is difﬁcult to quantify. In the
literature the increasing failure is used primarily to assess the robustness of the
structure in a theoretic way and not that much to compute the risk of the failure.
However, there is a certain probability that a simultaneous failure may happen and
it is increasing in the smart grid. In Paper C and Paper D, I give a motivation for
this failure, although it is unlikely that it affects a large number of nodes.
In the last two papers I focus not on the structure but on a process. The in-
spiration comes from other studies that use cascading chains between the power
grid and the ICT system (Buldyrev et al., 2010; Parshani et al., 2011; Svendsen
& Wolthusen, 2007). The coupling used in these studies is very tight and not ex-
plained in details. It is not clear why and how these back-and-forth cascadings
work in detail. In Paper F, I give a speciﬁc example on how a power grid failure
cascades to a part of the ICT system and how this in turn escalates the failure in
the power grid. The cascading chain stops after two steps. It would be interesting
to ﬁnd a realistic longer chain, but it is difﬁcult to do that without introducing
too many assumptions. Assuming a power grid component to fail or stop work-
ing when an ICT component is not working seems to be a very strong assumption.
Utility personal I talked to say that in the current power grid this is highly unlikely,
as the power grid can run blindly for a certain time period. But it is probably pos-
sible to construct a case with future technology or services where the dependency
is higher. The most realistic example of a failure chain is presented in Morris &
Barthelemy (2013). Although, strictly speaking it is mainly a propagating over-
load failure inside the power grid, which the control system tries to stop. It is not
a classical back-and-forth cascading chain as assumed in the papers above.
3.2.2 Discussion of RQ2: Impact Analysis
The qualitative and quantitative analysis of cascading and escalating failures shows
that the risks outlined in Kirschen & Bouffard (2009) are realistic and have a
strong impact on dependability. The different analyses are done for speciﬁc use
cases and it remains unclear what the overall impact would be. The advantage of
use cases is that they are more concrete and utilities can relate to them.
The analysis of the structural dependability in Paper C and Paper D shows
how important it is to include topology in the analysis. If the topology is not
included, the effect of a failure is assessed to be lower than when including the
topological effect. Additionally, when repairing a system, the knowledge about
the topology can reduce the consequences of an outage. The measures play also
an important role. There are many more measures, like for example various cen-
trality measures that are compared in Wang et al. (2010a). The choice depends on
the objective of the study and there is no single best measure. The analysis also
shows that future smart grid technologies and concepts such as demand response,
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distributed energy resources and micro grids may have a strong impact on the de-
pendability of the system. In Paper C and Paper D, I quantify this improvement,
which was proclaimed in Vadlamudi et al. (2014). However, in these examples, I
do not consider a malfunctioning of the new technologies. Passive latent failures
may reduce some of the improvement and active latent failures may even have a
negative effect, as explained in Paper A and Paper G. I did not conduct the anal-
ysis with faulty ICT systems because the focus of these studies was primarily on
the simultaneous failure and in a second step on the potential of new technologies
to improve the dependability. It assumes a best-case scenario in order to show the
possible potential.
The analysis results depend strongly on the input data, this is especially true
for the study on mobile networks in Paper E. I build on the data from Kvalbein
(2013). The two mobile operators from that study have very different up and down
times. One has many failures that are short and in total a low unavailability and
the other has fewer failures with much longer downtimes resulting in a higher un-
availability. These properties guide the recommendations about when to utilize
the different usage alternatives. When considering different operators, these rec-
ommendations will be different. However, the usage alternatives and the models
are still valid.
Introducing new technologies may not only bring advantages but may also
have negative consequences as stated in Heller (2001). My two studies analyzing
the power grid restoration process quantiﬁed this effect. Working with rare events
is difﬁcult as they, by nature, are not happening that often. I chose to use the
survivability approach as explained in Heegaard & Trivedi (2009), in which the
rare events do not need to be estimated, only the consequences are analyzed, i.e.
the system behavior immediately after a failure is quantiﬁed. In Paper F I give
some rough estimate about how often such an event may happen. The aim of
this study is not to get a correct numerical estimate, but to show that such events
indeed exist. In case of the rare events I had to make assumptions about the
reduction of repair crews and the change of repair rates due to missing training
and practice. Those are partly educated guesses. But from the results it can be
seen, that changing the parameters changes the amplitude but not the conclusion.
3.2.3 Implications and Guidelines for Grid Operators
The contributions to RQ1 and RQ2 indicate that the new challenges have the po-
tential to both negatively and positively inﬂuence the dependability of the smart
grid. What are the implications for the grid operators and how can they address
these issues? In the following I list the most important guidelines implied by the
contributions, together with a short discussion. In parentheses I indicate from
which paper the contribution is coming from.
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Create awareness: Be aware of interdependencies and the new failures
and failure patterns
The most important message for grid operators is to understand that the smart grid
has an increased interdependency between the power grid and the ICT system.
Creating awareness for this is of utter importance. All papers address this issue. A
meta-model (Paper A) may be useful to visualize the interdependencies. Different
failure patterns may emerge because of cascading failures from another system,
like for example a higher frequency of simultaneous failures (Paper C, Paper D).
The smart grid is also more susceptible to directed attacks, while this is not the
focus of this thesis, it is worth noting that the impact of a directed attack is much
more severe than random failures (Paper C). Failures may be escalated because
of a failure in a dependent system (Paper A, Paper F and Paper G).
Automation: Be aware of malfunctioning ICT
It might be obvious, but ICT can and will fail at some point. Therefore, it is im-
portant to investigate the effects of a malfunctioning ICT system whenever a new
ICT system is added or a step is automated. Automation may lead to a shorter
down time but at the same time to a higher frequency of failures as there are more
components that can fail (Paper G). The automation may give a higher availability
and lower consequences of frequent failures but it may lead at the same time to
more catastrophic failures in rare events as both more components and more pow-
erful components are involved. Automation has, therefore, to be accompanied by
a careful analysis and additional preparedness measures (Paper F and Paper G).
Modeling: Inclusion of interdependency in dependability model
From the analysis it follows, that it is crucial to include the state of both the power
grid and the ICT system in the dependability analysis (Paper A, Paper B, Paper F
and Paper G).
System analysis: Understand your system and their interdependencies
For a grid operator it is important to know their systems and understand were the
interdependencies lie and how they can manifest. Structural analysis can give im-
portant information about the structural dependability of a network (Paper C and
Paper D). The system also relies on external services such as mobile communica-
tion (Paper E and Paper F). And it is important to analyze interdependencies in
processes, e.g. the recovery process (Paper F and Paper G). There are many more
interdependencies that are sometimes difﬁcult to discover, e.g. the dependency
between different mobile networks (Paper E).
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Preparedness: Be prepared for new failures
The knowledge about the system and its properties can be used to increase the
preparedness. Having the right processes and enough trained people for the in-
cidents is crucial. This is even more important for failures in automated systems
as the personal usually relies on support from the system, which might be down,
and failures are potentially more complex (Paper F and Paper G). Repair strate-
gies should be evaluated and chosen beforehand based on the system properties
(Paper D).
Mitigation: Mitigate a failure that cannot be prevented
If a failure cannot be prevented, it might be mitigated. New smart grid services
such as demand response, distributed energy resources and micro grid might have
a great potential helping to mitigate the impact of a failure (Paper C and Paper D).
In interdependent systems it might also be possible to temporarily prevent the in-
terdependency failure by some means, e.g. installed battery support can allow
to use the communication network for a certain time even without power sup-
ply from the grid (Paper F). Shortening the downtime might prevent the further
cascading or escalation of a failure. The shortening can be achieved by techni-
cal means (Paper F) or by preparedness as discussed above and involves deﬁning
good processes and the right training for the responsible people.
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CHAPTER 4
Concluding Remarks
Properties of the power grid vary strongly between countries and with that the
focus in the smart grid is certainly very different. However, the challenges listed
here should concern all of them because they are based on the increasing use of
ICT.
In my opinion, the most important part is to create awareness about the future
challenges. I believe that easy understandable models like the one presented in
this thesis (Paper A) or from Kirschen & Bouffard (2009) can help to illustrate the
risks to a broader audience. It remains then a matter of taste to choose a model.
The model from Laprie et al. (2007) for example, includes more information, but
in my opinion it is more difﬁcult to grasp than the meta-model I presented in
Paper A. the latter can also be extended by duplicating it and using one to indicate
the actual system state and the other the state as perceived by the control system.
This allows to explain the problem of state awareness. The risk curve ﬁgure used
in Paper F and Paper G is another example that can be used to talk about the risks
on a easy understandable level.
Another good option is to create use cases, which explain step by step how
interdependent systems affect each other and create situations and failures that are
new or more frequent than without the dependencies. Paper F and Paper G do
exactly that but of course there are many more.
An important step is to convince the decision makers about the problem and
get their attention for this topic.An alternative route is via the regulator that could
oblige utilities to assess the system for the future challenges. It is also crucial that
international bodies discuss the risks of the extension of smart grids like it is done
by NERC (NERC Report, 2010).
There are several interesting directions for future research, I am presenting
here the two that are most intriguing to me. The liberalization of the electricity
market and the partial outsourcing of services, e.g. support or operation of ICT
systems, have created new interdependencies. In both cases, the number of actors
increases and with that raises the complexity of the system. Business processes
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are spread across several organizations and companies, which leads to new chal-
lenges. Line (2015) notes for example, that some power utilities seem to rely
almost blindly on ICT contractors to handle possible information security inci-
dents. This is especially true for smaller utilities, which might lack the resources
and the knowledge to operate their ICT systems in-house. Responsibilities might
not be deﬁned clearly enough, particularly in cases of emergency. The level of
preparedness may differ signiﬁcantly between the different parties and affect the
consequences of an outage. A good starting point for the dependability conse-
quences of the liberalization of the electricity market is the article by Antonsen
et al. (2010).
Another relevant topic for the future, which I only brieﬂy touched upon, is
how the knowledge about the system and the usage of new technologies can be
used to minimize the effect of unavoidable failures, i.e. increase the systems sur-
vivability. Nobody can control blizzards or hurricanes, but operators can prepare
themselves for it. One way is by conducting survivability analysis to ﬁnd more
robust working states in which the system can transition once a certain event is
predicted. With modern smart grid technologies there are even more options. For
example, demand response might be used to shift loads away from the predicted
event time and geographical region, and micro grids could be prepared to switch
to independent operation. This leads to less load during the predicted time period
an event occurs and thereby the consequences of the event are reduced. A starting
point for this is the work by Dikbiyik et al. (2014) on proactive disaster protection
in optical backbone networks.
This thesis is a small step towards reliable smart grids; the ﬁeld remains inter-
esting and challenging, not least because the power grid has a central role in our
society and at the same time high dependability requirements.
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Abstract. The smart grid is a complex system consisting of interdepen-
dent power grid and information and communication (ICT) components.
Complex systems have diﬀerent properties than simple networks and give
raise to new risks and failure types. In this paper, we study the dependen-
cies in smart grid and the inﬂuence ICT may have on the dependability.
We start with giving a categorization of the smart grid components and
deﬁne state machines for these categories and for smart grid services.
Then we investigate their interactions and interdependencies from a de-
pendability perspective. Further, we investigate the positive and nega-
tive eﬀects ICT can have on the dependability of the system. Finally, we
introduce a meta-model which incorporates the information about the
states of the components and services to create a state estimator for the
smart grid considering ICT and power components.
1 Introduction
The reliability analysis of power grids has traditionally not included the state
of supporting information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure
[1–3]. However, in the last ten years several authors pointed out the need of
studying the power grid as complex network by including the cyber or ICT part
in the analysis [1, 4, 5]. This complex network is called cyber-physical system or
more general system of systems.
Theoretical results indicate the importance of analyzing the power grid (PG)
and its supporting ICT together in one common model as a system of systems. It
has been shown for interdependent random graphs that system of systems have
diﬀerent properties than simple systems [6]. Additionally, with an increasing
number of interconnections and therefore a higher interdependency between the
systems the vulnerability to random failures increases also [7].
A classiﬁcation of particular types of failures which are caused by the in-
terdependency of systems is put forward by [8]. Failures are classiﬁed as cas-
cading, escalating and common cause failures depending on the interaction of
the systems. Studies of major power grid incidents show that these interdepen-
dency eﬀects between the PG and the ICT already exist in the current power
grid [6,9,10]. A chain of cascading failures, i.e. failures in one system that trigger
failures in another system, was a major reason for the large blackout in Italy in
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2003 [6]. And an escalating failure, i.e. independent failures in the systems that
amplify each other, was an important reason why the blackout in the US in 2003
could become so large [9]. Another analysis of the disturbances in the US power
grid from 1979 to 1995 found that ”problems in real-time monitoring and oper-
ating control system, communication system, and delayed restoration contribute
to a very high percentage of large failures” [10]. The smart grid will rely even
stronger on ICT than the legacy power grid, therefore, it can be expected that
these eﬀects will become even stronger.
The smart grid has the potential to increase the reliability of the power sup-
ply with new services like self-healing and demand response, which may reduce
downtime and increase dependability [11]. However, misbehaving ICT and in-
terdependency eﬀects between ICT and PG have to be analyzed carefully and
included into the dependability analysis, otherwise the results may be inaccurate
and could lead to false conclusions about the system.
An interdependency model for the electricity and information infrastructure
was presented in [12]. Using four to ﬁve diﬀerent states for both infrastructures
the model accommodates the three new failure types of system of systems as
described in [8]. The model contains interesting features like passive and active
latent errors; however, it is very high-level and the repair is not covered in details.
Both power grid and ICT components are repaired in one step at the same time.
In 2009 an interdependency model for the power grid was put forward to
illustrate the eﬀect ICT can have on the reliability of the whole power grid [1].
In this model, both ICT and PG have a binary state variable and can either
be in a normal or abnormal state leading to a four state model. The model is
very conceptual and concentrates mostly on the transitions. Because of the high
abstraction level most details are hidden within the states.
A more detailed approach is taken by [13] by introducing a three-level assess-
ment hierarchical architecture consisting of a device, network and service level.
Each level has its own properties and is modeled individually.
In this paper, we start bottom-up with the components constituting the smart
grid and give a categorization based on their use of ICT. We then give state
machines for the components and services and explain their interactions from a
dependability perspective. Further, we discuss the positive and negative eﬀects
ICT can have on the dependability of the system. Finally, we introduce a meta-
model which incorporates the information about the states of the components
and services to create a state estimator for the smart grid considering ICT and
power components.
2 Components and Services in the Smart Grid
The power grid consists of the power infrastructure on the one hand and of
intelligent devices and a communication infrastructure to control and monitor
it on the other hand. We categorize all components of the power grid into ﬁve
categories as shown in Fig. 1. Category A contains power components with no
communication means and no software like power lines and mechanical power
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Fig. 1: Services and components of smart grids.
devices. Category B contains power components that are conﬁgurable but run
autonomous and have no communication means like certain distributed energy
resources. Category C contains software controlled power components with com-
munication means like intelligent electronic devices used for monitoring and con-
trolling the power grid. Category D contains software controlled communication
components like routers. Category E contains communication components with
no software like communication cables. It is important to note that some devices
can be in several categories like a power cable which is also used as carrier of
a PLC (power line communication) signal. Such structural dependencies can be
the cause for common cause failures.
Devices in the categories B, C and D are in the following called intelligent
devices. Components in A and E are called hardware (HW) components. Power
HW components like power lines and transformers build the physical connections
in the power grid between production sites and loads. The intelligent devices and
the communication HW components are needed to operate the whole grid.
Smart grid services run on top of these components and they need a cer-
tain subset of components and other smart grid services to work. This partial
dependency is called in the following structural dependency. The services are
used to operate the power grid and include power delivery, monitoring, control,
protection and more advanced services like demand response.
The biggest change in the transition from the legacy power grid to the smart
grid will lie in the increase of software capabilities of B and C components and the
quantitative increase of C components. In other words, the components become
more intelligent and there will be more intelligent electronic devices to increase
the system awareness and control, especially in the distribution grid. The latter
will also lead to an increase of D and E devices in the smart grid. Additionally,
the transition to the smart grid will change the power grid services. On the
one hand, they are extensions to existing services like an increased monitoring
and controlling in the distribution grid. On the other hand, they introduce new
functionalities like smart metering or demand response.
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2.1 State Machines for Components and Services
In the following we present state machines for components and services. The
states are on a high level and diﬀerent failure modes are not diﬀerentiated. For
a quantitative analysis separate states for the considered failure modes have to
be created and transition rates or probabilities assigned to the transitions.
Hardware components are modeled with two states as seen in Fig. 2. They
can either be in a working state ok or a failed state F. Repair can happen after
the monitoring system detected a failure or it can happen before when the failure
is only temporary and disappears on its own.
Intelligent devices on the other hand, have a more complex failure behavior.
First, we diﬀerentiate between errors and failures, as described in [14]. A fault
can trigger an error in a device but only when the provided service is incorrect it
becomes a failure. Diﬀerentiating errors and failures allows for example to model
intermittent failures. While the failure disappears for some time, the responsible
error does not. Second, a failure may be either passive (Fp) or active (Fa),
depending on their behavior. We use the following deﬁnition similar to [12]:
passive failure: The device works incorrectly in a passive way, i.e. it does not
respond when needed (e.g. not sending monitoring data, not responding to
a control signal, not triggering a breaker when needed).
active failure: The device works incorrectly in an active way, i.e. it functions
but not as intended (e.g. sending wrong monitoring data, executing the
wrong control command, triggering self-healing when not necessary).
The corresponding errors are accordingly termed passive errors (Ep) and
active errors (Ea). A device may also directly change its state from ok to Fp for
example if parts of the hardware fail.
The devices are controlled by highly capable software which may cause harm
to the system if working incorrectly. Due to the potential complexity of designing,
conﬁguring and updating such devices, faults are likely and errors may reside
undiscovered in a device for a long time. Faults can be unintentional like de-
sign and conﬁguration faults but also intentional like viruses/worms, intrusions
and sabotage. Design, conﬁguration or maintenance errors like software bugs,
erroneous conﬁguration/reconﬁguration or the distribution of a faulty software
update will aﬀect potentially many devices at the same time. Failures may prop-
agate on their own like in the case of a virus or a worm. The degree of the
spreading depends on the detection and repair time.
The state of smart grid services may depend on the working and operational
state of certain components, their structural dependencies, other services and on
the input or the situation the system is in. The working states of a component are
the states described above, the operational states are states in normal operation
which can have an inﬂuence on a service. For example an open breaker which
was opened by an undetected failure in an IED may cause the disconnection
of parts of the grid and a state change for a service. The reason for the state
change is the operational state of the breaker and only indirectly a failure. A
service is said to be in the failed state F if the service produces incorrect output.
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Fig. 2: State machines for components and services and the perception of their state
in the monitoring system.
If components fail which are necessary to create correct output but the output
itself is not yet incorrect, then the service is in the error state E. For example,
consider a protection service which is responsible for opening breakers in a high
overload situation. This service relies on protection devices installed throughout
the power grid. The failure of one of these devices is already critical if there are
no redundant devices. However, as long as there is no overload in which this
speciﬁc device is needed to operate the service does not produce wrong output,
hence the service is in the error state E while the device itself is in a failed state.
In the error state the failure probability is much higher than in the working
state. It is not the same as a failed state because for dependability analysis this
state is considered as not failed. The monitoring system may detect the device
failure and initiate the repair before the service fails.
2.2 Interactions
The components and services are highly depending on each other. The transitions
between the states depend theoretically on the state of all the other components
and services at a given time. For practical analysis of large systems the states
may be modeled as depending only on the state of a subset of all components
and services which are either geographically or logically close. In the following,
we discuss the inﬂuence components can have on other components or services
depending on their states.
Inﬂuence of HW Components
F A failure may increase the load on other HW components and the probabil-
ity for them to fail. This is especially the case for power HW components.
Intelligent components may fail if a power HW component fails and there is
no other power source (transition into Fp).
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Inﬂuence of Intelligent Devices
Ea and Ep Errors have by deﬁnition no eﬀect on other components.
Fa An active failure may cause a change in the operational status in another
component, e.g. opening a breaker, increasing power production instead of
decreasing. This may lead to a critical situation and eventually even to a
hardware failure or a service failure. An active failure may also cause errors
and failures in other ICT components, e.g. by spreading harmful conﬁgura-
tion or virus. It can also cause a smart grid service to not function properly.
Fp A passive failure may cause a smart grid service to not function properly
because for example necessary information is not delivered or information is
not received and processed by the component. A passive failure may also lead
to a failure in a power grid HW component, e.g. by not alarming the control
center about a critical situation which could lead to an overload failure.
Inﬂuence of Services
E An error has by deﬁnition no eﬀect on other components or services.
F A failure can cause problems for the components or services relying on the
output of this service. It may provoke a critical situation end eventually even
to a failure in a component. For example, if the service demand response is
increasing the loads instead of decreasing. If this happens in a distribution
grid with a high number of charging electrical vehicles it could lead to an
overload in that particular area and eventually even to a blackout, i.e. a
failure of the power delivery service.
2.3 Perception of Components and Services
The monitoring system has its own perception of the system which is not the
same as the actual state of the system. This is because the monitoring system
is also just a service which can fail. The monitoring system can either indicate
failure or no failure. The error states are considered as no failure as the delivered
service is per deﬁnition still correct. As shown in Fig. 2 the indication can be
wrong, i.e. be a false positive if a failure is indicated when there is none or be a
false negative if no failure is indicated when there is indeed one.
The deviation of the indication in the monitoring system from the actual
state is critical. If false positives are frequent it may cause high costs for the
clariﬁcation of the cause and eventually to a loss of trust. False negatives may
prolong the time a component or service stays in the failed state which decreases
the dependability of the system. The longer a component is in the failed state
the longer the negative interactions described above take place and more state
changes in other components may happen.
2.4 Techniques for Quantitative Analysis
A diﬃculty when modeling the smart grid for quantitative analysis is that it
consists of dynamic parts, i.e. the components with their state machines, and
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structural parts, i.e. the structural dependencies between services and compo-
nents. This becomes clearer when considering the smart grid services. The work-
ing and failed state of a given service may be described by a fault tree, where the
events are failures of components or other services. This fault tree represents the
structural dependency of the given service. The dynamic parts are the diﬀerent
failure modes leading to the events, i.e. failure of components or services.
A straight forward way of quantitatively analyzing a service is by creating
markov models for each individual component and computing with them the
dependability parameters needed for the fault tree. In this way, both availability
and reliability of a service can be computed. However, this method assumes all
events or state changes to be independent which is a very strong assumption and
usually not true in real systems.
A way of including dependencies between components in an analytical model
has been proposed in [15]. It starts with a reliability block diagram, i.e. a struc-
tural model which is equivalent to a fault tree and has the same independence
assumption. The dependencies are then included by either isolating them or by
using a combination of pivotal decomposition and markov chain. This method
is most useful if the number of dependent components is small.
Another solution is to use a stochastic reward net (SRN) [16] which is an
extension of a stochastic Petri net. The state machines from Fig. 2 can be used as
a basis for the SRN in which the individual components and services are modeled
as tokens. The transitions in SRN may be enabled by boolean functions on the
markings of states and the transition rates may also depend on the marking of
states. This allows to create a small model for a complex problem. However,
this holds only if the components or services are treated as anonymous. If the
identity of the diﬀerent components and services become important, the model
becomes more complex as well.
If the two mentioned methods are unpractical then a simulation may also be
used for quantitative analysis.
3 Role of ICT in the Smart Grid
ICT components and services have a large potential for supporting the opera-
tion of a smart grid and increasing its dependability. The software part allows
for smarter decision making processes and the communication allows for sharing
information. Both are important for the most fundamental services: monitoring
and controlling. An optimal monitoring system shows the actual state of the
system with as little delay as possible and minimizes the discrepancy between
perceived and real state. Precise data can help to operate the system in an op-
timal state and reduce errors and failures in the ﬁrst place. For example, exact
monitoring data in the distribution grid may optimize its use, maintenance and
replacement, i.e. not wasting capacity or wearing the infrastructure unnecessarily
out and preventively initiate repair or replacement before an incident happens.
In case of a failure the monitoring service helps to detect and localize the failure.
The reparation time may also be shortened by ﬁnding an optimal repair strat-
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egy, by self-healing or by enabling the repair or mitigation by remote control,
e.g. by isolating a line failure and possibly reconnect disconnected loads by an
alternative route to reduce the impact of the failure.
By aggregating the data from the components new insights can be gained.
For example, by ﬁnding patterns for failures which might improve error and
failure prevention or failure detection. With a wide-area monitoring and control,
enabled by communication, the optimal strategy for operation can be found for a
certain area or the whole grid and not only for the local component. In case of an
incident a coordinated protection or isolation scheme may prevent a propagation
of the failure in the system.
While ICT can help to improve dependability, it can also have a negative
eﬀect. Passive failures in monitoring lead to a mismatch between perception and
reality. A critical situation or failure may not be detected due to the missing data.
In a controlling service a passive failure in a component leads to the disregard of
the control signal. If no acknowledgment message is used this stays undetected
and a mismatch between the assumed state of the component and the real state
arises.
Passive failures reduce the potential improvement of ICT. The total failure of
an ICT service nulliﬁes its eﬀect and intuitively one may conclude that additional
ICT services will either improve the dependability of the whole system or at
least keep the status quo. However, this is a dangerous conclusion because of
two reasons. First, if services or controllers blindly rely on the service a passive
failure may have a worse eﬀect as not having the service at all. In the former
case there is a strong assumption that the service works correct, in the latter
case there is no correctness assumption and nobody is left with a false sense of
security. Second, active failures may trigger new failures which would not exist
without the speciﬁc service or ICT component.
Active failures in monitoring lead to a mismatch between perception and
actual state and eventually even to undesired decisions and actions. For example,
wrong information about the status of a breaker or the load of a line can trigger
the isolation of a power grid part and lead to an unnecessary outage. Active
failures in controlling lead also to a mismatch of perception and actual state but
have in addition a direct eﬀect on some components. Examples are protection
devices initiating a protection process, breakers opening or closing, or the sending
of wrong control signals. Frequent active failures of ICT components may negate
the positive eﬀect ICT can have and lead to an overall negative eﬀect.
Last but not least, ICT plays a big enough role in the smart grid to qualify it
as system of systems, which have particular interdependency eﬀects and failure
types, i.e.Cascading Failure, Escalating Failure, and Common Cause Failure [8].
4 Aggregated view for the Control Center
In the legacy power grid the control centers for the power grid and the commu-
nication system are usually separated. However, as new failure paths emerge in
the smart grid which originate in or include ICT components, it becomes crucial
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Fig. 3: Meta-model for smart grid.
to incorporate the information of both into the state estimation of the whole
smart grid. This allows an early detection of possible failures coming from the
ICT components.
In the following, we propose a meta-model to describe the state of the whole
system for the control center. The meta-model is an aggregation and interpreta-
tion of the information from the monitoring system to determine the criticality
level of the system. It has two axis using the states of the power grid (PG) and
the ICT, see Fig. 3. The most important service in the power grid is the power
delivery to the customers. The state of this service plus the state of supporting
components are used to determine the power grid (PG) state. On the other hand,
the states of ICT components and services are used together with a logic which
indicates which services are critical to determine the state of the ICT system.
The model follows a service-centric approach. Failure means a service is not
delivered correctly and action has to be taken immediately. Excited means that
the service may run soon into a critical situation. More detailed, the states of
the two axis are deﬁned as:
PG ok: The system operates normally.
PG Excited: All customers are powered but the system is excited (N-1 redun-
dancy is harmed, the load is critical, etc.)
PG Failure: At least one customer is disconnected from the power supply.
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Fig. 4: Events in ICT and PG during an escalating failure in the US in 2003 as seen
by the control center. The black disks indicate the information about the events as
it happened. The white disks show how it could have been with a working detection
mechanism, may be stopping the chain after event 1 or 2.
ICT ok: The ICT system operates normally.
ICT Excited: All critical ICT services are delivered correctly but the system
is excited (non-critical components failed, congestion in the system)
ICT Failure: Some critical ICT services are incorrectly delivered.
The nine states are then created by the intersections of this two axis. Both
excited states denote states of the system where the corresponding system is still
working correctly but the stability and robustness is decreased. They are a key
factor in the meta-model because the system may be much weaker than in the
failure-free state and failures may propagate.
The states are as perceived by the control center and can be wrong as dis-
cussed above. These monitored states should be as close to the real states as
possible. The fast detection of failures reduces the risk that the failure can prop-
agate or cascade to other components. Monitoring should also be reliable to
reduce the risk of having false positives and false negatives.
The meta-model is a highly condensed view of the whole grid to create a
clear and easy understandable warning system. Due to the aggregation it is
highly scalable. In large systems or in presence of autonomous structures like
micro grids it may be useful to use several meta-models.
4.1 Applications
The primary application for the proposed meta-model is the state indication
of the smart grid for the control center as explained above. However, there are
additional applications.
In ex post incident analysis the meta-model can be used to show the basic
cause and eﬀect chains in a clear way and study alternative scenarios. In Fig. 4
we give an example of such an analysis by showing the events of an escalating
failure in the US in 2003 [9]. In short, several generators had an outage, which
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led to a tripping of several lines. When that happened, the energy management
systems (EMS) of the two responsible network operators were not fully functional
and the failure could propagate in the PG and ended in a voltage collapse and a
blackout spanning several federal states. In the ﬁgure, the black disks indicate the
information the control center had during the events. The control center knew
about the reduced functionality of the EMS but did not learn about the outage
in the power grid until it was too late. The white disks indicate the information
the control center would have had if the monitoring system had worked. The ﬁrst
outage could have been detected and the failure perhaps isolated which could
have stopped the chain of events.
As an extension of the ex post incident analysis the meta-model can also
serve as a tool to visualize and illustrate interdependencies in two systems. The
new failure types propagation, escalation and common cause failures can be
explained in an intuitive way and new failure paths are revealed.
5 Conclusion
The wide introduction of ICT changes the way the smart grid may fail. It is
necessary to consider the states of both the ICT and the PG in the dependability
analysis due to the following reasons:
– Dependability analysis for smart grid services yield inaccurate results if the
possible non-functioning or malfunctioning of ICT is not included. ICT can
have special dynamics like failure propagation within the system and active
latent errors, which can have a strong eﬀect on the smart grid.
– ICT plays a big enough role in the smart grid to qualify it as system of sys-
tems, which introduces particular interdependency eﬀects and failure types.
In individual models it is diﬃcult to include those.
In this paper we categorized the smart grid components and services and
showed the interactions between them. We motivated that their state and espe-
cially the state of the ICT components and services will play an important role
in the dependability analysis of smart grids. We proposed a meta-model which
takes this into account and combines the states of ICT and power grid compo-
nents and services. It can be used as a tool for the control center to estimate the
state of the smart grid. The proposed meta-model facilitates the understand-
ing of the mechanisms of previous incidents by tracing their trajectories in the
model. The simple structure creates an intuitive model that allows explaining the
interdependencies and new failure types that are created by connecting systems.
Understanding the risks is the ﬁrst step to make a system more dependable and
secure.
This work is meant to generally describe dependencies in the smart grid
and to create a basis for future work. Future work will focus on speciﬁc inter-
actions and interdependencies of components and services. We are especially
interested in studying the new failure modes and evaluating and quantifying the
dependability eﬀects of new smart grid services.
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Abstract—The pervasive use of information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) in the future power grid introduces
new dependencies and new failure patterns. The simultaneous
failure of several nodes may become more likely as devices get
more complex and increasingly interconnected. Several studies
investigated the behavior of power grids under simultaneous
failures. However, the commonly used measure to quantify the
outcome is agnostic to important characteristics of the power
grid and its interpretation for dependability analysis remains
unclear. We introduce two new measures which take the most
fundamental characteristics of the power grid into account: the
connectivity to power sources and the balancing of load and
production. We analyze the two measures in scenarios with
random and intentional node failures and conclude, that they are
suitable for structural dependability and survivability analysis
of power grids. Further, we use the new measures to quantify
the potential dependability increase when using the smart grid
services Demand Response (DR) and Distributed Energy Resources
for failure mitigation. We ﬁnd that a load reduction with DR
by 20% may already achieve a large part of the possible
dependability increase with Demand Response.
I. INTRODUCTION
The future power grid will rely strongly on information
and communication technology (ICT). Most proposed smart
grid services build on a high density of intelligent electronic
devices (IED) throughout the power grid and on a ﬂexible
communication platform [1]. This increasingly pervasive use
of ICT enables new services and may increase the depend-
ability of the future power grid [2], but it also increases the
dependency on ICT and changes the way how dependability
of power grids has to be assessed [3]. Failures in the future
power grid may have their origin in failed ICT services. This
chain of cause and effect is not new [4], [5] but it will have
an even stronger impact in the future power grid.
IEDs contain embedded systems which may be highly con-
ﬁgurable and together with the communication infrastructure
it builds a system not unlike already deployed ICT systems.
Highly conﬁgurable ICT systems are prone to human failures
as indicated in the study of the US public switched telephone
network where more than 50% of the failures were caused
by humans by wrong maintenance, conﬁguration or accidents
[6]. Human made failures may be caused among others by the
complexity of large networks with its various technical con-
cepts, historically grown solutions, and its continuous renewal
of technology [7]. Another study of critical infrastructures
in the US comes to the conclusion that more than 65% of
all reported failures were software related, including software
design, implementation, conﬁguration, malicious logic fault
inserted by an attacker, and authorization violation based on
a faulty access control [8]. If these failures happen in IEDs it
may lead to a failure in the power grid. Moreover, it is likely
that several elements in the power grid are affected as they
may have the same conﬁguration or software implementation.
Studies on ICT networks indicate indeed that failures are not
independent but rather correlated [9]–[11]. The reason may be:
• structural: subsystems share a common service or infras-
tructure (e.g. same conﬁguration, sharing software update
mechanism or using identical hardware)
• dynamic: a failure of one subsystem increases the stress
on other subsystems
• epistemic: failures remain unobserved until a certain
threshold is reached.
Correlated or simultaneous failures have been studied in
various networks including the internet [12], [13] and power
grids [14]–[17]. These studies model the simultaneous failure
based on percolation theory which describes the behavior of
the size of the largest connected network component after the
removal of a fraction of 1− p of the n nodes of a network. A
network component is a part of the whole network in which
any two nodes are connected with a path and which is not
connected to other nodes from the network. If a critical fraction
of nodes 1−pc is removed, the largest component collapses for
a high number of nodes. The percolation point pc and the size
of the largest component after a failure of a fraction of 1− p
nodes are used as indicators for the structural vulnerability
or robustness. The latter is called in the following Largest
Component measure and p goes usually from 0 to 1.
In [16] the relation of the percolation point pc of 19
european transmission grids is investigated to non-topological
reliability measures like average interruption time, power loss
and energy not delivered. Dividing the grids into two groups
based on the node degree distribution, they ﬁnd a correlation
between this grouping and the empirical reliability indices.
However, it is not clear yet how to use this results for a classic
dependability analysis as this Largest Component measure
and its percolation point is agnostic to characteristics of the
underlying network.
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In [14] an additional measure is deﬁned which takes connec-
tions between consumers and power sources into account. The
number of power sources reachable from each node is counted
before and after the incident and the averaged difference
is then called connectivity loss. This measure yields less
theoretic results as the Largest Component measure, however,
it measures only the change and gives no indication about the
number of disconnected nodes after the incident.
Several previous studies stressed the importance of adapting
purely topological measures to the speciﬁcs of power grids and
extended centrality measures with electrical parameters like
impedance [18], impedance and power ﬂow [19], electrical
distance, power transfer distribution and line ﬂow limits [20].
They have in common that they analyze the relative importance
of nodes and lines with the aim to ﬁnd vulnerable parts of the
system.
In this work, we explore how network percolation can
be used for structural dependability analysis of the future
power grid. We introduce new measures taking fundamental
properties of the power grid into account, i.e. the connectivity
between consuming nodes and power sources on the one hand
and balancing the consumption and production in connected
network components on the other. The measures are used in
scenarios with random failures and intentional failures. The
results are compared with the Largest Component measure
and analyzed for their suitability for dependability and sur-
vivability analysis. Further, we show how these new measures
can be used to quantify the potential increase in dependability
by using Demand Response and Distributed Energy Resources
for the mitigation of the studied simultaneous failures.
II. MEASURES
The quantiﬁcation of the outcome of a failure in f of the n
nodes can be done in different ways. The mentioned Largest
Component measure is used widely. However, it relies entirely
on the abstract indicator largest component and it is not
immediately clear how to relate this to realistic dependability
analysis. One may argue, that a power grid operator will
not worry about the size of the largest component after an
incident but rather about the number of customers experiencing
a blackout.
We introduce two new measures which can be seen as an
adaptation of network percolation to the needs of power grid
dependability analysis. The main difference is, that all nodes of
the network are considered, no matter how many components
there are. All nodes are categorized as alive or not alive and the
sum of all alive nodes gives then a dependability measure for
the power grid. The deﬁnition of alive is done on power grid
speciﬁc properties as explained in the next two subsections.
After an incident the network may be split into several
network components. In the best case, all of the network
components manage to pursue its operation independently in
an island mode. In order to do that, several requirements have
to be fulﬁlled. In the following we concentrate on the most
fundamental ones: the structural requirements.
A. Connectivity to power sources
The most fundamental requirement for a grid component to
run as an island is, that it contains power sources, otherwise
all its nodes experience a black-out. Using this key property
of power grids a measure called Connectivity can be deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 1 (Connectivity). Connectivity counts the number
of alive nodes, i.e. nodes for which:
1) There is a path between the node and a power source.
The measure indicates the number of nodes which could
potentially be supplied with energy without repairing any parts
of the network.
B. Balancing production and load
The next requirement for a network component to survive
as an island is, that the production capacity is high enough
for the load of the connected nodes. It is assumed, that if the
total load of a speciﬁc component is smaller than its maximal
production capacity, the component may stabilize and continue
operation as an island. If the load is higher than the maximal
production capacity, it is assumed that breakers will open and
disconnect loads until the total load of this network component
is small enough.
In other words, the Connectivity measure is extended to
consider also the production capacity of grid components.
Deﬁnition 2 (Balancing). Balancing counts the number of
alive nodes, i.e. nodes for which:
1) There is a path between the node and a power source.
2) There is enough power production capacity for that
speciﬁc node in the component. If the total production
capacity of a component is too small for all the nodes,
the number of alive nodes is continuously decreased by
one until the load of the alive nodes is smaller or equal
to the production capacity of the network component.
The reduction of alive nodes can be done according to
different strategies. We use a strategy that maximizes the
number of supplied nodes. Other strategies could minimize the
load not delivered or include priorities for critical customers
like hospitals.
The measure indicates the number of nodes in the whole
network which could be supplied with power in their respec-
tive component. The steps and the time used to increase the
production to its potential and, if need be, to reduce the number
of alive nodes, is outside of the scope of structural analysis.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. System Description and Modeling
The network used in this paper is based on a typical
medium-sized regional grid from Norway with voltage lev-
els 66 kV and 132 kV. It consists of transformer stations
connecting to both the distribution grid and the transmission
grid, power plants and interconnection points to other regional
grids. We model it as a network with 104 nodes and 124
links, as depicted in Fig. 1. It is assumed that there exist
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Fig. 1: Network based on typical medium-sized regional grid
in Norway with an example simultaneous failure in 2 nodes
(marked with grey disks). The resulting network is split into
5 network components after the failure (marked with red).
no other connections between the nodes than those depicted.
Power sources are modeled by adding a production capacity
to some nodes. For simplicity reasons, those nodes are in the
following called power sources, even though several smaller
power sources in the distribution grid could constitute the
production capacity.
The modeled network has an average node degree of 2.38
which is higher than the node degrees of all 19 european
transmission grids studied in [16]. The reason appears to be
the higher node degrees of transformer stations in urban areas.
The considered incidents are simultaneous failures of f of
the n nodes in the power grid. The nodes are modeled with
a binary state, either the whole node is alive or it failed.
Link failures are not included in our model because the main
contributor for simultaneous failures is assumed to lie in the
intelligent electronic devices (IED) in the nodes and not the
links itself. Already today are failures in substations more
frequent in the Norwegian power grid [21], however, the ratio
failures of links/failures in substation varies strongly between
different nations. It is important to note that the measures that
will be discussed are agnostic to the failure cause. Test runs
including link failures indicate similar results as for pure node
failures.
The aim is to conduct a structural analysis of the power grid,
i.e. an analysis of the structure ignoring power engineering
challenges like stabilizing the frequency. Two different sce-
narios are considered. First, failure of f random nodes which
models failures caused by unintentional faults like software
faults, conﬁguration faults or maintenance faults. Second,
failure of f nodes chosen with a strategy to maximize the
harm which models failures caused by intentional faults like
a cyber attack. Repair is not considered in neither scenario.
B. Simulation Setup
For this analysis, a snapshot of the system is considered in
which the load is maximal and close to the maximal production
of the power plants. All consuming nodes have the same power
consumption and the consumption is assumed to be static.
All the producing nodes have the same production capacity.
The total production capacity is 10% higher than the total
load at this peak moment in the year. These assumptions are
strong, but justiﬁable as the focus of this discussion lies on the
measures. Moreover, this assumptions can easily be changed
for a more realistic analysis of a given power grid.
Production capacity is assigned randomly to existing nodes
in the network. The number of power sources in a power grid
can vary widely depending on the topography but also strongly
on the strategy of the utility and the government. To cover
grids based on larger and smaller power plants, the simulation
is run twice: for a power grid with 10 and for a power grid
with 40 power sources.
A Monte Carlo simulation is used in which the number f
of failed nodes goes from 1 to the total number of nodes in
the network. The stochastic elements in the simulation are the
location of power sources in the network and the location of
failed nodes in the network.
C. Random Faults
An incident is assumed that leads to the failure of f random
nodes and their connected links in the network. The results in
Fig. 2 shows the number of nodes which are considered alive
according to the different measures.
The two newly introduced measures are closely related.
The value for Balancing can never be higher than the value
for Connectivity because the former is based on the lat-
ter and extends it by the requirement for enough capacity.
The difference between the values depends on the ratio
total production/total consumption which is set to 1.1 in this
study. If this value increases, then the difference between the
two curves will decrease and for very high values, which
corresponds to almost no restriction from the production
capacity, Balancing and Connectivity values will coincide.
The number of power sources in the system has a strong
impact on the Connectivity and Balancing measures. If the
number of power sources increases, the curve for the Connec-
tivity measure tends to the diagonal, i.e. to a situation where
the measure decreases linearly by the number of failed nodes.
The Balancing curve will converge also to the diagonal if in
addition the production capacity of the power source is at least
as high as the consumption of the node it is attached to. The
Largest Component measure does not consider this parameter.
For Connectivity and Balancing the 95% conﬁdence interval
shrinks when the number of power sources is increased. The
difference between removing the most and least vulnerable
nodes becomes less. This can also be seen in the next section
when trying to remove the most vulnerable nodes ﬁrst.
The measure Largest Component appears at ﬁrst sight to
be a conservative measure. However, this is not true because
depending on the structure of the network the results can be
higher than for the other two measures. For example, if there is
only one power source in the network because in Connectivity
and Balancing the power source may also be part of a minor
network component. Another more realistic example is a grid
which has all power sources clustered in a remote area and
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Fig. 2: Comparision of measures when performing random deletion of nodes. Results are mean values of 100 repetitions of
a Monte Carlo simulation with randomly positioned power sources and random node failures. Whiskers indicate the 95%
conﬁdence interval for every second value. The dotted diagonal indicates the theoretic maximum for all measures.
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Fig. 3: Comparision of measures with intentional node failures. Results are mean values of 100 repetitions of a Monte Carlo
simulation with randomly positioned power sources. The dotted diagonal indicates the theoretic maximum for all measures.
The conﬁdence interval is omitted to increase the readability.
they are connected only with few lines to the rest of the
network with the consumers. If in addition the network part
of the consumers is highly meshed then the results from the
Largest Component measure will be higher than for the other
two measures.
D. Intentional Faults
The previous experiment is repeated but now it is assumed
that an attacker chooses which nodes should fail. Two different
attacker models are used: In model A, the attacker chooses
the f nodes with the highest node degrees in the network. In
model B, the attacker chooses the f power producing nodes
with the highest node degrees. Fig. 3 shows the results for
the three discussed measures with the two attacker models.
For the Largest Component, the data for model B is omitted
because it is the same as for random faults, just stopping after
x failures, where x is the number of power sources in the
network. Using model A, there is no stochastic variance for
the Largest Component because it is independent of power
sources and the order for node failures is given by the strategy.
The results will only change when the topology changes.
Considering only the Connectivity measure, the most harm-
ful attacker model depends on the number of nodes which will
fail and on the number of power sources in the network. If
both numbers are small then the attacker model A has a higher
impact than attacker model B as can be seen from the results
with 10 power sources. The consequences for the grid are
higher when few nodes with a high node degrees are attacked
than when the same number of nodes with power sources are
attacked. In a highly connected network model B would yield
a Connectivity result which decreases only by one until all
power sources are deleted and the measure drops to 0.
For the Balancing measure it is slightly more complex
because the ratio total production/total consumption has to be
considered as well. As mentioned for the random failures, if
this ratio grows, the results for Balancing tend to the results for
Connectivity as the additional restriction from Balancing loses
its importance for the result. For a larger number of failures
model B is more harmful. If the number of power sources
approaches the number of total nodes, as it is the case in a
network with a high density of distributed energy resources,
the results of the two strategies will converge. In general, the
observation made for random failures are also valid here.
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Fig. 4: Dependability increase by using different degrees of Demand Response (DR) to mitigate a simultaneous failure. Results
are mean values of 100 repetitions of a Monte Carlo simulation with randomly positioned power sources and node failures
IV. SUITABILITY FOR DEPENDABILITY ANALYSIS
Dependability and Reliability terms are deﬁned differently
in power engineering and in ICT. Dependability in the ICT
context is a general concept deﬁned as “ability to avoid
service failures that are more frequent and more severe than
is acceptable” and it contains metrics like availability and
reliability [22]. The former refers to the readiness for correct
service and the latter to the continuity of correct service.
The service in a power grid is the power supply and correct
service for a customer stands for no outage. Availability is then
the probability that the customers experience no outage. In this
context, the introduced Connectivity and Balancing measures
quantify the instantaneous availability of the service after a
simultaneous failure. If the failure and repair rates are known,
then this can be used for the classic availability calculation
for both dependability and security, dependent on the chosen
failure model.
The measures can also be used for survivability analysis
of a system. Survivability, closely related to dependability,
is deﬁned as the “system‘s ability to continuously deliver
services (. . . ) in the presence of failures” [23]. The presented
model corresponds to survivability without repair.
How to use the Largest Component measure for dependabil-
ity analysis with the above deﬁnitions stays unclear because
of the difﬁculty of deﬁning correct service in a way that the
results from this measure become meaningful. It is used as an
indicator for topological robustness of a grid and even though
[16] showed a correlation to statistical reliability measures
it is easy to construct realistic scenarios where the results
of Largest Component are misleading in the dependability
analysis, as shown above.
In power engineering, reliability is deﬁned as “degree to
which the performance of the elements of that system results
in power being delivered to consumers (. . . )”, this deﬁnition
from NERC is also used by IEEE and CIGRE Working Groups
[24]. If this degree of reliability is deﬁned as percentage of cus-
tomers receiving correct service, then this metric corresponds
directly to the previous mentioned ICT availability.
V. ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTION OF SMART GRID
SERVICES TO DEPENDABILITY
In the following, the measures are used to study the potential
of two future smart grid services to mitigate the impact of
the modeled simultaneous failure and increase thereby the
dependability and survivability of the system.
A. Demand Response
Demand Response (DR) is a mechanism by which con-
sumers change their consumption based on the price, the load
or another signal [1]. In contrast to load shedding, an already
existing method to reduce the load, DR reduces the loads
without disconnecting customers. To study the potential of DR
for failure mitigation it is important to consider the reason for
a power loss in a node. According the Balancing measure, a
node can be non-functional because a) it was affected directly
by the failure, b) it is part of a component without power
source, or c) it is part of a component with too little power.
The ﬁrst two cases require repair. In the latter case, assuming
a network-wide instantaneous and failure-free DR scheme, the
load of the alive nodes can be reduced to supply non-functional
nodes and turn them into alive nodes.
The two introduced measures may be considered as the
two extreme cases of using DR, i.e. Balancing corresponds
to no DR and Connectivity corresponds to 100% DR with
no restriction on a minimal load per node. The difference
between the measures is then the potential of DR. In Fig. 4
this potential is plotted together with the results when the load
in each node is reduced by 20% and 40%. The y-axis shows
the increase of the number of surviving nodes if DR is used.
The results show that a DR scheme with 20% load reduction
may achieve already around 50% of the total potential for
DR under the taken assumptions. In countries with a high
percentage of non-time critical loads like air conditioning or
space and water heating, 20% or even 40% load reduction over
a short period of time are realistic. The results depend on the
ratio total production/total consumption. If this ratio is ≈ 1
or ≤ 1, the potential for DR is large. If the ratio increases, the
results of the two measures will get closer and the potential
for DR will decrease.
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B. Distributed Energy Resources and Microgrids
Distributed energy resources (DER) are medium and small
scale power sources located in any level of the power grid.
The coordinated operation of DERs requires either a centrally
located controller or a more local micro grid controller. The
latter having the advantage of being able to run this part of
the power grid in an island mode, speak as a decoupled micro
grid [25], [26]. Micro grids are a mean to make parts of the
grid independent from the functioning of the rest of the grid.
Assuming a high density of DER in the underlying distribu-
tion grid which are controlled by local micro grid controllers
yields a scenario where the number of nodes with power
sources is close to the number of total nodes. As seen in
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 increasing the number of power sources
increases also the dependability of the network for both ran-
dom and intentional node failures. The Connectivity measure
approaches the diagonal because the probability that a network
component ends up without a power source after the failure
becomes smaller. The same holds to a lesser extent also for
the Balancing measure. Assuming a failure-free operation of
the micro grid controller, it can be concluded that DER and
micro grids contribute to the mitigation of both random and
intentional simultaneous failures.
VI. CONCLUSION
Abstract measures from network science have been widely
used for the analysis of power grids. They have the strong
advantage of facilitating large scale studies and as they are
agnostic to the underlying network they enable a compari-
son with other real-life or random networks. However, their
meaning in the context of dependability and survivability
analysis can be unclear and, therefore, have to be checked
critically. In this paper, we introduced two measures based
on fundamental properties of the power grid: connectivity to
power sources and balancing of load and production. The
analysis showed, that both new measures are well suited for a
structural dependability and survivability analysis. In contrast
to the widely used Largest Component measure which results
can be misleading in this context.
Further, we showed how to use the measures to quantify
the potential of Demand Response and Distributed Energy Re-
sources to mitigate the consequences of simultaneous failures.
Under the given assumptions, we found that a load reduction
with DR by 20% can already achieve around half of the
possible dependability increase with DR.
The structural analysis conducted in this study ignores
dynamics in the system, however, the results give valuable
information to power engineers about the upper limit of
what can be achieved if all power engineering challenges are
successfully met.
Future work will include the analysis of larger structures and
possible failure mitigation strategies. Further, we will look into
relaxing the assumptions to make the model more versatile.
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Abstract
The behavior of networks under simultaneous failures has been
subject to various studies in the ﬁeld of network science. However, the
measures used do usually not take into account the peculiarities of the
studied network. In this paper, we introduce a new measure for power
grids based on the balancing of power and on the accumulated cost of
energy not supplied (CENS) during an outage. With the help of this
measure we quantify the performance of seven repair strategies. We ﬁnd
that both the choice of the right strategy and the topology of the power
grid has a major inﬂuence on the outage cost and the survivability of
the power grid. Additionally, we appraise the potential of smart grid
services and conclude that both distributed energy resources (DER) and
demand response (DR) has a large potential to reduce the cost of an
outage.
1 Introduction
Studies in information and communication technology (ICT) systems show the
vulnerability of complex systems to human and software errors [1, 2] which may
be caused, among others, by the complexity of large networks [3]. These errors
aﬀect potentially many devices as they run the same software, same conﬁguration
and are operated by the same humans. Studies indicate indeed that failures in ICT
networks are not independent but rather correlated [4–6].
As the power grid relies more and more on the use of ICT [7], the dependency
increases [8]. Failures in the power grid caused by failed ICT services are not
new [9, 10] but they may become more frequent and exhibit a diﬀerent pattern.
Correlated or simultaneous failures have been studied in various networks
including power grids [11, 12].These studies model the simultaneous failure based
on percolation theory which describes the behavior of the network when removing
This paper was presented at the NIK-2014 conference; see http://www.nik.no/.
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a fraction of 1− p nodes in a network. The most common measure to quantify the
outcome of a simultaneous failure is to count the nodes in the largest connected
component of the network, however, it is not clear how to use this results for
a classic dependability analysis as this measure is agnostic to characteristics of
the underlying network. Therefore, some measures were put forward considering
connections between consumers and power sources [11, 13].
In this work, we analyze and compare several repair strategies to recover from
simultaneous failures and quantify their performance during the repair time. In
order to evaluate the diﬀerent repair strategies we introduce a quantiﬁcation method
based on the accumulated cost of energy not delivered (CENS) during the repair. We
consider the scenario in which the failure only aﬀects the power grid and leaves the
ICT system completely unaﬀected, i.e. the control center has the full information
about the state of the whole network. We study how changes in the network, namely
increasing the average node degree or increasing the number of power sources aﬀect
the repair costs. Further, we interpret our results in the advent of the smart grid
services Demand Response and Distributed Energy Resources. And ﬁnally, we show
how the results can be used for a survivability analysis.
Our analysis covers the repair of the physical structure of the power grid. We
do not consider the restoration of the service, i.e. power delivery. The results give
valuable information about the upper limit of what can be achieved if all power
engineering challenges are successfully met.
2 Modeling
Our analysis takes place in regional grids with typical voltage levels of 66 kV and
132 kV. A regional grid consists of power plants, interconnection points to other
regional grids, transformer stations connecting to both the distribution grid and the
transmission grid, and lines and cables connecting all these entities. The network is
modeled as an undirected graph in which all the mentioned entities are modeled as
nodes and the lines and cables are modeled as links between the nodes. The lower
voltage levels with the consumers are not included in the model. However, the nodes
have a load and power production corresponding to the sum of all the loads or power
production connected to them. All nodes have a load, some nodes have additionally
an attached power production, these nodes are called power producing nodes or
power sources. We do not diﬀerentiate whether the power production is the sum
of several smaller power sources in the distribution grid or one large power plant.
Neither diﬀerentiate we between power plants, connections to the transmission grid
and interconnections to regional grid. Important is only the sum of the power
production. It is assumed that there exist no other connections between the nodes
than those in this voltage level, i.e. in the network.
Cost of Energy Not Supplied (CENS)
In regulated networks, the regulator gives incentives for eﬃcient and reliable
operation of the grid. In the following we use the Norwegian regulation framework
based on a yardstick regulation where the performance of a utility is measured in
comparison with the others. Cost of Energy Not Supplied (CENS) is one parameter
used for the eﬃciency and cost calculations for the revenue cap [14]. CENS is
calculated by a function taking as input the power not supplied to a customer and
the time of the outage. There exists a function for each customer group as listed
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Table 1: Cost functions and groups used for the CENS calculation (Unit: Norwegian
Krone /kW).
Customer original cost function avgerage cost share
group depending on outage time r function of
r ≤ 4h r > 4h used in sim. customer
Agriculture 10.6r + 4 62.3 4%
Residential 8.8r + 1 49.4 75%
Industry 55.6r + 17 18.4r + 166 244.8 1%
Commercial 97.5r + 20 33.1r + 280 422.45 10%
Public 14.6r + 1 4.1r + 44 59.85 10%
in Table 1. In the simulation we do not consider outage times, therefore, we use a
time independent cost function, which depends only on the customer group and on
the power not supplied. The value used in our cost function is the expected value of
the time-depending cost function under the assumption that the outage times are
uniformly distributed and take integer values between 1 and 10 hours. More details
about CENS can be found in [14].
The nodes in the network have no CENS values themselves because they are
substations and not customers. However, the sum of the CENS values of all
customers connected to a node is taken as the CENS value for that node. It is
assumed that all nodes have the same load and each node has only customers of the
same group attached. To calculate the cumulative CENS for a network node we can
use its cumulative load and use the cost function with the CENS parameter for the
corresponding group.
Failure and Repair
The nodes are modeled with a binary state, either the whole node is alive
or it has failed. Link failures are not included in our model. The ratio
(link failures)/(substation failures) varies strongly between diﬀerent nations [15].
The considered failure is a simultaneous failure of a fraction of f nodes. The
set of failed nodes is denoted as Vfailed, A failure can lead to a supply shortage or
disconnection of additional nodes leaving the network with a total of s% of nodes
non-alive. The set of non-alive nodes is in the following denoted Vnon-alive. The sets
have the properties: |Vfailed| = fn, |Vnon-alive| = sn and Vfailed ⊆ Vnon-alive where n is
the total number of nodes in the network.
The considered repair mode is a one-by-one repair, i.e. only one failed node at a
time can get repaired. In each repair step one node is chosen according to a strategy
and repaired. It is assumed that the repair is successful and that no additional
failures happen during the repair. All repair strategies start with |Vnon-alive| non-
alive nodes and end after |Vfailed| repair steps because only the failed nodes need to
be repaired. However, the order of repairing the nodes has an impact on how many
nodes of the network are alive as repairing the right node may bring back the power
supply to many other nodes as well.
3 Simulation Setup
The simulation covers only the repair process. A snapshot of the system is considered
in which the load is maximal and close to the maximal production of the power
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plants. All consuming nodes have the same power consumption and the consumption
is assumed to be static. All the producing nodes have the same production capacity.
The total production capacity is 10% higher than the total load at this peak moment
in the year. These assumptions are strong, but justiﬁable as the focus of this
discussion lies on the strategies. Moreover, these assumptions can easily be changed
for a more realistic analysis of a given power grid.
This Monte Carlo simulation has as stochastic variables the location of power
sources, the location of failed nodes and the assignment of CENS customer groups
to the nodes. The ﬁrst two use a uniform distribution, the last a distribution with
the expected values from Table 1. All stochastic variables change in each repetition.
During the analysis two diﬀerent networks are used. First, a network based on a
typical medium-sized regional grid from Norway with voltage levels 66 kV and 132
kV. It consists of 104 nodes and 124 links. Second, a network randomly generated
with a node degree distribution that follows an exponential distribution. It has been
shown in a study that the European transmission networks possess this property [12].
To cover grids based on larger centralized and smaller decentralized power plants,
the simulation is run for two parameters: for a power grid with 10 and for a power
grid with 40 power sources.
The ICT network is completely independent from the power grid and it is
assumed to work ﬂawlessly also after the failure in the power grid happened. The
control center has therefore a full and correct overview over the system and knows
which nodes belong to the set of non-alive nodes Vnon-alive and also which nodes
belong to the set of nodes with a failure Vfailed. The former gives information about
the extent of the outage, the latter the valuable information about which nodes
need to be repaired. As all the information is available only the order of repairing
the nodes has to be determined by a chosen strategy. We consider the following
strategies to choose the next node to repair:
1. Baseline for comparison:
(a) Random Repair: Choose a random node from Vfailed.
2. Strategies based on properties of single nodes:
(a) Highest Node Degree: Choose the node with the highest node degree, i.e.
the most links, in Vfailed.
(b) Highest CENS: Choose the node with highest CENS value in Vfailed.
3. Strategies optimizing outcome of next step:
(a) Maximize Node Count: Choose the node from Vfailed which maximizes the
number of alive nodes. The algorithm simulates all possibilities for the
next step and takes the one giving the highest result.
(b) Minimize CENS: Choose the node from Vfailed which minimizes the CENS
costs for the next step. The algorithm simulates all possibilities for the
next step and takes the one giving the lowest result.
4. Strategies based on properties of connected component:
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(a) Biggest Failed Component: Consider the graph formed by the nodes in
Vnon-alive and choose the biggest connected network component. Consider
all nodes from that component which are in Vfailed and take the one with
the highest node degree.
(b) Failed Component with Highest CENS sum: Consider the graph formed
by the nodes in Vnon-alive and choose the one with the highest sum of the
CENS values of its nodes. Consider all nodes from that component which
are in Vfailed and take the one with the highest node degree.
The strategies are chosen in a way to study the inﬂuence of considering single
nodes versus connected components, and node or degree count versus CENS values.
After the random strategy, which is used for comparison, there are three pairs of
strategies. The strategies from the ﬁrst pair consider only properties of single nodes
for their decision, the strategies from the second pair consider the outcome of all
possible repair steps and take the optimal solution and the strategies of the last
pair base their decision on connected components of nodes in Vnon-alive, i.e. they
consider also the non-alive nodes that have no failure. In each pair there is one
strategy considering only topological aspects like node degree or node count and
one strategy considering CENS.
Measures
In the following, we use the two measures proposed in our previous work [13] to
quantify Vnon-alive: Connectivity counts the number of nodes still connected to any
power source, Balancing requires in addition that the sum of loads in a surviving
connected network component is at maximum equal to the sum of power production
in that component. If the load is too high, loads are shut down.
When considering the ﬁnancial impact of an outage for the responsible utility it
becomes important which nodes are non-alive and not only how many. Therefore,
we extend the measures to include the ﬁnancial impact of the whole outage.
Deﬁnition 1 (CENS outage cost). The CENS outage cost is the sum of the CENS
values of all the non-alive nodes, summed up over all repair steps. The non-alive
nodes are determined with either the Connectivity or Balancing measure.
4 Simulations and Results
Performance of Strategies
We ﬁrst investigate the performance of the previously introduced strategies. The
simulation is run with the network based on the described Norwegian regional grid.
The results of 100 simulation runs are given in the lower row of Fig. 1. The best
performing strategy, i.e. the strategy that leads to the lowest CENS outage costs is
the Minimize CENS strategy. This is not surprising, as it optimizes the outcome
for the next step. The Maximize Node Count strategy performs reasonably well
considering that it is agnostic of the CENS values of the nodes. Although, for a
higher number of power sources (40) the diﬀerence becomes bigger. The other ﬁve
strategies are more than 50% more expensive than the best one. For a low number
of power sources the diﬀerence is even slightly higher.
The strategies Highest Node Degree and Biggest Failed Component consider
only topological aspects. They both have a similar performance. Taking into
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Figure 1: CENS outage costs in the regional grid model when 10% of the nodes fail.
In the left column 10 nodes have attached power sources, in the right column 40
nodes have attached power sources. The upper row shows the sum of non-alive nodes
over the whole repair process and the lower row shows the sum of CENS values of all
non-alive nodes over the whole repair process (CENS outage cost) for the diﬀerent
strategies. The non-alive nodes are determined with the Balancing measure. The
results are mean values of 100 repetitions of a Monte Carlo simulation with randomly
positioned power sources and random failures. Whiskers indicate the standard error
of mean.
account groups of nodes from Vnon−alive like in Biggest Failed Component brings
no advantage against considering only single nodes from Vfailed like in Highest Node
Degree, it yields even a slightly worse performance. The opposite is true for the two
strategies considering only the CENS values. Here the strategy taking into account
components of nodes from Vnon−alive, i.e. trying to reconnect the component with
the highest CENS sum (Failed Component with Highest CENS Sum) performs better
than the strategy Highest CENS Value which considers only single nodes from Vfailed.
Comparing CENS outage cost with Node count
A simple measure to quantify a repair strategy could be to count the number of non-
alive nodes per repair step and then sum it up. The proposed measure CENS outage
cost takes the additional information about the CENS values into account, which is
not directly topology related. Using this new measure we try to ﬁnd a strategy that
minimizes this CENS outage cost. It may seem wrong to use a ﬁnancial parameter
to measure the performance of repair strategies, but the CENS values can also be
understood as a criticality indication of the nodes. In order to check the implications
on the availability of the nodes, we run the same simulations with all strategies and
measure it with the purely topological measure sum of non-alive nodes and also
with the measure CENS outage cost. The results are presented in Fig. 1. The
strategy Maximize Node Count optimizes the ﬁrst measure, the strategy Minimize
CENS optimizes the second measure. The results show, that those two strategies
perform very similar when using the ﬁrst, topological measure, i.e. optimizing for
CENS values optimizes also the sum of non-alive nodes. However, this is not the
case for the second measure. The diﬀerence between the two strategies becomes
bigger with a higher number of power sources. The same is true for the two last
strategies focusing on components on either the topological level or the CENS level.
The statistical relevant diﬀerences are smaller here. Interestingly this is not true
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Figure 2: Remaining costs before repairing, after having repaired 10% of the
failed nodes, after having repaired 30% of the failed nodes in the regional grid
model. The upper row gives the absolute value for CENS, the lower row gives the
remaining outage costs after in percentage of the total costs. The non-alive nodes
are determined with the Balancing measure. The results are mean values of 100
repetitions of a Monte Carlo simulation with randomly positioned power sources
and random failures.
for the ﬁrst pair of strategies after the random strategy. Using the Highest Node
Degree strategy is for both measures better than using the Highest CENS Value. The
diﬀerence to the other two strategies using CENS is, that the two latter consider the
CENS-sum of a group of nodes which includes also a topological aspect, therefore,
they also perform well compared to their topological counterparts using the sum of
non-alive nodes measure.
As conclusion we can state that using the best strategy Minimize CENS reduces
the costs without increasing the number of non-alive nodes compared to the strategy
Maximize Node Count. This can be done because optimizing for a minimal CENS
implicitly also favors a small number of non-alive nodes. The utility can here reduce
costs without sacriﬁcing the availability of its nodes.
Cost Development of Strategies
In our model the repair takes always the same amount of steps, each strategy needs to
repair |Vfailed| nodes. But depending on the strategy the degree to which the service
is back will be diﬀerent. In Fig. 2 we have plotted the remaining CENS outage cost
after having repaired 0%, 10% and 30% of the failed nodes. The strategy with the
lowest absolute CENS outage cost also has the property of reducing the cost faster.
In the scenario with 10 power sources, the best strategy Minimize CENS reduces
the CENS outage cost by 30% by repairing 10% of the failed nodes, i.e. by repairing
one single node. After repairing 2 additional nodes (in total 30% of the nodes) only
1/3 of the total CENS outage cost remain. The results illustrate that repairing with
the right strategy can reduce the costs drastically.
Inﬂuence of Node Degree and Number of Power Sources
In the following we study the eﬀect of increasing the number of power sources.
As before the regional grid is used with randomly positioned power sources and
a random node failure of 10% of the nodes. The number of power sources takes
the values 10, 25, 40 and 55. Only the best strategy Minimize CENS is considered.
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(a) CENS outage cost in the regional
grid and in random networks whose node
degrees follow an exponential distribution
exp(λ) with λ ∈ {1.6, 2.0, 2.4}. The repair
strategy Minimize CENS is used after 10%
of the nodes failed. The non-alive nodes are
determined with the Balancing measure.
Whiskers indicate the standard error of
mean.
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(b) DR potential to reduce CENS outage
cost in the regional grid and in random
networks whose node degrees follow an
exponential distribution exp(λ) with λ ∈
{1.6, 2.0, 2.4}. The repair strategy Minimize
CENS is used after 10% of the nodes failed.
Figure 3: The results are mean values of 100 repetitions of a Monte Carlo simulation.
Additionally we use random networks whose node degrees follow an exponential
distribution exp(λ) with λ ∈ {1.6, 2.0, 2.4}. The simulation results are shown in
Fig. 3a. For all four networks the CENS outage cost goes down when the number
of power sources increases. Increasing λ, which increases the average node degree,
reduces the CENS outage cost as well. However, this eﬀect is stronger for a small
number of power sources in the network. If the number of power sources increases
even more the diﬀerence disappears completely as can be seen when considering the
case when all nodes have a power source. Then, the node degree of the nodes has
no inﬂuence anymore as each node is self-contained.
Utilities have two ways of reducing CENS outage cost : First, by increasing the
average node degree. Second, by increasing the number of power sources. The
former is very expensive, usually not practical because of restrictions for building
new links and as shown in the results less eﬀective than the latter.
5 Discussion
The results show that choosing the right strategy can reduce the costs of an outage
drastically. The best strategy is the one ﬁnding the optimal solution for the next
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step, i.e. it simulates all possibilities for the next step and chooses the one with
the best outcome. The computational complexity is higher than with the other
strategies, but this is not an issue as the number of possibilities is only as large as
the number of failed nodes. In our examples, the simulation runs could be executed
very quickly, the simulation ﬁnished in a matter of milliseconds on a normal desktop
computer and is several orders of magnitude smaller than the actual repair time.
The network type, the average node degree and the number of power sources has
an inﬂuence on the total CENS outage cost. Usually those parameters cannot be
changed in a power grid. However, with the advent of smart grid with its new
services two things may change:
1. The number of power sources may change drastically as small and distributed
power sources (DER) are promoted.
2. A Demand Response (DR) scheme may reduce the load.
The results can be used to appraise the potential to reduce the cost of outages
by using these two smart grid concepts.
Impact of Distributed Energy Resources on Outage Costs
Distributed energy resources (DER) are medium and small scale power sources
located in any level of the power grid. The coordinated operation of DERs requires
either a centrally located controller or a more local micro grid controller. The latter
having the advantage of being able to run this part of the power grid in an island
mode, i.e. a decoupled micro grid [16, 17]. Micro grids are a mean to make parts
of the grid independent from the functioning of the rest of the grid. Assuming a
high density of DER in the underlying distribution grid which are controlled by
local micro grid controllers yields a scenario where the number of nodes with power
sources is high. As seen in Fig. 3a increasing the number of power sources reduces
the CENS outage cost. We can, therefore, conclude that DER reduces the CENS
outage cost and it can even be quantiﬁed by using the introduced measure.
Impact of Demand Response on Outage Costs
Changing topological parameters or the number of power plants is in reality
either unrealistic or connected with potentially high costs. Instead, the existing
infrastructure may be used more eﬃciently; one solution is to use Demand Response
(DR). DR is a mechanism by which consumers change their consumption based
on the price, the load or another signal [7]. In contrast to load shedding, i.e.
disconnecting loads to achieve the power balance, DR reduces the loads without
disconnecting nodes. In a scenario with a high density of distributed power
production and energy storage, DR may also control the distributed production
or feeding of power from the storages to the grid. However, we do not consider the
control of production by DR in this paper. A DR scheme has the advantage of using
the existing infrastructure in a more eﬃcient way by regulating the load. This is also
linked with costs to install the DR infrastructure like devices and a communication
platform. But as the new infrastructure is also used by other smart grid services
like monitoring and controlling the costs can be split.
To study the potential of DR for reducing outage costs it is important to consider
the reason for a power loss in a node. According to the Balancing measure, a node
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can be non-functional because a) it was aﬀected directly by the failure, b) it is part
of a component without power source, or c) it is part of a component with too little
power. The ﬁrst two cases require repair. In the latter case, assuming a network-
wide instantaneous and failure-free DR scheme, the load of the alive nodes can be
reduced to supply non-functional nodes and turn them into alive nodes.
The measures Balancing and Connectivity may be considered as the two
extreme cases of using DR, i.e. Balancing corresponds to no DR and Connectivity
corresponds to 100% DR with no restriction on a minimal load per node. The
diﬀerence between the measures is then the potential of DR. In Fig. 3b this potential
is plotted, i.e. the reduction of CENS outage cost when the whole DR potential could
be used compared to no DR.
The results show that the DR potential is highest for a low number of power
sources in the network. Increasing the node degree leads to a decrease in DR
potential as the probability that a network component is without a power source
becomes smaller. In the extreme case of a complete graph the potential disappears
completely as the nodes are not dependent on the load of other nodes anymore. The
same holds for the case when the number of powered nodes goes to 100%.
The results depend on the ratio (total production capacity)/(total consumption).
If this ratio is close to 1 or even smaller than 1, the potential for DR is large. If the
ratio increases, the results of the two measures will get closer and the potential for
DR will decrease.
Survivability Contribution of Strategies
Dependability is deﬁned as “ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent
and more severe than is acceptable” and it contains metrics like availability and
reliability [18]. A related measure is survivability which is deﬁned as “system‘s
ability to continuously deliver services (. . . ) in the presence of failures” [19]. It can
also be understood as how fast and to what degree the service is still delivered or
restored after a failure. The CENS value has been introduced with the objective “to
achieve the most optimal level of continuity of supply for the society as a whole” [14].
Therefore, it can be understood as a criticality indicator of the node. The CENS
outage cost is then a measure for how well the continuity of supply has been provided
during the repair, or in other words it measures the survivability. The lower the
value, the higher its survivability. To get more details for the survivability analysis it
is necessary to investigate the development of service restoration; a highly survivable
system should restore the most critical parts ﬁrst. These information can be found
in Fig. 2, which shows the development of the CENS outage cost for the diﬀerent
strategies. The results can be directly applied to survivability analysis, i.e. using
the right strategy increases the survivability drastically.
Assuming we include time as a factor, we can also state that it is most crucial
to have short repair times for the ﬁrst nodes. For the second half or even for the
second 2/3 of nodes time is not so crucial anymore, as the most critical nodes are
already repaired.
6 Conclusion
Simultaneous failures have been studied in various networks in the ﬁeld of network
science. These abstract results can be used for power grids, however, it is crucial to
84
tailor them to the speciﬁc peculiarities of the system. In this paper, we introduced a
measure based on CENS values of power grid nodes and on the Balancing measure.
The new measure allowed us to quantify and compare the performance of diﬀerent
repair strategies and networks. As CENS has a direct impact on the regulated
tariﬀs of a utility it is an important parameter to consider in the event of an
outage but especially also for determining the order of repairing the nodes. CENS
was introduced speciﬁcally as a sort of criticality value for each node and to give
incentives to prioritize certain customer groups.
The results show that using the strategy minimizing the CENS costs for the
next step has various advantages. First, it performs comparably to the strategy
Maximize Node Count when using the node count measure. Second, it reduces the
CENS outage cost considerably compared to the CENS-agnostic strategies. Third,
it improves the survivability by restoring critical nodes faster.
We could also show that increasing the average node degree of a network reduces
the CENS outage cost. However, increasing the number of power sources leads to an
even stronger improvement and reduces the diﬀerence between networks of diﬀerent
average node degrees. Thus, increasing the number of power sources is the less
expensive way of reducing the CENS outage cost. In smart grid terminology this
indicates that DER reduces the CENS outage cost. And ﬁnally, we showed that a
DR scheme has the potential of reducing the CENS outage cost by up to 24%.
The structural analysis conducted in this study concentrates on the structure of
the power grid and its repair. We do not consider the service, i.e. power delivery
and, therefore, dynamics in the system are not included. The results give valuable
information to power engineers about the upper limit of what can be achieved if all
power engineering challenges are successfully met.
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Abstract. Critical infrastructures, like the future power grid, rely strongly
on a reliable communication infrastructure. Mobile communication seems
an attractive candidate, as the entry costs are low and, provided the cov-
erage, the new devices have immediate communication access upon in-
stallation. However, considering the long time-frame of this investment,
it is important to think about the constraints in mobile networks and
also potential challenges waiting in the future. In this study, which is
based on the situation in Norway, we discuss four important future chal-
lenges: policy change, contract change, change of Quality of Service and
network failure. We show that a clever use of mobile communication like
multihoming or using a mobile virtual network operator may meet the
challenges. In the second part, we quantify the availability of the diﬀer-
ent mobile communication usages with the help of analytical models and
show that already a small increase of additional battery capacity in the
mobile network improves the availability signiﬁcantly.
1 Introduction
Like other critical infrastructures, the future power grid is going to rely strongly
on a reliable communication infrastructure. Intelligent electronic devices (IED)
are going to be deployed throughout the power grid and are in need of a ﬂexible
communication platform [1]. The requirements concerning latency, availability
and security [2, 3] are very diverse and might be covered by either a ﬂexible
middleware framework for data communication like GridStat [4] or a mixture
of diﬀerent technologies. Among the considered technologies, mobile communi-
cation is regarded as a pragmatic choice for services like smart metering and
monitoring in remote locations. It is a tempting candidate, because the entry
costs are relatively low and, provided adequate coverage, the device has imme-
diate communication access upon installation. However, there are many pitfalls
to avoid, not least because of the long term nature of the investment.
The mobile networks conduct an access control based on the mobile device’s
subscription. A device is usually only allowed to use the network of the operator,
which issued the subscription. National roaming, i.e. the communication over
networks of other operators, is technically possible but commonly not permitted.
There are exceptions for special numbers like police and ﬁre department and
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for special groups of customers, e.g. in Norway the regulator stipulated national
roaming for a limited set of prioritized customers from rescue organizations [5]. If
a utility wants to use a diﬀerent operator because the reception has deteriorated
or it changed the contract, it has to manually exchange the SIM card in the
device, which may be very costly as the potential number of devices for smart
metering and monitoring is very large.
An important property for the suitability of a communication infrastructure
is its dependability. Only few public studies exist [6–8] as the access to data is
usually restricted. The ﬁrst two studies focus on operator internal incidents, the
third one [8], however, takes a diﬀerent approach: it is based on measurements
done by mobile devices distributed over 300 diﬀerent places in whole Norway.
The logged connectivity to the diﬀerent UMTS networks show the distribution
of time between failures, down time and unavailability. This study measures the
Quality of Service exactly how a user would perceive it.
In this paper we suggest several alternatives on how a power utility may use
mobile communication; we single out the four main future challenges and analyze
how the alternatives react to those. After this qualitative analysis we analyze the
availability of the alternatives quantitatively based on measurement data from
the study from [8]. And ﬁnally, we analyze the availability improvement when
equipping the base stations in the mobile network with more battery capacity.
2 System Description
We consider the case, in which a company wants to roll-out a large number
of mobile devices. These devices could be smart meters or monitoring devices
inside the power grid. The study focuses on the implication of using mobile
communication for these smart devices, this is done by concentrating on the
communication between a single smart device and the company. The mobile
communication is provided by two mobile network operators (MNO): MNO A
and MNO B. It is assumed, that there is no national roaming agreement between
MNO A and MNO B, i.e. subscribers of one network have no access to the
other network. As in real networks, the two infrastructures are not completely
independent and thus their failures manifest some dependencies. The reason is
twofold. First, shared infrastructure or geographical collocation of infrastructure
in certain parts of the network, e.g. A leases a communication line from B in
rural and sparsely populated areas or A and B have their cables in the same
ditch. Second, dependence on the same service like for example power supply. In
both cases one failure can cause a failure in the two MNOs.
The MNOs are considered as black boxes, no internal state is known, the
mobile device only knows whether a connection to an MNO is possible and, on
a higher network level, if it has a connection to the power utility. It is assumed,
that only the MNOs can fail, as they are the main focus of the study.
In order to connect to the mobile network any device needs a SIM card. On
each SIM card there is a number (IMSI) which uniquely identiﬁes each device.
Part of this number is the mobile network code (MNC), which identiﬁes the
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mobile company that issued the SIM card. Access control is based on the MNC,
an MNO allows only connections from devices with its own MNC or with an
MNC belonging to an MNO with a roaming agreement. In Norway, these roaming
agreements are scarce and limited to foreign MNOs or mobile companies owning
no or only a very limited network on their own.
2.1 Challenges
Any mobile solution faces challenges over its lifetime. In the following we list the
challenges, which are in our opinion the most important once.
Challenge 1: Policy Change Mobile communication depends on policies
from the national regulator and also on policies from the MNO. The national
regulator may for example forbid international roaming fees or impose national
roaming; the MNO may change national and international roaming agreements.
Challenge 2: Contract Change The contract between the subscriber and
the MNO is subject to changes over time. Examples are an increase of the sub-
scription fee above an acceptable price level, required services that are discon-
tinued, bankruptcy of the MNO or its acquisition.
Challenge 3: Change of QoS The Quality of Service (QoS) at a device may
change over time. Examples are a reduced signal strength or increased blocking
probability because of structural changes between the mobile device and the
base station (e.g. new walls, new buildings) or changes in the usage pattern of
the base station (e.g. increased number of subscribers).
Challenge 4: Network failure A network failure in this context is deﬁned
as service outage, i.e. communication from sender to receiver over this speciﬁc
network is not possible. The mobile device always tries to connect to a base sta-
tion of its prioritized MNO. If no base station of its prioritized MNO is available,
it may try to connect to a base station of another MNO, but a connection is
only established if a roaming agreement with that MNO exists.
The time granularity is very diﬀerent and decreases from the ﬁrst to the
last challenge, i.e. the reaction time for the operator is getting shorter. Policy
and contract changes have to be announced with a certain lead time and the
operator can look for a solution well in advance. A change of QoS, however, may
happen without notice and network failures usually come without warning and
the system has to immediately react to mitigate the failure.
3 Usage Alternatives
The ordinary way is to buy regular SIM cards from an existing MNO, denoted
in the following as ordinary subscription. This comes with a carrier lock-in: a
change of MNO can only be achieved by replacing the SIM card in each and
every device. This is costly, as the number of devices is likely to be high and
some of the devices may be located in remote areas or in places diﬃcult to reach.
Also a network failure has a strong impact, as a national roaming is usually not
allowed, i.e. only the network of your own MNO can be used.
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MVNO The utility takes the role of amobile virtual network operator (MVNO),
buying a certain amount of services from an MNO. Utilities may collaborate
nationally to reduce the operational costs.
The MNO can be changed by changing roaming agreements. There are al-
ready many MVNOs, so this is a proven solution and it can be implemented
quickly by out-sourcing almost everything if desired. A precondition for this so-
lution is that existing MNOs allow roaming by MVNOs. A policy change by the
national regulator or the MNOs may therefore have an impact on this solution.
An MVNO has usually only an agreement with one MNO and it may happen
that no MNO can provide a satisfactory QoS for all the devices. In this case,
changing the MNO does not help. This threat is higher for geographically wide
spread utilities. In case of a network failure, this solution has the same weakness
as the Ordinary Subscription, because the network cannot be changed on short
notiﬁcation but needs longer negotiations.
The MVNO may issue several series of SIM cards with diﬀerent MNCs. It
can then make individual roaming agreements for each MNC. This way some of
the discussed problems can be mitigated.
Multihoming Certain devices allow the use of multiple SIM cards. Using a
SIM card from each MNO implements a national roaming without dependencies
on policy changes by the regulator or the MNOs. An application on the device
probes the diﬀerent networks and chooses the one with the most favorable QoS.
There is a carrier lock-in, however, by using several SIM cards the risk is mini-
mized. Using a SIM card from an MVNO especially for utilities may increase the
ﬂexibility of this solution even more. A new MNO can only be used by inserting
their SIM card. The cost per device is higher, as it needs multiple SIM card slots
and multiple subscriptions per device.
International Subscription Interestingly, users with a foreign subscription
can have an advantage over those with a national subscription when the foreign
MNO has roaming agreements with several national MNOs. In this case, the
foreign subscription implements a national roaming.
The advantages are that it is very easy to implement and several mobile
networks can be used, depending on the roaming agreements. The switchover to
another network may be fast, depending on the network failure. International
roaming depends strongly on the policies of the regulator and the MNOs that
are in place. If the roaming costs are abolished for good, the MNOs may restrict
roaming agreements or make international coalitions with roaming agreements.
But all depends strongly on what is de ﬁned as legal by the European and the
national regulator. Additionally, this solution leads again to a carrier lock-in.
4 Unavailability
The availability of the alternatives can be grouped in three classes.
Asingle: only one single network is used, if it fails the connection fails as well;
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Astandby: there is a standby network, which is used in the case of a failure in
the primary one, the switchover time varies between the solutions;
ADMR (DMR: dual modular redundancy): two networks are used at the same
time and a failure in one does not interrupt the connection.
The ordinary subscription andMVNO (with one MNC) are in the classAsingle
because they can only use the network of a single MNC, namely the one having
issued the SIM card or the one having a roaming agreement, respectively. The
solution MVNO (with multiple MNCs) is either in the class Asingle or Astandby,
depending on whether the MNC is ﬁx or whether it can be changed dynamically
in case of a network failure.Multihoming is in the class ADMR if the SIM cards are
used in parallel and in class Astandby if one is in a standby state. The international
subscription is in the class Astandby because the device can only be connected to
one network at a time and needs to reconnect in the case of a network failure.
We compute the unavailability U of the classes, given by U = 1 − A, where
A is the availability deﬁned as “readiness for correct service” [9].
4.1 Quantiﬁcation of Asingle and ADMR
Table 1. Used parameters from study [8].
unavailability failure rate restoration rate
U λi,total [s
−1] μi [s−1]
Asingle 3.3× 10−4 1.11× 10−5 3.33× 10−2
Asingle 5.0× 10−3 2.01× 10−6 4× 10−4
ADMR 2.0× 10−5 – –
The mentioned study [8],
contains data for our
classes Asingle and ADMR.
Additionally, it also con-
tains the distributions for
time between failure and
down time when using a
single network. Assuming the distributions to be negative exponential, the fail-
ure and restoration rates are computed with the approximated mean time be-
tween failure (MTBF) and mean down time (MDT) by λ = 1/(MTBF-MDT)
and μ = 1/MDT. The parameters are given in Table 1. The two networks have
very diﬀerent properties: MNO A has more failures than MNO B, but due to its
short restoration time it has a lower overall unavailability.
4.2 Quantiﬁcation of Astandby
ok:ok
ok:d
d:ok
d:d cf:cf
λB
μB
λA
μA
λB
μB
λA
μA
λcf
μcf
Fig. 1. Model for class ADMR
There are no numbers for Astandby, however, we
show how it can be computed with a Markov
model and the given parameters. But ﬁrst, we
note, that the measurements in Table 1 indicate,
that MNO A and MNO B are not independent,
they are subject to common cause failures. In or-
der to compute this common cause failure rate the
Markov model in Fig. 1 is used. The round states
are system up states and the square states sys-
tem down states. The state of the whole system
is deﬁned by the states of the two MNOs (iA : iB) with iA, iB ∈ {ok,d,cf}. The
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states for each MNO are working (ok), down (d) or down because of a com-
mon cause failure (cf). Common cause failures from states other than (ok:ok)
are omitted for the sake of readability; the introduced error is negligible, as the
ok:ok state has by far the highest state probability. The λis are computed by
λi = λi,total − λcf in order to keep the total failure rates λi,total constant when
varying λcf . Setting λcf = 0, i.e. making the networks independent, we get an
unavailability of 1.67 × 10−6, i.e. around 12 times smaller than the measured
unavailability in Table 1, showing that the networks are in fact dependent as
mentioned above.
Table 2. Common cause rates
after parameter ﬁtting.
λcf [s
−1] μcf [s−1]
6.34× 10−7 4× 10−4
Details about shared infrastructures and ser-
vices inMNO A andMNO B are not known. How-
ever, leased line and power incidents are possibly
large contributors to failures [6], therefore, we as-
sume a restoration time of 1/μcf = 2500s, which
is in the order of a longer mobile restoration time and a power outage restora-
tion [10]. Solving the model with the unavailability and rates given in Table 1
yields a common cause failure rate λcf as listed in Table 2. The failure rate λcf
makes around 5% of the total failure rate of MNO A λA,total and around 30% of
MNO B λB,total.
OK:ok
D:okOk:d
D:d CF:cf
ok:D
d:D
d:OK
ok:OK cf:CF
λA
λB
μB
λcf
μcf
λAμA
μB
λB
λAμA
λB
μB
λcf
μcf
μA
λswitch
λswitch
Fig. 2. Model for class Astandby
Finally, the unavailability for Astandby is
computed by extending the state deﬁnitions to
(jA : jB) with jA, jB ∈ {ok,OK, d,D, cf,CF},
which yields the model depicted in Fig. 2. Up-
percase letters indicate that the mobile device is
currently using that network. E.g, state (ok : D)
means network B is used, but down and network
A is ok. It is a down state (square), only after
switching the network, leading to state (Ok : d)
is the system up and running again.
In a business oriented setting it can be ad-
vantageous to prefer one MNO over the other
because of special price models based for ex-
ample on data volume. The other MNO is only
used if the preferred one is down. For that, the
model in Fig. 2 is adjusted to always switch over
to the preferred network if it is working. i.e. if MNO A is preferred, adding a
new transition from (ok:OK) to (OK:ok) and marking the former state as down
state because of the unavailability during the switchover.
4.3 Discussion
The results of a steady-state analysis are given in Fig. 3. They show clearly
the large diﬀerence in unavailability of the diﬀerent solutions. Class Asingle has
two results depending on which MNO is chosen. The diﬀerence between the two
MNOs is big because of the large diﬀerence in restoration time.
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Fig. 3. Unavailability of the classes against switching time.
Zoom-in for low values of switching time.
In the classAstandby,
the unavailability is
linearly increasing with
the mean switching
time. The unavail-
ability is lower than
the unavailability of
Asingle if the mean
switching time is lower
than 95 seconds or
1485 seconds forMNO A
and MNO B, respec-
tively. The ﬁrst num-
ber is surprisingly small,
it is explained by
the very short aver-
age restoration time
in MNO A of 1/μA =
30s. The switching
time itself depends
strongly on the used
alternative and im-
plementation. Two alternatives belonging to the class Astandby may, therefore,
not necessarily have the same unavailability.
Preferring one MNO leads to a higher unavailability. MNO B is here the
better choice of the two, as this solution beneﬁts from the longer uptime of MNO
B and the shorter restoration time of MNO A. Preferring one MNO creates
additional interruptions, i.e. a lower mean time between failure (MTBF) and
should be avoided. However, as stated above there might be other considerations
that need to be taken into account. We consider the system as down during the
switchover, if it is performed without downtime, then preferring MNO B has a
lower unavailability than the standard standby class.
5 Improving Availability with Batteries
okbd
(1− p)λi
μi
pλi
μi
λbat
Fig. 4. Model for class
Asingle with limited bat-
tery capacity.
Today, batteries are available in some base stations.
Depending on the MNO the number of equipped base
stations as well as capacity varies strongly. In Norway
there are discussions between the national regulator
and MNOs about stipulating a required battery in-
stallation in base stations in mobile networks [11]. So
far, installed batteries in the power grid were already
included implicitly, because we used measurements of
actual networks. In the following we study the eﬀect of installing additional
battery capacity.
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Batteries allow the communication system to keep on working in case of a
power failure, if it is bridgeable by battery. We assume that this is the case for
p% of all failures, valid for both individual failures and common cause failures.
The battery capacity is assumed to be negative exponentially distributed with
mean 1/λbat. This assumption is justiﬁed by the variation of capacity due to
diﬀerent battery types, battery ages, working conditions and charging states.
ok:ok
ok:d
ok:b
d:ok
b:ok
d:d
d:b
b:d
b:b cf:cf
b:b (CF )
(1− p)λB
μB
pλB
μB
(1− p)λA
μA
pλA
μA
(1− p)λB
μB
pλB
μB
(1− p)λA
μA
pλA
μA
(1− p)λA
μA
pλA
μA
(1− p)λA
μA
pλA
μA
λbat
λbat
λbat
λbat
λbat
λbat
(1− p)λcf
μcf
pλcf
μcf λbat
Fig. 5. Model for the class ADMR with limited battery ca-
pacity.
The extended mod-
els for the classes
Asingle and ADMR are
depicted in Fig. 4
and Fig. 5. The state
deﬁnition is extended
by the network state
b, indicating that the
network suﬀered a
power failure and parts
of it is running on
battery. The dashed
arrows indicate a tran-
sition caused by bat-
tery depletion. The
model for Astandby is
not depicted but is
constructed as before
by duplicating the model for ADMR, adding an indication for which MNO is
active and adding two new transitions with rate λswitch between ok:D to OK:d
and D:ok to d:OK.
5.1 Discussion
Fig. 6(a) shows the results for the class Asingle when using MNO A. The un-
availability is most sensitive to a mean battery capacity in the order of the mean
down time, i.e. 1/μA = 30 seconds. For the MNO B the plot would look similar,
but shifted towards its mean down time of 1/μB = 2500 seconds.
Fig. 6(b) shows the results for the class ADMR. The two parameters λcf and
μcf are set to the values used previously, noted in Table 2, which equals to
a mean common cause restoration time of 2500 seconds. As expected are the
absolute values lower than in the class Asingle; the plot is in fact almost the same
as for MNO B, except the y values are much lower. The reason being, that of
the two down states in the model, the state cf:cf is responsible for the highest
fraction of the down time. The mean sojourn time for this state is given by 1/λcf
and is equal to the restoration time in MNO B.
Fig. 7 shows the results for the class Astandby. The simulation is done for two
scenarios with diﬀerent pairs for λcf and μcf . In scenario 1, 1/μcf is chosen to
be very short, i.e. 30 seconds, which corresponds to the restoration rate of MNO
A. As before, λcf is given indirectly by the model in Fig. 1 by solving the steady
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Fig. 6. Unavailability against battery capacity for diﬀerent values of p.
state equations for it. In scenario 2, the two parameters λcf and μcf are set to
the values used previously , i.e. 1/μcf of 2500 seconds. Additionally, it is done
for two diﬀerent switching times. For a switching time of 1 second the diﬀerence
between the two scenarios is big, i.e. the downtime caused by the common cause
failure is dominant. When increasing the switching time to 60 seconds, however,
the downtime caused by the switching itself becomes dominant and the diﬀerence
between the two scenarios is minimal.
The numbers show that the availability gain can already be large for a small
battery capacity bridging a time of 1-3 minutes. However, it depends strongly
on the restoration times and switching times between the networks.
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6 Conclusion
We list diﬀerent alternatives of how to use mobile communication in this paper.
By combining them, more are possible, but they are not fundamentally diﬀerent
to the presented ones. As the machine-to-machine communication (M2M) is
likely to increase in the future, new technologies and especially new regulations
may change the way mobile communication is used. For example, a decoupling
of the SIM card and the operator by issuing carrier-free SIM cards would allow
the switching between diﬀerent networks and subscription contracts with only a
short switching delay. This would inexpensively implement a virtual multihoming
belonging to the availability class Astandby as discussed above.
This study is based on the regulation status and availability statistics in Nor-
way. Details might be diﬀerent in other countries. If and how mobile communica-
tion should be used depends on what service is run over it and its requirements
concerning availability, performance and costs. In this paper we only focused on
future challenges, usage alternatives and the availability; performance and costs
are important factors but were outside the scope.
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Abstract—The pervasive use of information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) in the future power grid creates an
interdependent system: ICT systems depend on power supply
and the power grid depends on information channels and systems
for monitoring and controlling. The automation of processes
with ICT can reduce the most frequent failures and decrease
their consequences. However, the added complexity and the tight
integration comes with new failure sources and increased mutual
dependencies between the systems and opens the possibility for
more catastrophic failures. In this paper we focus on these
interdependencies between the power grid and ICT in different
phases of the recovery process of a power failure. We model the
dependencies and quantify the effect of using smart monitoring
devices in the detection phase. The analysis shows that adding
battery backup into the communication network is a good
measure to delay the interdependency effect encountered. The
study of scenarios with different degrees of battery support,
number of repair crews and fault detection mechanisms indicates
that while automation can reduce the human effort needed for
the most frequent failures, it can lead to longer down times in less
frequent incidents, if no prevention measures are taken. Finally,
we show that the skill sets and training level of the repair crews
play a crucial role and can be used to prevent the negative effect
in low frequency incidents.
I. INTRODUCTION
The todays power grid depends on functioning information
and communication technology (ICT) services for various
aspects like monitoring, controlling and protection. In the
future power grid, the smart grid, this dependency is expected
to increase even more [1]. What makes the relation between
the power grid and the supporting ICT complex, is that on
one side the power grid relies on the ICT to get data and
to control the system, but on the other side, the ICT system
needs the power grid for power supply. Hence, we have an
interdependent system [2], [3]. In order to understand such a
system, it is crucial to investigate both of the systems and their
interactions [4]–[6].
Studies of major power grid incidents show the importance
of these interdependency effects in the past [7]–[9]. A formal-
ism to classify the different types of interdependencies and
failures is put forward in [2] and there are theoretic results
focusing on a long chain of failures cascading back and forth
between the power grid and the ICT system [7].
The introduction of new services based on ICT comes also
with the potential to increase the dependability of the power
grid [10]. The promise is that the automation of processes
can reduce the most frequent failures, which can be called
the primary effect. However, the new systems contain more
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Fig. 1: Schematic example how the introduction of automation
may inﬂuence the risk curve of a system.
sophisticated software and more conﬁguration possibilities.
This makes the development, conﬁguration and maintenance
more critical and complex. Lets call this the secondary effect.
Two large studies on the public switched network and critical
infrastructures showed that the majority of failures are either
human made due to wrong maintenance, conﬁguration or
accidents [11]; or software related [12]. Human made failures
may be caused among others by the complexity of large net-
works with its various technical concepts, historically grown
solutions, and its continuous renewal of technology [13].
The mentioned primary and secondary effects of the intro-
duction of ICT can be visualised in a simple plot as shown in
Fig. 1. The hyperbola represents the risk curve of a speciﬁc
system. The focus is usually on the primary effect of the
ICT support, which is supposed to reduce the frequency and
the consequences of high frequency incidents, denoted by the
arrow on the right side. The automation reduces human effort
for these incidents. However, there is also a change on the
other end of the scale, caused by the secondary effect. Without
any prevention this can lead to larger consequences in low
frequency incidents.
A situation where the interdependency between power grid
and ICT becomes apparent is during the recovery of a power
grid incident. The repair crews have a need to communicate
with the control centre but the prevailing failure in the power
grid has an inﬂuence on the power supply of the commu-
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nication system and its availability. Norway, a country with
remote regions and harsh weather conditions, suffered several
large winter storms in the last years. The power outages were
followed by the outage of the mobile network, which then
slowed down and impeded the recovery process. Triggered
by this events, the national regulator and the mobile network
operators (MNOs) started the discussion about stipulating
a required minimal battery supply in parts of the mobile
networks [14], which would delay the dependency effect on
the communication system.
In this paper, we focus on the interdependency in the smart
grid during the recovery process. We take a survivability
approach in which the study starts the moment the system fails
and ends with its full recovery [15]. The recovery process is
split into several phases and the interdependencies between
power grid and ICT systems are analysed step-wise for all
of them. Based on this, we propose an analytical model for
the recovery phase. First, it is used to investigate the potential
of automation and additional battery supply in the communi-
cation network to delay the interdependency effects between
the systems. Second, it is used to analyse scenarios with
different degrees of battery support, automation and number of
repair crews, under high, medium and low frequency incidents.
Finally, we discuss the impact of automation on the needed
skill set for the repair crews and its implications for the
recovery time.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The objective is to model the interdependency between the
power grid and the communication network during recovery.
More precisely, we are interested in the case, in which the
power grid suffers an outage that needs a repair crew to go
on location to conduct a repair. The repair crew is using
mobile handsets to coordinate among each others and with
the operator at the control centre. For operation, however,
the mobile network relies on the power supply by the power
network. The most critical components in the access network
of the mobile network are the base stations. While on place
for the repairing activity, the handsets of the repair crews
are connected to the base stations in the area affected by the
outage. Most important, the base stations, to which the mobile
handsets connect to, are in the same region as the power
incident and are likely to be affected by the power outage. The
base station may have an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
in form of a battery pack, which allows staying operable for
a certain time after the power went out. As soon as the base
station becomes unpowered, the mobile communication in that
speciﬁc region is not possible anymore and the repair crew is
slowed down because it has to work without communication.
Note, in highly populated areas there are usually several base
stations within reach. For this paper, we consider a sparsely
populated area with a low density of base stations as it is found
in large parts of Norway.
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Fig. 2: State diagram showing the cascading and escalating
interdependency failures during a power failure and its restora-
tion, with μR > μR2.
A. Dependencies between Power Grid and ICT
The dependencies in this system are two-fold. First, the
communication system depends on the power grid for power
supply. Second, the length of the recovery process depends on
the correct operation of the communication system.
The high-level state diagram in Fig. 2 shows the depen-
dencies in the failure case in more details. The model is
drawn along the two axes showing the state of the power
grid (PG) and the communication system (ICT) as described
in [6]. The failure in the power grid leads to a power outage
in the base station, which transitions into an excited state,
because it is now running on a ﬁnite battery supply. If no
battery was available, it would go straight into a failed state.
This is categorized as a cascading failure according to [2],
meaning the power failure is the single cause why the ICT
system transitions into an excited or failed state . The power
grid is now being restored, however, if the battery supply runs
out before its completion, the loss of communication leads to
a slower restoration rate. This mechanism is categorized as
escalating failure according to [2], meaning the power grid is
already in a critical or failed state but is additionally negatively
affected by the state change of another system, i.e. the failure
in the communication system.
B. Dependencies inside the Power Grid
There are additional dependencies, which concern only one
system. In a hurricane situation the probability is high that
several lines or stations in the power grid suffer a failure
at the same time. This leads to a state in which the repair
staff becomes a scarce resource and the repair of a failure
needs to be delayed until the necessary resources are available.
The recovery time for a failure depends, therefore, on the
availability of resources or more general on the state of the rest
of the power grid. This dependency can be seen as a failure
escalation as the failure in part of the system is escalated, i.e.
the recovery time is increased, if the repair crews are already
busy repairing other failures.
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Fig. 3: Recovery stages of the phased recovery from a power grid incident (phases are based on ITU-T E.800 (1994) [16]).
III. RECOVERY
The recovery process is split into the different phases based
on the partitioning of the down time as described in ITU-T
E.800 (1994) [16]. The phases are depicted in Fig. 3.
A. Recovery Stages
There are ﬁve phases in the recovery process:
• Detection phase: This phase comprises the detection
delay between the moment a failure happens until it is
actually noticed in the monitoring system and the time to
gather information about the incident. The power grid is
equipped with a protection system and fuses, which work
independently. Without monitoring devices installed, the
incident is not reported directly to the control centre.
Depending on the size of the incident, the control centre
may indirectly notice it by a load drop or other indi-
cations. Monitoring devices throughout the system can
detect failures close to real-time and thereby reduce the
detection time drastically. The level of details known
about the incident can vary from knowing the location,
affected components and exact fault type to basically
nothing. However, the system relies on a communication
channel between the devices and the control centre and
on power for the devices. The devices need only a short
time span in the order of seconds to collect data about
the incident and inform the control centre.
• Administrative phase: The recovery is planned and the re-
pair crew has to be assigned and instructed. This includes
using a communication system to reach the repair crew,
which might be located in a different region or might be
on duty in the ﬁeld. The used network is either a ﬁxed
network or a mobile network, depending on the location
of the crew.
• Logistics phase: The repair crew is gathering the needed
material and equipment and drives to the location of the
incident.
• Fault localisation: This phase includes the precise geo-
graphical location and ﬁnding the cause of the failure.
This may include communication with the control centre
to get additional information about the system or the
failed devices. This is especially important for less trained
or inexperienced workforce.
• Repair phase: The system is repaired and brought back
to normal operation.
B. Role of Communication
The used communication devices and communication net-
works change over the phases. In the detection phase smart
monitoring devices are used, which are distributed over the
whole network. They use a communication network that can
either be the utilities own network or a public network. All the
following phases use only mobile handsets as ﬁeld devices.
The used network is the mobile network but the region in
which it is used changes. In the administrative phase the
mobile handsets are used quite probably outside of the region
where the incident happened. In the logistics phase the repair
crew is relocating itself towards that region and for the last
two phases they are in the exact location of the incident. The
base stations in the access network of the mobile network in
this speciﬁc location depends on power supply and is suspect
to a failure if no battery power backup is available.
As explained above, the importance of information from
the ﬁeld devices and a working communication channel is
different in the recovery phases and inﬂuence the sojourn time
for the phases. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 with the boxes inside
the phases.
• Detection phase: The sojourn time depends on the exis-
tence of monitoring devices and an available communi-
cation channel to the control centre. If both are provided,
the sojourn time is in the order of seconds, if not, it is in
the order of several minutes and up to hours.
• Administrative phase: The sojourn times in the admin-
istrative phase is in the order of several minutes if the
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Fig. 4: Stochastic activity network for the recovery phases (print screen from the Mo¨bius tool [17]).
communication system is working and in the order of
hours if it is not working.
• Logistics phase: This phase is dominated by the trans-
portation time and is modelled as independent from the
availability of a communication system. Any communi-
cation activity is moved to the administrative phase. Its
sojourn time is in the order of tens of minutes to hours.
• Fault Localisation phase: The sojourn time depends on
the availability of the communication system to get addi-
tional information about the system or the failed device.
Additionally, it depends on the detection phase. If the
detection came from a smart monitoring device, then the
precise location and problem is known and the needed
time is short, i.e. in the order of tens of minutes. There is a
third case in this phase, namely when the communication
dies while the phase is ongoing. The repair crew may
have received already certain information from the con-
trol centre and the sojourn time is shortened compared to
the case without communication from the beginning but
is longer than the case with communication. The sojourn
times are in the order of tens of minutes.
• Repair phase: The sojourn time depends also on com-
munication as the recovery of the system can happen
smoother when communicating with the control centre.
The times are in the order of tens of minutes.
C. Model
The system is modelled with a stochastic activity network
(SAN) [18]. The cases detection with communication and
detection without communication are not in the model, but
are distinguished by using a different set of intensities in
the model. We assume that the ﬁxed network is used for
communication in the administrative phase and, for the sake
of simplicity, we assume that this does not fail.
The model is depicted in Fig. 4. The places are mirrored into
a second row representing the state in which the batteries in the
base stations in the incident regions are depleted. Therefore,
the fault localisation and the repair phase cannot use mobile
communication. It is important to note, that this gives no
information about the availability of the communication in
the other phases. This modelling decision is taken to allow
analysing multiple failures in the same model by simply
increasing the number of tokens in the initial marking.
Stage I of the recovery, i.e. the detection phase, runs
independent of repair crews, but as soon as Stage II is entered,
the recovery process is stopped until a repair crew is available.
This is modelled with a place representing the pool of available
repair crews, the consumption of one token from that place at
the start of Stage II and setting back a token after ﬁnishing
the recovery.
The initial marking is N tokens in the place det and R
tokens on R idle, where N is the number of failures in the
system and R the number of repair crews. The timed activities,
represented by a thick bar, follow all exponential distributions
and are multiplied by the number of tokens in the respective
input place to allow modelling multiple failures. The thinner
bars (wait, wait2, tidy_up) represent instantaneous
activities ﬁring as soon as all input places contain a token.
These transitions are introduced to make the model easier to
read.
D. Numerical analysis
We ﬁrst analyse the model numerically for a single failure,
i.e. N = 1, using the rates as given in the ﬁrst two columns
of Table I for the activities. The numbers are based on data
for longer outages from the Norwegian regulator [19]. In 2013
the mean down time (called CAIDI in power engineering) was
1.36 hours.
104
TABLE I: Rates used in the numerical analysis.
detection mechanism
automatic manual (1) manual (2)
activities [min−1] [min−1] [min−1]
aDet, aDet2 1/1 1/20 1/20
aA, aA2 1/5 1/5
aLog, aLog2 1/15 1/15
aFL 1/10 1/20 1/30
aFL to no 1/15 1/30 1/45
aFL no 1/22 1/45 1/90
aRep 1/10 1/15
aRep no 1/15 1/30
aBatx, x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 1/(battery supply)
A
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Fig. 5: Instantaneous availability A(t) during the recovery
process.
The quantitative analysis of the SAN is done by simulation
runs with the Mo¨bius tool [17]. The results are mean values
of 10’000 simulation runs for each parameter set.
For the ﬁrst analysis, an impulse reward is added to the
very last transition in the SAN model called tidy_up.
Whenever this transition ﬁres, a reward of 1 is given. The
time distribution of this reward gives the distribution of the
recovery time. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) is
then equal to the instantaneous availability during recovery:
A(t) = P (Trecovery ≤ t), which also denotes the probability
that the recovery time Trecovery is less than t.
The result is given in Fig. 5. The lower four curves show the
results for manual detection, the upper four curves the result
for automatic detection. Both, having an automatic detection
and having a battery supply at the base stations have a positive
effect on the recovery speed.
In order to break down the effect on the different recovery
phases, we repeat the simulation with a different reward
function. A reward of 1 is given after leaving any of the ﬁve
recovery phases. The rewards are then summed up over time
and the results are plotted in Fig. 6. The plot shows how the
battery supply inﬂuences the availability only after entering
the later recovery phases. The automatic detection has the
strongest impact in the ﬁrst phase and in the fault localisation
phase.
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E. Costs
The installation of additional battery has a clear effect on the
recovery process, however, it comes with an installation and
maintenance cost. In Norway there are discussions between
the regulator and the mobile network providers to increase the
battery supply in the network [14]. On the other side, there
are costs for the power utility during the recovery process
for the smart monitoring devices, material, equipment and
the repair crews. Increasing battery supply increases both the
dependability of the network and the costs for the society.
For a utility under pressure it might be tempting to reduce
recovery costs by proﬁting from the battery supply in the
mobile network by reducing the number of repair crews. The
impact of this reduction is analysed in the next section.
In our analysis we do not consider cost in more details, it
is outside the scope of this paper. But the main point is, that
the expenses are on the mobile operators, while the potential
savings are for the power utilities.
IV. RISK CURVE
A. Consequence of Incident
The risks of a system are analysed by studying the proba-
bility or frequency of an incident and its consequences. The
analysis yields a characteristic risk curve for a system. As
a measure for the consequence we use the mean down time
(MDT) of a system. It is computed by getting the recovery dis-
tribution, i.e. the instantaneous unavailability U(t) = 1−A(t)
beginning immediately after a failure, where A(t) denotes the
availability. The MDT is now computed by integrating U(t)
over time
MDT =
∫ ∞
0
U(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
1−A(t)dt
.
Another option for the measure is the cost of energy not
supplied (CENS), which is used in the Norwegian regulation
framework [20]. It also uses the down time for the calculations
but includes more information like the estimated costs of
an outage for a speciﬁc customer group. For the sake of
simplicity, we only concentrate on the down time as a measure
because it is the dominating factor.
A power utility may proﬁt from battery supply in the mobile
network by decreasing the number of repair crews, which
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Fig. 7: Mean Down Time (MDT) for the scenarios under the
three incidents.
leads to a cost cut. Table II shows a simple comparison of
a system having no battery, and a system having an average
of 180 minutes battery supply and a decreasing number of
repair crews. There are 5 failures in each of the systems.
The MDTs show clearly the effect of the battery supply.
When having no battery supply, the MDT with 5 repair crews
is slightly longer than the MDT with 180 minutes battery
supply but only two repair crews. However, these results are
only valid for 5 failures in the system. A system needs to be
analysed over a range of different incidents before a decision
about a reduction of repair crews can be taken.
B. Considered Incidents
We compute the risk curve for our system for the following
three different incidents:
• high frequency incident: Incident happing several times a
year. We use a single power grid failure.
• medium frequency incident: Incident happening every
other year, like a smaller storm leading to several power
grid failures. In the numerical example we use 5 failures.
• low frequency incident: Incident happening once in 10
years, like a hurricane that causes a larger number of
power grid failures. In the numerical example we use 10
failures.
C. Numerical analysis
We consider several scenarios for the system and start
with the top three rows in Table III. Scenario 1 is the old
system. There are no monitoring devices in the network and
the detection phase is, therefore, manual. There is no battery
supply for the base stations. The used parameters are listed in
TABLE II: Inﬂuence of reducing repair crews when having
battery supply.
Failures Repair Battery MDT
Crews [min] [min]
5 5 0 106
5 5 180 76
5 2 180 101
5 1 180 144
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Fig. 8: Mean Down Time (MDT) for the scenarios under the
three incidents.
Table I, in the column manual (1). Scenarios 2 and 3 both
have some battery supply but a reduced number of repair
crews. They also have smart devices that provide an automatic
detection in the high and medium frequency incident case. In
the low frequency incident, i.e. the rare event, it is assumed
that the communication to this devices is cut and that the
detection has to happen manual as well. The used parameters
are listed in Table I, in the columns manual (1) and automatic.
D. Missing Training and Practise
In the previous case it is implicitly assumed that the repair
crews in Scenario 2 and 3 manage the recovery phases in
the low frequency incidents with the same efﬁciency as the
repair crews in scenario 1. However, this might be unrealistic
as they most often operate with information sent to them from
the smart devices during the automatic detection. Only seldom
do they perform a recovery starting with a manual detection.
Therefore, there might be less operational knowledge, less
training and missing skills for the recovery phases without
the information from the smart devices. In addition, a repair
crew in the automatic detection case does not need the same
knowledge and background as one in scenario 1, which might
have an effect on the stafﬁng. The combination of these
reasons, leads to the conclusion, that the repair crews might
perform worse in the low frequency incident than the repair
crews in scenario 1, and the results are probably too optimistic.
Therefore, we create the scenarios 4 and 5, which are replicas
of scenarios 2 and 3, but with adjusted rates. The scenarios are
given in Table III and the parameters in Table I in the columns
manual (2) and automatic. For the parameters in manual (2),
the expected activity time in manual (1) are multiplied by 1.5
TABLE III: Scenarios (parameters are given in Table I).
Battery Repair Detection in incident case:
[min] Crews Low Medium High
Scenario 1 0 5 manual (1)
Scenario 2 30 3 manual (1) automatic
Scenario 3 180 3 manual (1) automatic
Scenario 4 30 3 manual (2) automatic
Scenario 5 180 3 manual (2) automatic
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if the communication to the control centre still is available and
by 2.0 if the communication is not available.
E. Discussion
The results are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. They show,
that the scenarios 2, 3, 4 and 5 have a signiﬁcant lower MDT
than scenario 1 for high and medium frequency incidents, even
though they use less repair crews. The reason is two-fold.
First, the battery supply, which delays the power outage in the
communication network allows the repair crews to communi-
cate with the control centre and reduces the recovery time.
Second, the automatic detection with the smart monitoring
devices gives valuable information about the exact place and
nature of the failure. In other words, the advantage of the
introduction of monitoring devices, and strengthening of the
communication platform, is so strong that it is even possible
to downsize the number of repair crews and still have a better
performance, i.e. a lower MDT, than without.
However, in incidents with lower frequency, the improve-
ments have the opposite effect. The scenario 2 and 3 perform
here similar to scenario 1, which has no battery supply at all.
The scenarios 4 and 5 have a more pronounced risk curve and
the MDT is actually higher than in scenario 1.
The results indicate, that decreasing the consequences of
the most common incidents by increasing the automation
and using less trained employees can have the inverse effect
in rare events. This can be circumvented by the following
endeavours. First, by not downsizing the repair staff. Second,
by keeping the repair staff on a high training standard and
having efﬁcient and well-established processes for the rare
events. However, the utilities are under a certain economical
pressure and the incidents in which the additional repair staff
or the additional skills are needed are seldom. Therefore, this
might be overlooked or ignored to save money. As both the
MNOs and the power utilities are regulated, the pressure might
also come from the regulators to counterbalance the investment
costs for the battery supply on a macro-economic level. Hiring
repair staff on demand might help, but there the risk of missing
training and practise is even more noticeable and in a critical
situation the skilled repair staff might be a scarce resource.
An additional option is to compensate the reduction of repair
crews and the change of skill sets by employing additional
specialist that can cover the rare events as indicated in Fig. 1.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the characteristics of the smart grid is the wide use
of ICT to operate the power grid more efﬁcient and in a more
reliable way. The automation of processes reduces the most
common failures and makes them less severe. However, the
added complexity and the tight integration comes with new
failure sources and increased mutual dependencies between
the systems. We focused on modelling and analysing these
interdependencies between the power grid and the communi-
cation system in the different phases of the recovery process.
As shown in this paper, it is possible to reduce or delay the
dependency by adding battery supply to the most critical part
of the mobile network and adjust the skill sets of the repair
staff to cover not only the most frequent failures, but also
the rare events in which deep knowledge about the system is
necessary.
There are costs for minimising and preventing failures, but
also for the recovery of failures. They have to be balanced
by either the market or legislations from the regulator. We
touched upon it very brieﬂy but in general, it is outside the
scope of this paper.
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Managed dependability in interacting systems
Poul E Heegaard, Bjarne E Helvik, Gianfranco Nencioni, Jonas Wa¨ﬂer
Abstract A digital ICT infrastructure must be considered as a system of systems in
itself, but also in interaction with other critical infrastructures such as water distri-
butions, transportation (e.g. Intelligent Transport Systems), and Smart Power Grid
control. These systems are characterised by self-organisation, autonomous subsys-
tems, continuous evolution, scalability and sustainability, providing both economic
and social value. Services delivered involve a chain of stakeholders that share the re-
sponsibility, providing robust and secure services with stable and good performance.
One crucial challenge for the different operation/control centers of the stakeholders
is to manage dependability during normal operation, which may be characterised
by many failures of minor consequence. In seeking to optimise the utilisation of the
available resources with respect to dependability, new functionality is added with
the intension to help assist in obtaining situational awareness, and for some parts
enable autonomous operation. This new functionality adds complexity, such that the
complexity of the (sub)systems and their operation will increase. As a consequence
of adding a complex system to handle complexity, the frequency and severity of
the consequences of such events may increase. Furthermore, as a side-effect of this,
the preparedness will be reduced for restoration of services after a major event (that
might involves several stakeholders), such as common software breakdown, security
attacks, or natural disaster.
This chapter addresses the dependability challenges related to the above mentioned
system changes. It is important to understand how adding complexity to handle com-
plexity will inﬂuence the risks, both with respect to the consequences and the prob-
abilities. In order to increase insight, a dependability modelling approach is taken,
where the goal is to combine and extend the existing modelling approaches in a
novel way. The objective is to quantify different strategies for management of de-
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pendability in interacting systems. Two comprehensive system examples are used to
illustrate the approach. A Software Deﬁned Networking example addresses the ef-
fect of moving control functionality from being distributed and embedded with the
primary function, to be separated and (virtually) centralised. To demonstrate and
discuss the consequences of adding more functionality both in the distributed enti-
ties serving the primary function, and centralised in the control centre, a Smart Grid
system example is studied.
1 Introduction
The private and public ICT service-provisioning infrastructure has developed over
many years into a complex system and its interactions with other critical infrastruc-
ture systems such as water distributions, transportation (e.g. Intelligent Transport
Systems), and Smart Power Grid control have created diverse digital ecosystems.
Digital ecosystems are characterised by self-organisation, autonomous subsystems,
continuous evolution, scalability, and sustainability, providing both economic and
social value. Services delivered involve a chain of stakeholders that share the re-
sponsibility, providing robust and secure services with stable and good performance.
This evolution has been evident for some time. In spite of this, and the crucial role
of such systems, not much research is directed toward ensuring the dependability of
the services provided by such ecosystem of systems. The objective of this chapter
is to address some of the issues that arise when we seek to mange the dependability
of systems.
1.1 Challenges
One crucial challenge for the different operation and control centres of the different
systems is to manage the dependability in normal operation with many failures of
minor consequence. In seeking to optimise the utilisation of the available resources
with respect to dependability [1], the complexity of the (sub)systems and their op-
eration will increase due to increased interconnectedness and complexity.
Some issues to take into consideration include:
• The public ICT services are the result of the cooperation between a huge number
of markets actors. The overall system providing these services are not engineered,
and there is no aggregate insight into their design and operation.
• There is no coordinated management to deal with issues involving several au-
tonomous systems, in spite of such issues being a likely cause of extensive prob-
lems and outages.
• It is necessary to prepare for restoration of service after a major event such as
common software breakdown, security attacks, or natural disasters. This prepa-
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ration must include technical and operational as well as organisational and soci-
etal aspects.
An additional challenge is the management of dependability over multiple net-
work domains, with uncoordinated operations in each of the different domains.
As a potential side-effect of this, the preparedness for restoration of services
after a major event (that might involve several stakeholders) such as common
software breakdown, security attacks, or a natural disaster will be reduced. In ad-
dition, the frequency and consequences of such events may increase. More focus
on exercises and use of the improved situational awareness provided by the new
operational functionality, will to some extent reduce the negative side effect.
Ensuring the dependability of services based on an interacting relationship be-
tween independent stakeholders in the provision is typically agreed upon through
Service Level Agreements (SLAs), which give guarantees on the non-functional
properties of the services, including dependability aspects such as interval avail-
ability. These are important means to ensure the dependability of the services, but
are insufﬁcient to prevent and handle dependability problems across providers, as
outlined above.
New functionality is added to enhance and improve operation and management
of complex digital ecosystems. This is done to rationalise the operation, save money,
simplify resource management, and maximise utilisation. It also enables more
timely and precise knowledge and information about system state, facilitating timely
(proactive) maintenance, and reducing the frequency and consequences of failures.
The operational cost is reduced by reduction in manual labour through better and
quicker detection and diagnostic mechanisms, and more autonomous self-repair.
The objective is to shorten the recovery time and to reduce the failure frequency
through better proactive maintenance. It should be kept in mind that this function-
ality targets the frequent (everyday) failures which are anticipated in the system
design and normally of low consequence. However, this increased maintainability
is achieved by the introduction of new, and partly centralised functionality, that in-
creases the total complexity and creates an interdependent system [8]. These sys-
tems not only have additional failures and failure modes [12, 22], but they may also
manifest a more fragile behaviour in critical situations [2, 18].
Figure 1 illustrates a risk curve, where the events with high “probability” have
low consequence and the events with low “probability” have high consequence. The
introduction of ICT-based support system, to operate an ICT system, or a critical
infrastructure such as Smart Grid, is expected to reduce the consequences and prob-
ability of daily events. Less human resources are needed for the daily operations.
However, due to the introduction of another ICT-based system, the complexity and
interdependency in a system will increase, with the potential consequence of in-
creased probability of critical events with extensive and long lasting consequences.
Such events affect large parts of the system and a take long time to recover from
because of lack of understanding of the complexity (“we have not seen this failure
before”), or the lack of maintenance support and coordination between the different
subsystems and domains in the digital ecosystem (“who should do what?”). As in-
dicated in the ﬁgure, it is not only necessary to increase the focus and manpower
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on the events with larger consequences, but also increase the competence of the
operation personnel.
Critical events
Frequent events
 Introduction of ICT support 
More advanced human effort needed 
(to prepare for the unknown)   
Move personnel 
Increase competence 
Focus is here
Move personnel
Increase competence 
"Probability"
Consequenses
Before
After
Fig. 1 Introducing ICT support to assist daily operations may increase the overall risk
There is a lack of theoretical foundation to control the societal and per service
dependability of ICT infrastructure in the digital ecosystem. No foundation is estab-
lished for optimisation, consolidated management, and provision of this infrastruc-
ture, neither from a public regulatory perspective, nor from the perspective of groups
of autonomous (commercially) co-operating providers. A model of an ICT infras-
tructure must describe the structure and behaviour of the physical and logical infor-
mation and network infrastructure, and include the services provided. Furthermore,
through the modelling phases, it should be described how resilience engineering [9]
can be applied to manage the robustness and survivability of the ICT infrastructure
ecosystem.
1.2 Outline
This chapter describes the above mentioned challenges and outlines potential ap-
proaches to gain more insight into the risks. To increase the understanding and as-
sess the risk (both consequences and probabilities), a holistic modelling approach is
taken of service in systems of systems. The goal is to quantify different strategies
for management of dependability in interacting systems. This should be addressed
by different approaches:
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• System modelling: Modelling of the functional interaction between embedded
technical sub-systems in an ecosystem with multiple actors coordinated via busi-
ness models only.
• Management strategies: Management and provisioning of (digital) ecosystems in
a cost-efﬁcient way, considering the trade-off between cost and quality.
• Quantitative assessment: Resource allocation optimisation (modelling, measure-
ments, simulations) of robustness/dependability and performance in digital ecosys-
tems.
Figure 2 illustrates that to improve the operation and management (O&M) of
complex systems (e.g. in the Smart Grids), new control logic and functionality must
be added and in some cases also be centralised (e.g. in Software Deﬁned Network-
ing (SDN), and by the introduction of network function virtualisation NFV in next
generation communication networks). This needs to be modelled, and the system
models parametrised to quantify the effect on the dependability and to identify po-
tential changes and improvements that can be made in O&M. The reason is that the
new and/or moved functionality poses new risks and threats to the systems, and may
have potential undesired side-effects that need to be qualitatively assessed to again
identify potential changes and improvements that can be made during O&M, and to
the O&M systems.
Improve O&M in 
complex systems
Add and move 
functionality
Potential side effects
(Increased complexity)
Systems model
Parameterized
Effect on dependability? 
Changes in O&M?
implies
modelling
qualitative
quantitativerisks/threats
Fig. 2 Understanding the complexity
As a step towards gaining this understanding, Section 2 discusses how the com-
plexity is changing by adding and moving control logic from being embedded and
closely integrated with the functionality to be controlled to being separated and
to some extents also centralised. Being able to deal with these issues, the ability
to build representative, yet understandable and tractable dependability models are
crucial. Seeking to build an entirely new theoretical approach does not seem feasi-
ble. Our approach is to extend and combine current approaches in novel manners
to reach our objective. Hence, to illustrate this and to exemplify the effect of the
changes in complexity, Section 2 includes two simple models with numerical exam-
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ples. To demonstrate how the complexity might be modelled and assessed, Section 3
gives an example of modelling of the increase complexity in SDN, and Section 4
provides the same for a Smart Grid example. Finally, our concluding remarks are
found in Section 5.
2 Complex digital ecosystems
As discussed in the previous section, digital ecosystems are complex systems, which
are challenging to operate and control. This is due both to their tight integration with
other technical systems and the necessity to perform management over multiple
system domains where each domain has (partly) uncoordinated operations.
To enhance and improve the operation and maintainability of the complex
digital ecosystems, new functionality is added and/or moved and centralised. As
an example, in Software Deﬁned Networking, the functionality of the control logic
is separated from the forwarding functionality in the data plane and moved from the
distributed control plane residing on the components to be controlled to a virtually
centralised control plane. Another example is Smart Grid, where the ICT and power
grids are tightly integrated and interdependent. New functionality is added both in a
distributed manner to enable observability and controllability of the components in
the power grid, and centralised in the control centres to implement the control and
management.
Adding and moving functionality will contribute to changes in the complexity.
The goal is to simplify, or assist handling of complexity. However, adding new hard-
ware and software, or moving the existing, will change the interrelations between
functional and logical “entities”/“components”. This means that, even though the
total complexity is the same or reduced, the system is less well understood and po-
tentially contains new vulnerabilities and poses new management challenges.
Later in this chapter, two comprehensive system examples are introduced to
demonstrate the modelling of this change in complexity. In Section 3, a model of
Software Deﬁned Networking is given and in Section 4 a Smart Grid example.
2.1 Centralising distributed functionality
IP networks are comprised of distributed, coordinated, but autonomous network
nodes, where the control logic is embedded and closely integrated with the same
forwarding functionality that is to be controlled, as illustrated in Figure 3(a).
In emerging networking technology, the trend is to separate the control and for-
warding1 and to move the control logic from the network nodes to a (virtually) cen-
tralised controller. The reduction in the distributed (control logic) functionality and
1 This is similar to how it was done in telephony systems (PSTN) with separate data trafﬁc and
signalling trafﬁc using Signalling System 7 (SS7) [10] and in B-ISDN [11]
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a corresponding increase in the centralised functionality will potentially reduce the
complexity in the (partly) autonomous network nodes and increase the complexity
of the centralised systems, as illustrated in Figure 3(b).
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the forwarding engine of the network
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(b) Logically centralised control logic
with simple distributed network nodes
Fig. 3 Moving control logic to enhance the resource utilisation and improve QoS
It is reasonable to assume that a simpliﬁcation in the functionality will reduce
the complexity of the network nodes. If the properties of the hardware platform is
unchanged the network node will then be less error prone. However, if at the same
time commodity hardware is used to reduce the node cost then there is a potential
risk of decreasing the hardware availability. Then, it is not obvious whether the node
availability will improve or not.
The centralisation of the complex functionality should increase the system avail-
ability, due to better global overview and coordination. The control logic has com-
parable (or the same) functionality to the functionality that is moved from the dis-
tributed nodes, but additional functionality is needed to coordinate and mitigate the
central controllers. Furthermore, centralisation invites new more advanced function-
ality, for instance consult the motivation for SDN, [6, 20, 24]. It is therefore not
known what effect the central controllers have on the system availability.
A separation of the forwarding and control functionality does not necessarily
mean a separation of the hardware platform and its functionality. A common mis-
take is to forget that the underlying resources, such as the routing and switching
hardware, are typically utilised not only by the primary information handled by the
system, such as user packets, but also for the signalling of information exchange
necessary to control and manage the very same resources. Such an interdependency
has a negative effect on the overall system availability [4].
Whether the system availability is improved or not when centralising complex
functionality depends on to what extent the reduced complexity of the functionality
will have a positive effect and improve resource utilisation (due to the global system
state being availability, which eases resource coordination) compared to the added
complexity in the overhead associated with managing the centralised functionality.
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Example 1: Availability requirement of the controller. To demonstrate the ef-
fect of moving the complexity on availability a very simple example can be consid-
ered. Assume that the conventional network in Figure 3(a) is modelled as a serial
structure with three network nodes with availability ANo. The serial structure of the
network nodes is assumed for simplicity and is not regarded as realistic. The new
network is a serial structure consisting of the central controller with availability AC
and the three networks nodes with availability ANn. Since moving the complexity
should improve the availability then ANo < ANn. The availability requirement of the
controller is given by
AC > (
ANo
ANn
)3 (1)
If ANo = 0.98 and ANn = 0.99, then AC > 0.97.
If we have some inherent redundancy in the distributed system the effect becomes
radical. Assuming the elements in the network in Figure 3(a) operate in a ideal
load-shared mode where on them can take the entire load. They will then constitute
a parallel system and we get A∗C · 1− (1− ANn)3 > 1− (1− ANo)3, where A∗C >
0.999992.
Later, in Section 3, a system model of Software Deﬁned Networking is intro-
duced to address in more detail the effect of moving control functionality from being
distributed and embedded with the primary function to be separated and (virtually)
centralised.
2.2 Add distributed and increase centralised functionality
The need for enhanced operation and control in the power grid is an excellent ex-
ample where new ICT based control logic is added to the distributed power grid
components. In power distribution grids, the grid components typically contain lit-
tle or no automated control logic. This means that manual detection and recovery
is required, which must be coordinated by the control centre, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4(a).
Figure 4(b) shows that new functionality must be added to the centralised con-
troller to be able to utilise the new distributed functionality (remote control logic).
Centralising functionality to achieve better decisions will provide a single point of
failure, performance bottleneck, and expose targeted attacks.
The ICT based control functionality is not only supporting the operations, but
needs to be operated in addition to the primary functionality. The technology and
functionality will in many cases be new to the organisation and might change the
workﬂows and result in a need for enhanced knowledge and competence in opera-
tion.
From a dependability perspective, adding ICT based control seems to be a bad
idea since all the negative side-effects pointed out in the previous subsection apply,
with functionality added both in the distributed nodes and in the centralised con-
trollers. This produces less positive effects compared to moving and centralising
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Fig. 4 Adding control logic to enhance the maintainability and improve service reliability
functionality. However, the new ICT based control functionality will increase the
maintainability through more timely and precise knowledge and information about
system state, so timely (proactive) maintenance can be carried out, and hence, the
frequency and consequences of the most frequent faults (failures) are reduced. The
operational cost is reduced by reduction in manual labour through better and quicker
detection mechanisms and more autonomous (self-)repair. The results are reduced
recovery times and better proactive maintenance.
It is not guaranteed that the system availability will increase from added (ICT-
based) functionality or not. Even though the maintainability is signiﬁcantly im-
proved, which makes both proactive and reactive maintenance more effective, it
is an uncertainty in that the control functionality itself adds complexity that might
affect the system availability.
Example 2: Mean component down time. Adding more logic to the components is
assumed to reduce the components recovery time, but at the same time increase the
component failure intensity. The hardware failure intensity is assumed unchanged,
but the added logic might also fail.
To compare the two systems we should consider the requirements of mean down
time (MDT), mean time to failures (MTTF), and availability. In this example, we
say that the new system should have the same availability requirement and will then
determine the maximum MDT requirement of the component for a given set of
failure intensities for the hardware, λH , and software, λS.
The availability of the original system is:
ANo = ASo ·A3H =
μS
λS+μS
·
(
μH
λH +μH
)3
(2)
while for the modiﬁed system with added functionality it is:
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ANo = ASn · (AHS ·AH)3 = μSμS+λSS · (
μSμSS
(λS+μS)(λH +μSH)
)3 (3)
To retain the same availability level in the new system, the maximum mean down
time MDT = 1/μHS is determined by ANo < ANn. Let the software failure intensity
[in minutes−1] for the centralised control logic be λSS = 0.5λS, and λH = 1/24,
μS = 60, λH = 1/168, μH = 1 then μHS > 1.18529, which means that MDT < 50.6
minutes.
In Section 4, a Smart Grid example is introduced to demonstrate and discuss the
consequences of adding more functionality, both in the distributed entities serving
the primary function and centralised in the control centre.
3 Example: Availability in Software Deﬁned Networking
The purpose of this section is to present a case study that highlights how the com-
plexity changes by moving the control logic of a system from distributed to cen-
tralised. To illustrate this, we extend and combine current approaches in order to
model and assess the availability of a new network paradigm. The results show how
the management of complex systems is critical from a dependability perspective.
In the following, we introduce some details about Software Deﬁned Networking
(SDN) and describe the problem addressed, then we present a two-level hierarchi-
cal model for to evaluate the availability of SDN. Finally, we perform a simple
sensitivity analysis on a selected set of parameters that will potentially affect the
dependability of SDN.
3.1 Software Deﬁned Networking
During the recent years, the SDN has emerged as a new network paradigm, which
mainly consists of a programmable network approach where the forwarding plane
is decoupled from the control plane [6, 14]. Despite programmable networks hav-
ing been studied for decades, SDN is experiencing a growing success because it is
expected that the ease of changing protocols and provide support for adding new
services and applications will foster future network innovation, which is limited and
expensive in todays legacy systems.
A simpliﬁed sketch of the SDN architecture from IRFT RFC 7426 [6] without
the management plane is depicted in Figure 5. The control plane and data plane are
separated. Here the control plane is logically centralised in a software-based con-
troller (“network brain”), while the data plane is composed of the network devices
(“network arms”) that conduct the packet forwarding.
The control plane has a northbound and a southbound interface. The northbound
interface provides an network abstraction to the network applications (e.g. routing
protocol, ﬁrewall, load balancer, anomaly detection, etc...), while the southbound
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Fig. 5 SDN architecture (exclusive the management plane)
interface (e.g. OpenFlow) standardises the information exchange between control
and data planes.
In [20], the following set of potential advantages of SDN were pointed out:
• centralised control;
• simpliﬁed algorithms;
• commoditising network hardware;
• eliminating middle-boxes;
• enabling the design and deployment of third-party applications.
However, from a dependability perspective, the SDN poses a set of new vulnera-
bilities and challenges compared with traditional networking, as discussed in [7]:
• consistency of network information (user plane state information) and controller
decisions;
• consistency between the distributed SDN controllers in the control plane;
• increased failure intensities of (commodity) network elements;
• compatibility and interoperability between general purpose, non-standard net-
work elements
• interdependency between path setup in network elements and monitoring of the
data plane in the control plane;
• load sharing (to avoid performance bottleneck) and fault tolerance in the control
plane have conﬂicting requirements;
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3.2 Problem description
Traditional IP networks consist of a set of interconnected nodes that include both
the data and control planes. Each network node is a complex device that has the
functionality of both data forwarding and networking control. To increase the avail-
ability and performance of such devices, manufacturers have focused on specialised
hardware and software over the past few decades.
As discussed in Section 2, SDN has the potential to change the principles of net-
working and to enhance network ﬂexibility. This implies moving the control logic
from the network nodes to a (virtual) centralised controller, and to open up the con-
trollers to a third party via an API (northbound interface), as illustrated in Figure 6.
The transition from a distributed network with a focus on establishing and maintain-
ing the connectivity between peering points, to a centralised network with a focus on
QoS and resource utilisation, will potentially lead to much simpler network nodes
with less control logic. The centralised control logic, such as the routing decisions,
might be simpler and can even be made more advanced, without making it more
complex compared to the distributed solution. The controller has the potential to set
up data ﬂows based on a richer set of QoS attributes than in traditional IP networks.
However, the coordination and handling of the consistency between the SND con-
trollers, will require new, and complicated logic that will be a critical element to
also make SDN a good solution from a dependability perspective.
In the example in this section, we study how the SDN paradigm modiﬁes the
overall availability of the network relative to the traditional distributed IP network
and analyse which factors dominate in this new scenario.
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Fig. 6 Software Deﬁned Networking is an example where the control logic is moved from dis-
tributed to virtually centralised (see Fig. 3)
Although dependability must be regarded as an important issue to make SDN
a success, to the best of our knowledge, very limited work on modelling the de-
pendability in SDN availability has been performed. In [17], a model of SDN con-
trollers is developed, while [7] discusses potential dependability challenges with
SDN, which is partially illustrated by a small case study with a structural analysis
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of SDN enabled network. In this section, we study a comprehensive system model
of SDN with respect to dependability.
3.3 Modelling
A two-level hierarchical model is introduced to evaluate the dependability of SDN
in a global network. In this example, the dependability is measured in terms of
steady state availability, in the following referred to as availability. The two-level
hierarchical modelling approach consists of
• upper level: a structural model of the topology of network elements and con-
trollers
• lower level: dynamic models (some) of network elements
The approach seeks to avoid the potential uncontrolled growth in model size, by
compromising the need for modelling details and at the same time modelling a
(very) large scale network. The detailed modelling is necessary to capture the de-
pendencies that exists between network elements and to described multiple failure
modes that might be found in some of the network elements and in the controllers.
The structural model disregards this and assumes independence between the com-
ponents considered, where a component can be either a single network elements
with one failure mode or a set of elements that are interdependent and/or experience
several failure modes and an advanced recovery strategy. For the former we need to
use dynamic models such as a Markov model or Stochastic Petrinet (e.g., Stochastic
Reward Network [3]), and for the latter structural models such as reliability block
diagram, fault trees, or structure functions based on minimal cut or path sets.
In the following section, we will demonstrate the use of this approach.
3.3.1 Model case
In this example, we analyse the availability of a nation-wide backbone network
that consists of 10 nodes across 4 cities, and two dual-homed SDN controllers. See
Figure 7 for an illustration of the topology. The nodes are located in the four major
cities in Norway, Bergen (BRG), Trondheim (TRD), Stavanger (STV), and Oslo
(OSL). Each town has duplicated nodes, except Oslo which has four nodes (OSL1
and OSL2). The duplicated nodes are labelled, X1 and X2, where X=OSL1, OSL2,
BRG, STV, and TRD. In addition to the forwarding nodes, there are two dual-homed
SDN controllers (SC1 and SC2), which are connected to TRD and OSL1.
The objective of the study is to compare the availability of SDN with a traditional
IP network with the same topology of network elements (SDN forwarding switched
and IP routers). We assume that nodes, links, and controllers in the system may fail.
The peering trafﬁc in a city is routed through an access and metro network with a
connection to both (all four) nodes in the city. The system is working (up), when
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Fig. 7 Case study: nation-wide backbone network
all the access and metro networks are connected. Note that for SDN, at least one
controller must be reachable from all nodes along a working path.
3.3.2 Structural analysis
The critical parts of the connection between the trafﬁc origins and destinations can
be determined using structural analysis based on either minimal cut sets, S, or mini-
mal path sets. The sets are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. Minimal cut set: The system is failed if and only if all the subsystems
in a minimal cut set are failed, given that all the other subsystems that are not in the
set are working.
Deﬁnition 2. Minimal path set: The system is working if and only if all the subsys-
tems in a minimal path set are working, and given that all the subsystems that are
not in the set are failed.
We use the minimum cut sets, S, to form the basis for a structure function, Φ
(minimum path sets can also be applied).
Deﬁnition 3. Structure function: Each max-term of the structure function expressed
in a minimal product-of-sums form corresponds to a minimal cut set.
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The following connections in SDN must be considered:
• ﬂow triggering: a path for the trigger message that should be sent from the source
node (at least one node of each city) to at least one SDN controller on arrival of
a new ﬂow;
• network state update and route directives: a path from the SDN controller to each
node;
• forwarding: forwarding path from/to each city (6 combinations).
The structural analysis for all the possible connections in the SDN example,
shows that the cardinality of the set of minimal cut set S is ‖S‖ = 2916. The car-
dinality c j = ‖s j‖ of each of the minimal cut sets, j = 1, · · · ,2916 is given in Ta-
ble 1. Each column contains the number of sets that is Ck = ‖{s j ∈ S|c j = k}‖,
k = 1, · · · ,13. The table compares the minimal cut sets of SDN with a conventional
IP network where the control plane is embedded in the nodes, and hence, no con-
trollers are needed.
Table 1 Distribution of cardinality of the minimum cut sets for the IP network and SDN
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 sum
IP network 0 3 8 91 304 360 356 189 70 13 1394
SDN 0 4 15 107 340 520 780 584 302 170 59 31 4 2916
The number of minimal cut sets with cardinality one is equal to zero because
trafﬁc sources are at least dual-homed and there are two dual-homed control sites.
The number of minimal cut setsC2 increases from 3 to 4 due to the control nodes.
Note also that the number of minimal cut setsC3 almost doubles. This indicates that
in this example, a signiﬁcant increase in vulnerability is observed for the SDN case
that is not explained solely by the introduction of a control node, but the fact that a
controller must be reachable from every node across the backbone in order for the
network to work.
3.3.3 Markov model of networks elements
In order to evaluate the availability of each network element, we develop Markov
models of each of the links, traditional routers/switches, SDN routers/switches, and
the SDN controllers.
Links
The network model of a link is assumed to be dominated by hardware failures.
Therefore, a simple two-state Markov model is used. The links are either up or down
due to hardware failure. We use the same model for both traditional networks and
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SDN. Given failure rate λL and repair rate μL, the availability of a link is AL = μLλL+μL .
This model is assumed for each of the components in the structural model.
Routers
The model of a traditional router/switch is depicted in Figure 8(a), where the states
are deﬁned in Table 2.
Table 2 State variables for traditional IP router
state up/down description
OK up System is fault free
OM down Operation and Maintenance state
CHW1 up Hardware failure of one controller
CHW2 down Hardware failure both controllers
COV down Coverage state, unsuccessful activation of the stand-by
hardware after a failure; manual recovery
FHW down Permanent hardware failure in forwarding plane
FHWt down Transient hardware failure in forwarding plane
SW down Software failure
Multiple failures are not included in the model since they are rare and will have
an impact signiﬁcantly smaller than the expected accuracy of the approach.
OKFHWt
O&MSW
CHW1 CHW2
FWH COV
μdSλdS
λdO
μdO
μdFt
λdFt
λdFμdF
2Cλdc
2(1− C)λdc
μdc
μdc
λdc
μdc
(a) Traditional network
OK
FHWt
SW
FWH
μdSλdS
μdFt λdFt
μdFλdFt
(b) SDN
Fig. 8 Markov model of a router/switch
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SDN forwarding nodes
Figure 8(b) shows the model of the forwarding node, i.e., router or switch in an
SDN, which corresponds to the traditional IP router. It is signiﬁcantly simpler. The
states related to the control hardware and O&M failures are not contained in this
model, since all the control logic is located in the controller. The software is still
present but its failure rate will be very low since the functionality is much simpler.
SDN controller
The model of the SDN controller is composed of two sets of states. One set captures
the software and hardware failures. The second set captures the O&M failures in
combination with the hardware states of the system. We have assumed that the SDN
controller is a cluster of M processors and the system is working, i.e., posesses
sufﬁcient capacity if K out of the M processors are active, which means that both
software and hardware are working. To represent this scenario, each state is labelled
by four numbers {n, i, j,k}, where n is the number of active processors, i the number
of processors down due to hardware failures, j the number of processors down due to
software failures, and k the state of the O&M functionality (k = 1 if O&M mistake,
k= 0, if not). Figure 9 shows the outgoing transitions from a generic state {n, i, j,k}.
The main characteristics of the model are:
• single repairman for a hardware failure;
• load dependency of software failure when the system is working, λS(n) = λS/n,
where the meaning of λS is explained in more detail in Section 3.4;
• load independence of software failure when the system has failed, λS(n) = λS;
• when the entire system fails, only processors failed due to hardware failures will
will be down until the system recovers.
3.3.4 Using inclusion-exclusion principle to evaluate the system availability
The inclusion-exclusion principle is a technique to obtain the elements in the union
of ﬁnite sets. Using the inclusion-exclusion principle on the structure function, we
can write the system availability as the probability of the union of all minimal paths:
AS = P
(
n⋃
i=1
Qi
)
=
n
∑
k=1
(−1)k−1 ∑
/0
=I⊆[n]
|I|=k
P
(⋂
i∈I
Qi
)
, (4)
where {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qn} is the set of all minimal paths, and P(Qi) is the probability
of set Qi.
127
n+1,i-1,j,0
n+j+1,i-1,0,1 n+j-1,i+1,0,1n+j,i,0,1
n,i,j,0 n-1,i+1,j,0
n-1,i,j+1,0
n+1,i,j-1,0n+j,i,0,0 n,i+1,j-1,0
μH (n+ j)λH
μO
λO
jλH
nλH
λS
μH
jμS
Fig. 9 Generic states of the model of SDN controller
To compute the probability of the intersection of minimal paths, we need to know
the availability of each network element. To this emd, we can calculate the element
availability by using the proposed Markov models.
3.4 Numerical evaluation
To evaluate the availability of traditional networks, we consider the typical parame-
ters in Table 3, which are inspired by and taken from several studies [5, 15, 23].
All SDN parameters are expressed relative to the parameters for the traditional
network (Table 3). The parameters for the SDN switch you ﬁnd in Table 4 and for
the SDN controller in Table 5. The parameters αH , αS, and αO are proportionality
factors that are studied in this example.
Using these parameters in the models described in this section, we can com-
pare the (un)availability of traditional IP and SDN networks. Failures with the same
cause, have the same intensities in both models. However, we assume that the soft-
ware on an SDN switch/router will be much less complicated than on a traditional
IP router, and we have set the failure rate to zero, for the sake of simplicity. In
an SDN controller, all failure rates are N-times larger than in the traditional net-
work, where N is the number of network nodes. This is because we assume that the
centralised system needs roughly the same processing capacity and amount of hard-
ware. Therefore, the failure intensity is assumed to be proportional to N, and of the
128
Table 3 Model parameters for the IP network
intensity [time] description
1/λL = 4 [months] expected time to next link failure
1/μL = 15 [minutes] expected time to link repair
1/λdF = 6 [months] expected time to next permanent forwarding hardware failure
1/μdF = 12 [hours] expected time to repair permanent forwarding hardware
1/λdFt = 1 [week] expected time to next transient forwarding hardware failure
1/μdFt = 3 [minutes] expected time to repair transient forwarding hardware
1/λdC = 6 [months] expected time to next control hardware failure
1/μdC = 12 [hours] expected time to repair control hardware
1/λdS = 1 [week] expected time to next software failure
1/μdS = 3 [minutes] expected time to software repair
1/λdO = 1 [month] expected time to next O&M failure
1/μdO = 3 [hours] expected time to O&M repair
C = 0.97 coverage factor
Table 4 Model parameters for SDN switch/router
intensity description
λF = λdF intensity of permanent hardware failures
μF = μdF repair intensity of permanent hardware failures
λFt = λdFt intensity of transient hardware failures
μFt = μdFt restoration intensity after transient hardware failures
λsS = 0 intensity of software failure
Table 5 Model parameters for SDN controller
intensity description
λH = αH λdC N/K intensity of hardware failures
μH = μdC hardware repair intensity
λS = αS λdS N intensity of software failures
μS = μdS restoration intensity after software failure
λO = αO λdO N intensity of O&M failures
μO = μO rectiﬁcation intensity after O&M failures
same order of magnitude as the total failure intensity of the traditional distributed
IP router system.
The results of a numerical example are given in the plot in Figure 10. The overall
unavailability, i.e., the probability that not all cities in Section 3.2 are connected
(for SDN this requires also a connection to a controller) is given for different values
of αO. The ﬁgure shows that the unavailability increases with about one order of
magnitude when αO changes in the range from 0.1 to 1. The sensitivity of αH and
αS are far less signiﬁcant. This indicates that O&M failures are dominant and most
critical to the dependability of SDN.
As a preliminary conclusion from this study, it seems as the use of commod-
ity hardware and centralised control has a moderate effect on the availability of
the overall network. However, the O&M failures and software/logical failures that
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Fig. 10 Unavailability of SDN (solid line) and of traditional network (dashed line) by varying αO
(αH = 1 αS = 1)
causes a control cluster to fail are very important in order to improve the depend-
ability when changing from the traditional distributed IP network to SDN.
4 Example: Restoration in Smart Grid
The purpose of this example is to show how the automation of process steps changes
the dependability of a system. The system under consideration is a power grid and
we focus on the restoration process after a physical failure.
A power grid is a critical infrastructure and its reliability is critical to the smooth
operation of a resilient society. Power grids are due to undergo modernisation in the
coming years. This next generation power grid is commonly called the smart grid.
One of the biggest differences compared to the current grid is additional monitoring
information about the current state of the grid and new control abilities throughout
the grid. These improvements allow the introduction of more automated processes
with the goal of increasing the overall dependability of the system.
This is the starting point of our example. We model the restoration process with
and without automation and conduct a dependability analysis. Our results show that
the introduction of automation yields beneﬁts like a reduction of down time, but it
also extends the system into a compound and more complex system. This system
has new failure modes as the automation may malfunction and thus, without taking
the appropriate measures, may partially negate beneﬁts.
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4.1 Problem Description
The power grid (PG) has traditionally contained only a few monitoring and control-
ling devices distributed throughout the grid. Mostly they are deployed in the higher
voltage levels. In the lower voltage levels monitoring and controlling devices are,
depending on the country, virtually absent. In case of a failure a distributed and
autonomously working protection system automatically disconnects a whole pro-
tection zone by opening a circuit breaker, causing a power outage to all customers
inside this protection zone.
The future power grid, the so called smart grid, will possess monitoring and
control systems widely deployed throughout the power grid. These devices detect
failures automatically and send failure diagnostics to a central control, operation,
and management system. The central system then attempts to isolate the failure by
opening other circuit breakers closer to the failure and connecting the rest of the
protection zone again to the grid. It is assumed that the power grid at this voltage
level has an open ring topology that allows reconnection to the non-isolated parts
after a single failure. Figure 11 shows a protection zone in the current PG and in
the smart grid, consisting of three PG nodes and two protection devices represented
by large squares. The small squares represent new circuit breakers controlled by the
centralised control system.
In the following, we study how the introduction of detection and isolation au-
tomation changes the characteristics of the restoration process. More precisely, we
study the downtime and the energy not supplied (ENS), which is the accumulated
energy that could not be delivered due to outages, i.e., down time weighted with the
load during the outages. Both the lines and the PG nodes can fail, but only larger
outages that require a repair crew to go on cite are considered.
logic
PG 
node
PG 
node
PG 
node
(a) Current power grid: no automated
detection and controlling.
add automation logic
logic
PG 
node
logic
PG 
node
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(b) Smart grid: added logic for auto-
mated detection and controlling (dis-
tributed and centralised).
Fig. 11 Schematic view of a protection zone in the current power grid and smart grid.
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4.2 Modelling
The restoration process of a power grid failure consists of two stages containing a
total of six phases, as shown in Figure 12. The phases are:
Detection Time period between a failure and its detection in the monitoring sys-
tem. It is assumed that the protection system disconnects the protection zone
containing the failure immediately after the incident. In reality, there is a short
delay of several milliseconds. The disconnection leads to a black out in the whole
protection zone.
Remote Isolation The failed element is isolated more precisely, either automati-
cally by the central system or manually by a controller at the control centre. The
rest of the protection zone is powered up again.
Administrative Failure diagnostics from the monitoring devices are evaluated,
the recovery is planned, and a repair crew is assigned.
Logistic Repair crew is equipped with the necessary material and moves to the
incident location.
Fault Localization Precise localisation of the failure, both geographically and in
the system.
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Repair Actual repair, all isolated network elements are restored to normal opera-
tion.
The difference between the current power grid and the smart grid lies mainly
in Stage I. In the current power grid, detection occurs manually, i.e., the failure
is detected by a controller or through a call by a consumer. There are no remote
isolation capabilities, so this phase is skipped. Throughout the entire restoration
phase, the whole protection zone is without power in the model in Figure 12. This
is denoted by pentagonal states.
In the smart grid, the distributed devices detect the failure automatically and send
an alarm together with fault diagnostics to the central system. Now, the failure is
isolated automatically and remotely from the central system and Stage II begins. If
a PG node is affected by the failure, and now isolated, then the system proceeds
to state 8. If only a line is isolated then it proceeds to state 4. In the ﬁrst case,
there are still consumers without power. In the latter case, the power supply has
been reinstated to all consumers. This difference is indicated in the model by the
different shapes of the states. In both cases, the number of consumers affected is
smaller than in the current system. An additional difference is the sojourn time of
the fault localisation phase. It is shorter for the smart grid, as the detection devices
provide fault diagnostics that accelerate this phase.
So far, we have described the process during operation without any failures in the
new system. In the following, we consider failures in the information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) subsystem used for the automation. It is assumed that all
the other systems, e.g., the protection system, work perfectly. The following failures
in the detection system are considered:
• false positive detection failure: there is no failure, but the detection system re-
ports one.
• false negative detection failure: there is a failure but the detection system does
not notice it.
A false positive detection failure is modelled with a new transition out of state 1
with an additional failure intensity leading to state 19. The failure is detected by the
system as before. If the system discovers the false positive failure the restoration
process is interrupted and the system goes back to state 1, otherwise it continues.
A false negative detection failure is modelled by splitting the transition from
state 1 to 2 into two, pointing one to state 18 and weighting the rate by the
false negative probability pFN. The new state 18 indicates a manual detection be-
cause of the non-detection in the system. The isolation is then done manually by an
operator. If the isolation is successful it proceeds as before either in state 4 or 8 de-
pending on whether a line or a node is affected. If the isolation is not successful the
entire protection zone remains without power for Stage II of the restoration process.
In the isolation system, the following failures are considered:
• isolation failure: there is a failure, but isolation is unsuccessful because of prob-
lems with communication or systems. The whole protection zone remains un-
powered.
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• spontaneous isolation failure: there is no failure, but a network element is
falsely isolated by the system.
An isolation failure is modelled in the system by splitting the transitions from
the isolation states 3, 12, 13, 20, and 22 into two, and weighting the rate by the
probability of an isolation failure pIF, except for the transitions from 13, which uses
a higher probability pIFC, because the system already suffered one ICT failure and
is in a critical state.
A spontaneous isolation failure is modelled with a new transition out of state 1
with an additional failure intensity leading to state 21. The failure is detected by the
system as before. If the system discovers that the failure originates from the isolation
system and not the power grid it restores the system (state 23) and goes back to the
up state, otherwise it continues.
4.3 Numerical Example
All event times in the system are assumed to be exponentially distributed with the
following expected values. The event times are based on data for longer outages
from the Norwegian regulator [21].
Table 6 Model parameters for the IP network
intensity [time] description
1/λ = 4 [months] expected time to next PG failure inside this protection zone
1/λFP = 6 [months] expected time to next false positive detection failure
1/λSIF = 12 [months] expected time to next spontaneous isolation failure
1/μD,M = 20 [minutes] expected manual detection time
1/μD,A = 1 [minutes] expected automatic detection time
1/μI,M = 5 [minutes] expected manual isolation time
1/μI,A = 1 [minutes] expected automatic isolation time
1/μA = 5 [minutes] expected time in administrative state
1/μL = 15 [minutes] expected time in logistics state
1/μFL,M = 20 [minutes] expected manual fault localisation time, i.e. without fault diag-
nostics from the detection devices.
1/μFL,A = 10 [minutes] expected automatic fault localisation time
1/μR = 10 [minutes] expected repair time
1/μrestore = 10 [minutes] expected restoration time for discovered spontaneous isolation
failure
pnode = 0.1 probability of failure affecting a node
pFN = 0.01 probability of false negative detection failure
pD,FP = 0.2 probability of discovering a false positive in isolation phase
pD,SIF = 0.2 probability of discovering a spontaneous isolation failure in iso-
lation phase
pIF = 0.1 probability of unsuccessful isolation
pIFC = 0.5 probability of unsuccessful isolation (ICT failure)
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Fig. 13 Mean values per outage
First, we compute MDT and the mean time between failure (MTBF) for the
model in Figure 12. All states in which there is a power outage are considered as
down states, i.e. all states but the round states. MTBF is computed with
MTBF= 1/( ∑
i∈ΩUp
∑
j∈ΩDown
λi j pi)
where pi is the steady state probability of being in state i, λi j is the transition rate
from state i to j, and ΩUp and ΩDown are the sets of up and down states respectively.
MDT is computed by MDT =U ·MTBF, where the unavailability U is computed
with U = ∑i∈ΩDown pi.
The results are presented in Figure 13(a). Four scenarios are computed:
1. current system, which is today’s power grid system
2. new system,
3. new system with perfect ICT, i.e. pFN = 0, pIF = 0, λFP = 0, λSIF = 0, and
4. new system with a permanent isolation failure, i.e. pIF = 1.
The MDT of the new system is smaller than the current system, due to the reduced
event times. However, when considering the new system with imperfect ICT, the
MTBF is reduced as well. Hence, the reduction in MDT comes at the expence of
more frequent failures. In case of a permanent isolation failure, the MDT increases
signiﬁcantly but is still shorter than the current system, as the time in the detection
phase is reduced.
MDT gives a one-sided picture of the situation, as the down states have dif-
ferent consequences for the system. The consequences are marked in the model
with three different shapes. To incorporate this information, we use the concept of
Energy Not Supplied (ENS). ENS is used in outage reports in power engineering and
plays a central role in the Norwegian regulation framework [13]. As the name sug-
gests, it indicates the amount of energy that could not be supplied due to an outage.
For our example, we assume that each PG node has a constant energy consumption
of 1 kWh per minute. In the pentagonal states, three nodes are down. Therefore, the
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ENS is 3 kWh per minute. The octagonal states have an ENS of 1 kWh per minute
and the round states 0 kWh per minute.
We use a Markov reward model to obtain the instantaneous ENS e(t), i.e., the
energy that cannot be delivered at time instance t. First, state 1 is deﬁned to be ab-
sorbing. When the system is in steady state, a down period starts in state j ∈ ΩDown
with probability p j(0) = MTBF ·∑i∈ΩUp, j∈ΩDown λi j pi. Now the instantaneous ENS
is computed with e(t) = ∑i∈ΩDown pi(t) · ei, where pi(t) and ei are the instantaneous
state probability and the energy consumption per minute of state i respectively.
Integrating e(t) over time yields Mean ENS per outage =
∫ ∞
0 e(t), which is plot-
ted in Figure 13(b). The MTBF is the same as in Figure 13(a). Compared to MDT,
the improvement achieved by automation is even larger in this metric because ENS
weighs the downtime according to the consequences. However, this is not true for
the case with a permanent isolation failure because the down states are all pentago-
nal like in the current system.
Finally, we extend downtime-frequency curves [19] to characterise how the total
ENS per year of all failures in this protection zone depends on the down time. Let us
denote the total ENS per year with ENStotal. Counting only the ENS of those outages
that are longer than time t0, it becomes time dependent and is computed by:
ENStotal(t0) =
d(t0)
MTBF
(
∫ ∞
t0
e(t)
d(t0)
dt+ e∗(t0))
where (MTBF)−1 is the number of failures per year, d(t) the probability that the
system is down at time t, computed by d(t) = ∑ j=ΩDown p j(t), and e
∗(t0) is the
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energy not supplied up to time t0 given that the system has not yet been restored.
In order to compute e∗(t0), the Markov model is modiﬁed so there is no transition
out of the subspace formed by ΩDown because no complete restoration takes place
before t0 by deﬁnition. The transition rates are deﬁned as
λ ∗i j =
{
λi j if i, j ∈ ΩDown
0 otherwise
The initial state vector of the system is p∗(0) = p(0), as before. Thus, p∗(t) and
e∗(t) are computed in the same way as explained above.
The results for ENStotal(t0) are shown in Figure 14. In the current system, the
relation between downtimes and ENStotal is approximately linear during the ﬁrst 50
minutes. In the new system, however, there is a drop in the beginning, indicating that
short down times contribute disproportionately to ENStotal. The drop corresponds
to Stage I of the model. After that, there are either no consumers without power
or the system is in the restoration process with the octagonal or pentagonal states
and behaves similarly to the current system but at a reduced level. In the case of a
permanent isolation failure, ENStotal(t0) is larger than in the current system for t0 <
55 minutes, mainly because of the shorter MTBF. For larger t0, this is compensated
for by the effect of shorter MDT due to automatic detection. The results show that
the automation possesses signiﬁcant potential to reduce ENStotal. However, in case
of longer failures, this may become a disadvantage.
4.4 Observations from the example
The automation of the detection and isolation phase is introduced with the goal of
reducing MDT and mean ENS per failure. However, as the new supporting ICT sys-
tems may fail as well, the failure characteristics of the system are changed. First, the
MTBF decreases signiﬁcantly, i.e. the number of failures per year increases. Second,
outages are on average shorter, and short outages become an important factor when
the total ENS per year is considered. Third, in case of a longer permanent failure
in the ICT system, the consequences increase temporarily and, thereby, adversely
affect of the beneﬁt of automation.
The introduction of automation should, therefore, be accompanied by two cru-
cial steps. First, additional training is necessary for the staff covering the new fail-
ure characteristics and failures, including the scenario of a malfunctioning ICT sys-
tem [16]. Second, it is necessary to acquire the skills to maintain and quickly restore
the new ICT system to assure a high dependability and thus achieve the positive ef-
fects for which the automation was originally introduced.
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5 Concluding remarks
The focus of this chapter has been the increasing complexity in digital ecosystems,
which are system-of-systems of ICT infrastructures or interact with other critical
infrastructures such as water distribution, transportation (e.g. Intelligent Transport
Systems), and Smart Power Grid control. There is a lack of theoretical foundation
to control the societal and per service dependability of ICT infrastructure in the dig-
ital ecosystem. No foundation has been established for optimisation, consolidated
management, and provision of this infrastructure, neither from a public regulatory
perspective, nor from the perspective of groups of autonomous (commercially) co-
operating providers.
More ICT based operation support and control functions are included to manage
digital ecosystems, with the objective to reduce the frequency and consequences of
daily events. However, it is important to be aware of the potential side-effects that
might increase the frequency and consequences of critical and catastrophic failure
events. The reason is that the added support enables interaction and integration of
even more complex and heterogeneous systems, changes workﬂows in organisa-
tions, and ICT based support systems may fail.
To enhance and improve the operation and maintainability of complex digital
ecosystems, new functionality is added and/or moved and centralised. Two exam-
ples are considered in this chapter: (i) Software Deﬁned Networking, which sepa-
rates the control logic from the forwarding functionality and moves the logic from
the distributed network elements to a virtual centralised controller, (ii) Smart Grid
integrates ICT and power grids which make them more interdependent. Here, new
functionality is added both in a distributed manner to enable observability and con-
trollability of the components in the power grid and centralised in the control centres
to implement the control.
How the changes in complexity affect the overall system dependability is less
understood, contains potential vulnerabilities, and poses new managements chal-
lenges. This chapter emphazises the importance of being able to model ICT infras-
tructures. A model must describe both the structure and behaviour of the physi-
cal and logical information and network infrastructure, including the services pro-
vided. Furthermore, through the modelling phases, it should be explained how
resilience engineering can be applied to manage the robustness and survivabil-
ity of the ICT infrastructure. This is the research focus of the research lab on
Quantitative modelling of dependability and performance, NTNU QUAM Lab
(www.item.ntnu.no/research/quam/start).
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
Details on Downtime-Frequency
Curve and ENS Extension
This appendix gives more information about the formulas and calculations of the
downtime frequency curves and its extension used in Paper E. First, I explain the
formula for the downtime frequency curve, then I explain how it can be adjusted
to include the energy not supplied.
A.1 Downtime Frequency Curve
We assume a stationary system with ﬁnite downtimes. The downtime distribution
is deﬁned as
d(t) = P(DT ≥ t) (A.1)
i.e. it gives the probability that the downtime (DT) is longer than time t. As a
side note, if we assume that no additional failures happen during the downtime,
than this is the same as the instantaneous unavailability u(t) after an outage, which
starts with u(0) = 1 and gives the probability that the system is not yet repaired at
time t. The mean downtime (MDT) is computed by
MDT=
∫ ∞
0
d(t)dt (A.2)
Additionally it is known that
U = Λ ·MDT= 1
MTBF
·MDT (A.3)
where U denotes the steady state unavailability of the system, Λ the failure inten-
sity of the system and MTBF the mean time between failure.
The downtime frequency curve shows how much outages longer than t0 con-
tribute to the unavailability. In other words, it also computes the unavailability,
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Figure A.1: Calculation of MDTt0 .
but includes only outages lasting longer than t0. In order to compute it, we ﬁrst
compute the MDTt0 , i.e. the MDT for outages lasting longer than t0, and then we
compute Ut0 , the unavailability of the system, when only outages lasting longer
than t0 are considered.
As seen in equation A.2 the MDT is computed by integrating d(t) from 0 to ∞,
i.e. we integrate all downtimes. To compute MDTt0 we take only those downtimes
lasting longer than t0. In order to do that, we have to remove the short downtimes
and then scale the distribution up, so that the new distribution dt0(t) starts with 1,
i.e. dt0(0) = 1. dt0(t) becomes:
dt0(t) =
{
d(t)/d(t0) if t > t0
1 else
Figure A.1 illustrates the function. The solid line shows d(t) and the dashed
line dt0(t). The colored areas show the unscaled integral of dt0(t). Integrating the
function yields:
MDTt0 = t0+
∫ ∞
t0
d(t)
d(t0)
dt (A.4)
If we consider only a subset of all failures, in this case only failures last-
ing longer than t0, then the frequency of failures is lower than when considering
all failures. The downtime distribution gives us the probability that failures last
longer than t0 so we can compute the new frequency by
Λt0 = Λ ·d(t0)
144
And with that we can computeUt0 , the unavailability of the system, when only
outages longer than t0 are considered:
Ut0 = Λ ·d(t0)(t0+
∫ ∞
t0
d(t)
d(t0)
dt) (A.5)
A.2 ENS Frequency Curve
The extension with the energy not supplied (ENS) follows the same reasoning as
above. We start with the formula to compute the mean ENS per outage which is
done by
MeanENS=
∫ ∞
0
e(t)dt
and extend it to get the formula for mean ENS per outages longer than t0:
MeanENSt0 = e
∗(t0)+
∫ ∞
t0
e(t)
d(t0)
dt
As in equation A.4 d(t0) is the scaling factor from the downtime distribution.
e∗(t0) is the energy not supplied up to t0 caused by only the failures that last
longer than t0. To calculate it, we need to use the Markov model as explained in
the paper, i.e. remove all links from the down states to the up states and compute
the accumulated cost until t0 by
The total ENS costs are then computed by multiplying it with the frequency
of these failures as in equation A.5:
ENStotal(t0) =
d(t0)
MTBF
(e∗(t0)+
∫ ∞
t0
e(t)
d(t0)
dt)
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